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Erschienen in:
2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Securing a Compiler Transformation
verfasst von : Chaoqiang Deng, Kedar S. Namjoshi
Erschienen in: Static Analysis
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Abstract
A compiler can be correct and yet be insecure. That is, a compiled program may have the same input-output behavior as the original, and yet leak more information. An example is the commonly applied optimization which removes dead (i.e., useless) stores. It is shown that deciding a posteriori whether a new leak has been introduced as a result of eliminating dead stores is difficult: it is PSPACE-hard for finite-state programs and undecidable in general. In contrast, deciding the correctness of dead store removal is in polynomial time. In response to the hardness result, a sound but approximate polynomial-time algorithm for secure dead store elimination is presented and proved correct. Furthermore, it is shown that for several other compiler transformations, security follows from correctness.