2008 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Proving Tight Security for Rabin-Williams Signatures
verfasst von : Daniel J. Bernstein
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2008
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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This paper proves “tight security in the random-oracle model relative to factorization” for the lowest-cost signature systems available today: every hash-generic signature-forging attack can be converted, with negligible loss of efficiency and effectiveness, into an algorithm to factor the public key. The most surprising system is the “fixed unstructured
B
= 0 Rabin-Williams” system, which has a tight security proof despite hashing unrandomized messages.