4. Transparency

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 563ff.

Ibid, para 573ff.

Ibid, paras 564, 576ff.

The Market Abuse Directive (MAD), Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (MAD) [2003] OJ L96/16, covered only parts of the energy market as it was designed for financial markets. Thus, physical energy products were not covered at all and derivatives were covered only if they were admitted for trading on regulated markets. The MAD has now been replaced by the Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC [2014] OJ L173/1, and the Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (Market Abuse Directive) [2014] OJ L173/179. With regard to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (MiFID) [2004] OJ L145/1, the majority of energy wholesale firms benefitted from exemptions for commodity firms and were not considered as MiFID investment firms. Thus, they escaped reporting obligations under MiFID.

Council of European Energy Regulators, ‘Pilot Project for an Energy Trade Data Reporting Scheme’ Final Report, 4 May 2011, 11 <www.​energy-regulators.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​PUBLICATIONS/​CEER_​PAPERS/​Cross-Sectoral/​2011/​C11-WMF-11-03a_​FinalReport-ETDRS-I_​4-May-2011.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency [2011] OJ L326/1 (REMIT).

‘Wholesale energy products’ are defined in Art 2(4) REMIT.

Recital 17, Art 7 paras 1–2 REMIT.

Art 1 para 2, Art 7 para 2 REMIT.

Art 8 para 1 REMIT. See also ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ Ref: E10-ENM-05-01, 8 September 2010, 3 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​CONSULT/​CLOSED%20​PUBLIC%20​CONSULTATIONS/​ELECTRICITY/​Comitology%20​Guideline%20​Electricity%20​Transparency/​CD/​E10-ENM-05-01_​FEDT%20​IIA_​8-Sept-2010.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Régine Feltkamp and Cécile Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ OGEL 5 (2013) 31 <www.​ogel.​org/​article.​asp?​key=​3397> accessed 1 December 2015.

Odd-Harald Wasenden, ‘The Nordic Electricity Market – A Mature International Market and Power Exchange’ in Martha M Roggenkamp and François Boisseleau (eds), The Regulation of Power Exchanges in Europe (Energy and Law Series, vol 2, Intersentia 2005) 60; Régine Feltkamp and Cécile Musialski, ‘Electricity Markets and the Functioning of Spot Power Exchanges – A Belgian Perspective’ Revue de la Concurrence Belge, 2010 No 2, 6 <www.​philosophie-management.​com/​docs/​2010/​Feltkamp_​R_​and_​Musialski_​C_​-_​Electricity_​markets_​and_​the_​functioning_​of_​spot_​power_​exchanges_​-_​A_​Belgian_​perspective_​-_​article.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015; Commission, ‘Draft discussion paper by DG TREN on transparency and integrity of traded wholesale markets in electricity and gas’ 9 December 2009, 2 <http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20100723_​discussion_​paper_​on_​market_​transparency_​and_​integrity.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Directive 2009/72/EC (Chap. 2 n 109) Art 40; Directive 2009/73/EC (Chap. 2 n 109) Art 44.

Draft discussion paper by DG TREN on transparency and integrity of traded wholesale markets in electricity and gas (n 13) 2.

According to Art 10 REMIT the ACER has the obligation to share information it receives with competent national authorities.

Art 8 para 2 REMIT.

Art 8 para 5 REMIT. See also Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 30; ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11) 3.

Beyond that, there exists a rather weak monitoring duty for NRAs for ‘monitoring the level of transparency, including of wholesale prices, and ensuring compliance of electricity undertakings with transparency obligations’. See Art 37 para 1(i) Directive 2009/72/EC (n 109).

For electricity see the section below on Regulation 714/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109). For natural gas see Regulation 715/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109) in particular Arts 18, 19 and Annex I. Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 has been amended by the Commission’s decision of 24 August 2012. See Commission Decision of 24 August 2012 on amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks [2012] OJ L231/16. According to the decision ‘all data shall be made available as of 1 October 2013 on one Union-wide central platform, established by ENTSO-G on a cost-efficient basis’. All necessary data from individual gas TSOs is uploaded on the ENTSO-G transparency platform and made available to all market participants.

