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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

IoT-Friendly AKE: Forward Secrecy and Session Resumption Meet Symmetric-Key Cryptography

verfasst von : Gildas Avoine, Sébastien Canard, Loïc Ferreira

Erschienen in: Computer Security – ESORICS 2019

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

With the rise of the Internet of Things and the growing popularity of constrained end-devices, several security protocols are widely deployed or strongly promoted (e.g., Sigfox, LoRaWAN, NB-IoT). Based on symmetric-key functions, these protocols lack in providing security properties usually ensured by asymmetric schemes, in particular forward secrecy. We describe a 3-party authenticated key exchange protocol solely based on symmetric-key functions (regarding the computations done between the end-device and the back-end network) which guarantees forward secrecy. Our protocol enables session resumption (without impairing security). This allows saving communication and computation cost, and is particularly advantageous for low-resources end-devices. Our 3-party protocol can be applied in a real-case IoT deployment (i.e., involving numerous end-devices and servers) such that the latter inherits from the security properties of the protocol. We give a concrete instantiation of our key exchange protocol, and formally prove its security.

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Fußnoten
1
Any other \(\hbox {2-AKE}\) protocol can be used, as long as it provides the same properties as SAKE, but we are not aware of other such protocols.
 
2
The case where XS is the initiator is very similar.
 
3
The detailed proof is given in the extended version of the paper [3].
 
4
The proof of SAKE-R is similar to that of SAKE and is given in the extended version of the paper.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
IoT-Friendly AKE: Forward Secrecy and Session Resumption Meet Symmetric-Key Cryptography
verfasst von
Gildas Avoine
Sébastien Canard
Loïc Ferreira
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29962-0_22

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