2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Feasibility and Infeasibility of Secure Computation with Malicious PUFs
verfasst von : Dana Dachman-Soled, Nils Fleischhacker, Jonathan Katz, Anna Lysyanskaya, Dominique Schröder
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
A recent line of work has explored the use of
physically uncloneable functions (PUFs)
for secure computation, with the goals of (1) achieving universal composability without (additional) setup, and/or (2) obtaining unconditional security (i.e., avoiding complexity-theoretic assumptions). Initial work assumed that all PUFs, even those created by an attacker, are honestly generated. Subsequently, researchers have investigated models in which an adversary can create
malicious
PUFs with arbitrary behavior. Researchers have considered both malicious PUFs that might be stateful, as well as malicious PUFs that can have arbitrary behavior but are guaranteed to be stateless.
We settle the main open questions regarding secure computation in the malicious-PUF model:
We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious)
stateful
PUFs.
We show that universally composable two-party computation is possible if the attacker is limited to creating (malicious)
stateless
PUFs. Our protocols are simple and efficient, and do not require any cryptographic assumptions.