Art 15 para 6 Regulation 714/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109); Art 20 Regulation 715/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109).

Art 8 para 6 sentence 3 REMIT.

See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency [2014] OJ L363/121. According to the Implementing Regulation the reporting of reportable wholesale energy contracts admitted to trading at organised market places and of fundamental data from the ENTSOs central information transparency platforms should begin on 7 October 2015. The reporting of the remaining reportable wholesale energy contracts (OTC standard and non-standard supply contracts and transportation contracts) and of reportable fundamental data from TSOs, LSOs (LNG system operators) and SSOs (storage system operators) shall start on 7 April 2016. See also ACER, ‘REMIT: Manual of Procedures on transaction data, fundamental data and inside information reporting’ (30 September 2015) <www.​acer.​europa.​eu/​remit/​REMITATACER/​Data_​collection/​Pages/​default_​ORIGINAL.​aspx> accessed 1 December 2015.

See also Art 2(1)(b) REMIT. ‘For the purposes of this definition, “information” means: (b) information relating to the capacity and use of facilities for production, storage, consumption or transmission of electricity or natural gas or related to the capacity and use of LNG facilities, including planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities.’

ACER, ‘Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency’ (3rd edn, 29 October 2013) 27 <www.​acer.​europa.​eu/​remit/​Documents/​REMIT%20​ACER%20​Guidance%20​3rd%20​Edition_​FINAL.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Ibid. See also the definition of ‘inside information’ in Art 2(1) REMIT.

ACER, ‘Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency’ (n 25) 28.

Ibid 32.

Ibid.

Art 4 para 1 REMIT; ACER, ‘Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency’ (n 25) 28 ‘Regardless of whether indicative thresholds are applied by market participants, NRAs should ensure that market participants are aware that a planned or unplanned change in the capacity or output of any size at a facility for production, storage, consumption or transmission of natural gas or electricity may constitute inside information if it meets the criteria outlined in Article 2(1) of REMIT. It is up to market participants to judge whether information that they hold constitutes inside information and therefore needs to be made public.’

The ACER, however, in its Guidance on the application of REMIT seems to be fond of a more disaggregated publication. See ACER, ‘Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency’ (n 25) 43, and 44 on the issue of timely disclosure.

Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 32.

Bundeskartellamt, ‘Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung und -großhandel’ (Chap. 2 n 98) 285–286. With these arguments the German Federal Cartel Office welcomes the Market Transparency Body for electricity and gas wholesale trading (Markttransparenzstelle für den Großhandel mit Strom und Gas) called for by the Federal Government in Germany. The same arguments apply for the introduction of the REMIT.

Ibid 285.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid 166, 199. The German Federal Cartel Office noted that it was impossible to subject the data on marginal costs for all 340 generating units to a plausibility check. The possiblity should not be excluded, however, that undertakings have overstated their marginal costs. This could be a possible explanation for the fact that generating units were found to be selling electricity at times when, on account of the provided data on marginal costs, they were not ‘in the money’ (i.e. they could not attain a contribution margin).

The relevant benchmark for assessing the non-dispatch of generation units and excessive pricing can vary, however, depending on the conditions prevailing in each electricity wholesale market. See Sect. 3.​3.​2.​4.

Bundeskartellamt, ‘Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung und -großhandel’ (Chap. 2 n 98) 286. See also Viola von Wrede, Die Transparenz im börslichen Stromgroßhandel am Beispiel der European Energy Exchange (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierecht an der Universität zu Köln, Bd. 167, Nomos 2012) 46.

The current transparency platform of the ENTSO-E (European network of transmission system operators for electricity) can be found at <www.​entsoe.​net> accessed 1 December 2015. The transparency platform has been operational since 2006 when the ETSOVista platform was launched. Key operational and congestion management information about electricity transmission between Member States was made available for the first time on the ETSOVista platform. With the Regulation 714/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109), the ETSO (the Association of European Electricity Transmission System Operators) was succeeded by the ENTSO-E and the platform was renamed to ENTSO-E.​net platform.

