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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. The Making of the Modern Political Order

verfasst von : Berhanu Abegaz

Erschienen in: A Tributary Model of State Formation

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

A modern political order stands on three interlocked legs that are hard to put in place simultaneously: a centralized state authority to contain widespread private violence, the rule of law to restrain abuse by powerholders, and an acceptable mechanism for the accountability of the rulers to the ruled. Precolonial political orders emerged in an environment where external threats loomed large, internal political fragmentation and contestation were high, and a weak incentive to build a solid fiscal base to support a viable state. The forms state formation assumed varied widely across time and among world regions. We need to identify, without falling into the trap of historicism or Eurocentrism, the conditions under which a given pathway can lead to the emergence of a viable modern political order.

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Nächstes Kapitel The Tributary-Civilizational State

Haldon (1993: 13) rightly notes: “Description alone explains neither how social formations work, nor how change occurs—although the effects of these processes can be observed. In short, it cannot reveal by itself the structural and causal relationships referred to already. And history is, if anything, about explaining change, not merely describing the fact that it happens.”

State building, being highly contestable, has until World War II involved incredible external violence among warring national states, city-states, and other principalities. This would explain why war abroad and civil strife at home have long been the preoccupation of state builders. Historically, wars were financed by a combination of tax revenue and public debt (against future revenue and plunder) whose mix and coerciveness depended on the nature of the economic base, be it based on capital, land, or labor (Tilly 1975, 1990; Parrott 2012; Giustozzi 2011). The project of centralizing power and ensuring monopoly over the instruments of violence was, therefore, costly and protracted. However, it permitted a degree of separation of the private sphere from the public sphere thereby paving the way for sustained civilian control of the specialists of violence.

It would be useful to note here that by “institutions” we mean norms and codified rules which serve societal needs for order, efficiency, and accountability. To be effective, they need to be backed by the requisite organizations with the mandate and the capability to enforce them as impartially as possible (NWW 2012). Economic, political, and social institutions also interact in complex ways to produce changing mixes of predation and shared growth in the economic realm, and coercion and freedom in the political realm. While disentangling random changes from systemic changes is difficult, we do know that the impediments to collective action tend to perpetuate inefficient and inequitable institutions.

Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2014: 63) make the interesting point that Marx’s ideas about the state proved enormously influential while being insubstantial in an especially dangerous way: “It was not just that Marx had precious little to say about how you construct government. He was wrong to argue that political forms do not matter. There was a huge difference between a liberal London, where Marx could while away his time in libraries, and authoritarian Berlin, where he was a wanted man. Marx also ignored the fact that the state could be an interest group in its own right, as it was to become, in extreme form, in the countries that claimed his blessing. But his bigger failure lay in his refusal to come to terms with Hobbes’s great insight that a state is necessary for the peaceable conduct of all human affairs.”

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Titel: The Making of the Modern Political Order
verfasst von: Berhanu Abegaz
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: A Tributary Model of State Formation
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75779-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-75780-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75780-3_1

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