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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain

verfasst von : Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Erschienen in: Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the possibility that some well-known voting procedures are vulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox even in preference profiles that are characterized by a restricted domain where a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in each disjoint subset of voters but not in their union. Our focus is on 15 voting procedures known to be vulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox in unrestricted domains. These procedures include 10 Condorcet-consistent and 5 Condorcet-non-consistent rules. The former are, however, only briefly touched upon because their invulnerability to the Inconsistency paradox in the restricted domain is obvious.

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Fußnoten
1
This is the preference ordering of the majority of the voters. The voters constituting the majority may not be the same for all pairs of candidates.
 
2
The description of all the 20 voting procedures analyzed in this chapter appears in Chap. 2.
 
3
For an explanation why these four procedures are generally invulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox see Felsenthal and Nurmi (2018, Chaps. 4–5).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Felsenthal, D. S., & Nurmi, H. (2018). Voting procedures for electing a single candidate: Proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.CrossRef Felsenthal, D. S., & Nurmi, H. (2018). Voting procedures for electing a single candidate: Proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Young, H. P. (1974). An axiomatization of Borda’s rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 43–52.CrossRef Young, H. P. (1974). An axiomatization of Borda’s rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 43–52.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain
verfasst von
Dan S. Felsenthal
Hannu Nurmi
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_4