Annex I, Section 5 Regulation 714/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109). In addition, according to Art 8 para 3(b) Regulation 714/2009, ENTSO-E ‘shall adopt a non-binding Community-wide ten-year network development plan, (Community-wide network development plan), including a European generation adequacy outlook, every two years’. The Network Development Plan should identify viable electricity transmission networks and regional interconnections relevant for commercial and security of supply purposes. See Recital 9 and Art 8 para 10 Regulation 714/2009. According to Art 8 para 3(f) Regulation 714/2009, ENTSO-E ‘shall [also] adopt annual summer and winter generation adequacy outlooks’. The aim of such reports is to provide information and forecasts on transmission capacity and consumption for the seasons ahead. This information may be also very useful for market participants to predict long-term shortcomings of the market, thus allowing a better understanding of price formation in the long-run. See Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 33.

More detailed transparency requirements, including on generation, existed in ERGEG, ‘Guidelines of Good Practice on Information Management and Transparency in Electricity Markets (GGP-IMT)’ Ref: E05-EMK-06-10, 2 August 2006 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​PUBLICATIONS/​CEER_​PAPERS/​Electricity/​2006/​ERGEG_​GGPIMT_​2006-08-02.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015. The ERGEG GGP-IMT represented ERGEG’s views on the minimum level of transparency that should be in place across the European market. Transparency requirements are also to be found in the Reports on Transparency published within the context of the Electricity Regional Initiative (ERI) launched by ERGEG in 2006 in an attempt to support harmonisation of congestion management and transparency within predefined European regions. See, for instance, ERGEG, ‘Report on Transparency: Electricity Regional Initiative – Central Western Regional Electricity Market’ Final Version, 23 November 2007 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​ACTIVITIES/​EER_​INITIATIVES/​ERI/​Central-West/​Final%20​docs/​Report%20​on%20​Transparency> accessed 1 December 2015; ERGEG, ‘Report on Transparency: Electricity Regional Initiative – Northern Regional Electricity Market’ Final Version, 13 September 2007 <http://​energia.​fi/​sites/​default/​files/​report_​on_​transparency_​2007.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015. The reports contain transparency requirements based on the Congestion Management Guidelines annexed to the Regulation 714/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109) and the ERGEG GGP-IMT. Detailed transparency requirements as those provided for in the ERGEG GGP-IMT have become mandatory transparency requirements with the adoption of the Regulation 543/2013 on submission and publication of data in electricity markets.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice on Comitology Guidelines for Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ Ref: E10-ENM-05-01, 7 December 2010, 15 <www.​energy-regulators.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​CONSULT/​CLOSED%20​PUBLIC%20​CONSULTATIONS/​ELECTRICITY/​Comitology%20​Guideline%20​Electricity%20​Transparency/​CD/​E10-ENM-05-01_​FEDT%20​IIA%20​update_​7-Dec-2010.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Commission, ‘Public Consultation Document – Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ 22 July 2011, 1 <http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​consultation.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Ibid; Adeline Lassource, European Energy Markets Transparency Report – 2013 Edition: Overview of Progress in Europe (Technical Report, Florence School of Regulation 2013) 18 <http://​cadmus.​eui.​eu/​bitstream/​handle/​1814/​28897/​ETA_​report_​dig.​pdf?​sequence=​1> accessed 1 December 2015.

Recital 4 Regulation (EU) No 543/2013 of 14 June 2013 on submission and publication of data in electricity markets and amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2013] OJ L163/1.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice on Comitology Guidelines for Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 43) 15.

Art 19 Regulation 543/2013.

Art 3 para 1 of the ibid.

Art 3 para 3 and Art 20 of the ibid. See ENTSO-E Transparency Platform (n 33).

Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Electricity Markets and the Functioning of Spot Power Exchanges – A Belgian Perspective’ (n 13) 31.

RWE, ‘Response of RWE to the Public consultation on Enhanced Data Transparency on Electricity Market Fundamentals’ (19 September 2011) 1 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015.

Recital 3 Regulation 543/2013.

