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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Back to Massey: Impressively Fast, Scalable and Tight Security Evaluation Tools

verfasst von : Marios O. Choudary, P. G. Popescu

Erschienen in: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2017

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

None of the existing rank estimation algorithms can scale to large cryptographic keys, such as 4096-bit (512 bytes) RSA keys. In this paper, we present the first solution to estimate the guessing entropy of arbitrarily large keys, based on mathematical bounds, resulting in the fastest and most scalable security evaluation tool to date. Our bounds can be computed within a fraction of a second, with no memory overhead, and provide a margin of only a few bits for a full 128-bit AES key.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Making Password Authenticated Key Exchange Suitable for Resource-Constrained Industrial Control Devices

Nächstes Kapitel Fast Leakage Assessment

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

On a Intel i5 4-core CPU at 3.2 GHz, with 16 GB RAM.

The only limitation being the numerical representation used by the computing machine.

For the case of the real dataset, we first applied a Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack [3] to determine which is the leakage sample that leaks the most and then used this single sample in a template attack.

Unprofiled side-channel attacks such as CPA often return a score vector, e.g. based on the correlation coefficient \(\rho _k\in [-1, 1]\) for each possible candidate value \(k\), which might not work very well with rank estimation methods. However, even in the unprofiled setting is possible to use other methods, such as linear regression on the fly [15] to obtain pseudo-probabilities that work well with rank estimation algorithms.

This measure assumes that an evaluator knows which is the correct key.

We assume all key bytes are equally likely, in the absence of leakage information.

There are other ways to estimate the conditional entropy, including several variants of the Monte Carlo method. Here we focused only on the two most popular such variants.

While this is not as tight as other rank estimation algorithms, we shall see later that our bounds stay tight even when using a large number of target subkey bytes and that they are always sound (due to the mathematical demonstration), while existing rank estimations can provide estimation and calculation errors.

We used MATLAB R2015b.

Computed using symbolic variables and variable precision arithmetic features of MATLAB, within 13 seconds per iteration.

However, the computation of our bounds would work equally well for any set of lists of probabilities.

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Titel: Back to Massey: Impressively Fast, Scalable and Tight Security Evaluation Tools
verfasst von: Marios O. Choudary
P. G. Popescu
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2017
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66786-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-66787-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_18

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