2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Improved Side Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography
verfasst von : Johannes Blömer, Peter Günther, Gennadij Liske
Erschienen in: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Several known invasive and non-invasive attacks against pairing algorithms only work if the second but not if the first argument of the pairing is the secret. In this paper we extend some of these attacks to the case where the first argument is the secret. Hence we conclude that positioning the secret as the first argument of the pairing does not necessarily improve the security against (SCAs), as it sometimes has been suggested.