Heinz-Joseph Loddenkemper, Transparenz im öffentlichen und privaten Wirtschaftsrecht: eine Untersuchung zu ihrer Bedeutung anhand ausgewählter Beispiele aus dem Bank-, Börsen- und Medienrecht (Schriftenreihe Europäisches Recht, Politik und Wirtschaft, Bd. 182, Nomos 1998) 22ff. See also European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), ‘EFET Response to ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (28 October 2010) 1 <www.​efet.​org/​Cms_​Data/​Contents/​EFET/​Media/​Documents/​Public/​Transparency%20​draft%20​guidelines%20​EFET%20​response.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 31.

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 564.

Ibid, para 565. See also Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 30.

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 565.

von Wrede (n 39) 39; Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 31 footnote 148.

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) paras 563–565.

von Wrede (n 39) 39, 70; Draft discussion paper by DG TREN on transparency and integrity of traded wholesale markets in electricity and gas (n 13) 2.

Commission, ‘Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors’ (Chap. 2 n 19) para 27.

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 565; European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) (n 54) 1; Lassource (n 45) 4; Feltkamp and Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market – New Rules for a Better Functioning Market?’ (n 12) 30.

Lassource (n 45) 2. See also Recital 19 Regulation 714/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109); Recital 24 Regulation 715/2009 (Chap. 2 n 109).

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 563.

Recital 4 Regulation 543/2013.

Recitals 4 and 10 ibid.

Nordenergi, ‘Commission draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (21 October 2011) 1 <http://​energia.​fi/​sites/​default/​files/​nordenergy_​letter_​to_​dg_​comp_​fedt_​oct_​20111021_​0.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Lassource (n 45) 2.

According to whom transparency obligations are directed at, transparency could be categorised into first and second level transparency, meaning transparency towards the market in general and transparency only towards specific stakeholders (e.g. competent authorities) respectively. See von Wrede (n 39) 46.

Florian Wagner-von Papp, Marktinformationsverfahren: Grenzen der Information im Wettbewerb: die Herstellung praktischer Konkordanz zwischen legitimen Informationsbedürfnissen und Geheimwettbewerb (Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik, Bd. 191, Nomos 2004) 31; Gerd Aberle, Wettbewerbstheorie und Wettbewerbspolitik (Schaeffers Grundriss des Rechts und der Wirtschaft, Abt. 3: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 65, Kohlhammer 1980) 24.

For an analysis of competition law and information economics theories with regard to the relation between information and competition see von Wrede (n 39) 56–70.

von Wrede (n 39) 65.

Ivaldi and others (Chap. 3 n 232) 12, 45; Bettina Tugendreich, Die kartellrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Marktinformationsverfahren: eine juristische und ökonomische Untersuchung zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht unter Berücksichtigung der US-amerikanischen Rechtspraxis (Schriftenreihe Institut für Energie- und Wettbewerbsrecht in der kommunalen Wirtschaft, Bd. 11, Nomos 2004) 151.

The principle of secret competition does not entirely prohibit any information exchange but attempts to put limits to information exchanges so that information is sufficiently aggregated and anonymised and thus cannot be attributed to any specific undertaking. See von Wrede (n 39) 63.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11). With the ACER fully operational, ERGEG was dissolved by the Commission with effect from 1 July 2011.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ Ref: E10-ENM-02-07, 8 September 2010 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​CONSULT/​CLOSED%20​PUBLIC%20​CONSULTATIONS/​ELECTRICITY/​Comitology%20​Guideline%20​Electricity%20​Transparency/​CD/​E10-ENM-02-07_​FEDT_​8-Sept-2010.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

ERGEG, ‘Draft Comitology Guideline on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – ERGEG Public Consultation Paper – Cover Note and Consultation Questions’ Ref: E10-ENM-02-07a, 8 September 2010 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​CONSULT/​CLOSED%20​PUBLIC%20​CONSULTATIONS/​ELECTRICITY/​Comitology%20​Guideline%20​Electricity%20​Transparency/​CD/​E10-ENM-02-07a_​FEDT_​Questions_​8-Sept-2010.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Public Consultation on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Evaluation of Responses’ Ref: E10-ENM-27-03a, 7 December 2010 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​CONSULT/​CLOSED%20​PUBLIC%20​CONSULTATIONS/​ELECTRICITY/​Comitology%20​Guideline%20​Electricity%20​Transparency/​CD/​E10-ENM-27-03a_​FEDT_​EoR_​7-Dec-2010.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice – Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ Ref: E10-ENM-27-03, 7 December 2010 <www.​ceer.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​PUBLICATIONS/​CEER_​PAPERS/​Electricity/​2010/​E10-ENM-27-03_​FEDT_​7-Dec-2010.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015. See also ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice on Comitology Guidelines for Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 43).

