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Erschienen in:
2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round AES in the Single-Key Setting
verfasst von : Patrick Derbez, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Jérémy Jean
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2013
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this paper, we revisit meet-in-the-middle attacks on
AES
in the single-key model and improve on Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir attacks at
Asiacrypt
2010. We present the best attack on 7 rounds of
AES-128
where data/time/memory complexities are below 2
100
. Moreover, we are able to extend the number of rounds to reach attacks on 8 rounds for both
AES-192
and
AES-256
. This gives the best attacks on those two versions with a data complexity of 2
107
chosen-plaintexts, a memory complexity of 2
96
and a time complexity of 2
172
for
AES-192
and 2
196
for
AES-256
. Finally, we also describe the best attack on 9 rounds of
AES-256
with 2
120
chosen plaintexts and time and memory complexities of 2
203
. All these attacks have been found by carefully studying the number of reachable multisets in Dunkelman et al. attacks.