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Erschienen in:
2007 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols
verfasst von : Han Gao, Chiara Bodei, Pierpaolo Degano, Hanne Riis Nielson
Erschienen in: Advances in Computer Science – ASIAN 2007. Computer and Network Security
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We present a reduction semantics for the
LySa
calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.