Commission, ‘Public Consultation Document – Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 44).

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice – Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 81) Section 4.3.2.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11) 23.

Ibid.

Ibid 3 (emphasis added).

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 78) 4; ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11) 3 (emphasis added).

Nils-Henrik M von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ Report commissioned by Statkraft, 27 October 2010, 3 <www.​energy-regulators.​eu/​portal/​page/​portal/​EER_​HOME/​EER_​CONSULT/​CLOSED%20​PUBLIC%20​CONSULTATIONS/​ELECTRICITY/​Comitology%20​Guideline%20​Electricity%20​Transparency/​RR/​FEDT_​Statkraft_​accompanying%20​study.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Rafał Weron, Modeling and Forecasting Electricity Loads and Prices: A Statistical Approach (Wiley 2006) 101; BR Szkuta, LA Sanabria and TS Dillon, ‘Electricity Price Short-term Forecasting using Artificial Neural Networks’ (1999) 14 I.E. Transactions on Power Systems 851, 851. On the optimal short-term operation of electricity generation systems see Soliman Abdel-Hady Soliman and Abdel-Aal Hassan Mantawy, Modern Optimization Techniques with Applications in Electric Power Systems (Energy Systems Series, Springer 2012) 83ff.

Orvika Rosnes, ‘Subsidies to Renewable Energy in Inflexible Energy Markets’ (Nordic Workshop on Electricity Economics, Stockholm, 8–10 June 2008), 2 <www.​ifn.​se/​eng/​events/​past-public-activities/​past-activities/​norel/​file_​archive_​11/​subsidies_​to_​renewable_​energy_​in_​inflexible_​power_​markets> accessed 1 December 2015.

Fabio Genoese, Massimo Genoese and Martin Wietschel, ‘Occurrence of Negative Prices on the German Spot Market for Electricity and their Influence on Balancing Power Markets’ (7th International Conference on the European Energy Market, Madrid, 23–25 June 2010), 1 <http://​ieeexplore.​ieee.​org/​xpl/​articleDetails.​jsp?​arnumber=​5558703> accessed 1 December 2015; Veronika Grimm, Axel Ockenfels and Gregor Zoettl, ‘Strommarktdesign: Zur Ausgestaltung der Auktionsregeln an der EEX’ (2008) 32 Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft 147, 155.

Enzo Fanone, Andrea Gamba and Marcel Prokopczuk, ‘The Case of Negative Day-Ahead Electricity Prices’ (2013) 35 Energy Economics 22, 24; Julie Johnsson and Naureen S Malik, ‘Nuclear Industry Withers in U.S. as Wind Pummels Prices’ Bloomberg News (11 March 2013) <www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​2013-03-11/​nuclear-industry-withers-in-u-s-as-wind-pummels-prices-energy.​html> accessed 1 December 2015.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 4.

Ibid.

Martha M Roggenkamp and François Boisseleau, ‘The Liberalisation of the EU Electricity Market and the Role of Power Exchanges’ in Martha M Roggenkamp and François Boisseleau (eds), The Regulation of Power Exchanges in Europe (Energy & Law Series, vol 2, Intersentia 2005) 25. Block bids are allowed in most power exchanges. Depending on the market design, block bids are included in the price determination (matching process) as price independent bids for the hours concerned. An average of the market clearing prices for the hours included in the bid is calculated. If this price is not equal or higher than the price limit stated by the participant to satisfy the bid, the bid drops and the aggregation of bids and offers is run again. Other power exchanges use continuous trading to settle block bids. For further information see Reinhard Madlener and Markus Kaufmann, ‘Power Exchange Spot Market Trading in Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence’ OSCOGEN Discussion Paper No 5, March 2002 <www.​oscogen.​ethz.​ch/​reports/​oscogen_​dp5_​010702.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Grimm, Ockenfels and Zoettl (n 92) 153; Xifan Wang, Xiaohong Guan and Xiuli Wang, ‘Block Bidding Power Markets’ (International Conference on Power System Technology, Kunming, October 2002), 1831 <http://​ieeexplore.​ieee.​org/​xpls/​abs_​all.​jsp?​arnumber=​1067847&​tag=​1> accessed 1 December 2015.

The example is borrowed from Grimm, Ockenfels and Zoettl (n 92) 152–153.

Weron (n 90) 101; Katarzyna Maciejowska and Rafał Weron, ‘Forecasting of Daily Electricity Spot Prices by Incorporating Intra-day Relationships: Evidence from the UK Power Market’ (International Conference on the European Energy Market, Stockholm, 27–31 May 2013), 1 <http://​ieeexplore.​ieee.​org/​stamp/​stamp.​jsp?​tp=​&​arnumber=​6607314> accessed 1 December 2015.

Nordenergi, ‘Nordenergi Response to the EC Public Consultation: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (13 September 2011) 3 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Norwegian Competition Authority, ‘European Commission – Public Consultation on Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (16 September 2011) 2 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015. See also Ifiec Europe, ‘Response to the EU Commission – Public Consultation Document – Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Transparency’ (16 September 2011) 2 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Oesterreichs Energie, ‘Public Consultation by the Directorate General for Energy on ERGEG’s Advice: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (16 September 2011) 4 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015. An outage of a generation unit requires replacement or disposition in a very short timeframe. The publication of the unit by unit production output could be impractical in markets with a limited level of liquidity and integration especially in the intraday market.

Electricity price forecasting techniques can be categorised into statistical techniques, simulation techniques and equilibrium techniques. They have been implemented to forecast electricity prices with respect to various time scopes: short-term, medium-term, and long-term. It is thus customary to talk about short-term (STPF), medium-term (MTPF) and long-term price forecasting (LTPF) but there is no consensus on what the thresholds should actually be. For a review on existing techniques of electricity price forecasting see Li, Lawarree and Liu (n 89); Weron (n 90) 101ff. For a review of the different modelling approaches to short-term electricity price forecasting see Antonio Muñoz and others, ‘Short-term Forecasting in Power Systems: A Guided Tour’ in Steffen Rebennack and others (eds), Handbook of Power Systems II (Springer 2010). For more recent works see, for instance, Eran Raviv, Kees E Bouwman and Dick van Dijk, ‘Forecasting Day-Ahead Electricity Prices: Utilizing Hourly Prices’ Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2013-068/III <http://​papers.​tinbergen.​nl/​13068.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015; Maciejowska and Weron (n 99).

See, for instance, Bushnell (Chap. 2 n 274) 80.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 5.

Li, Lawarree and Liu (n 89) 162.

Weron (n 90) 101; Szkuta, Sanabria and Dillon (n 90) 851.

On price forecasting techniques see footnote 101.

Ibid.

Roger LeRoy Miller, Economics Today (15 edn, Addison-Wesley 2010) 611; David C Colander, Microeconomics (8 edn, McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2010) 318; Per Baltzer Overgaard and H Peter Møllgaard, ‘Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly’ in Wayle Dale Collins (ed), Issues in Competition Law and Policy, vol 2 (American Bar Association 2008) 1244.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 5.

The specific input data that is required for the forecasting exercise varies across different forecasting techniques. See Li, Lawarree and Liu (n 89) 167ff. For short-term predictions some of these variables may not influence high-frequency electricity prices. See Nektaria V Karakatsani and Derek W Bunn, ‘Forecasting Electricity Prices: The Impact of Fundamentals and Time-Varying Coefficients’ (2008) 24 International Journal of Forecasting 764, 772; Muñoz and others (n 101) 147; Hany S Guirguis and Frank A Felder, ‘Further Advances in Forecasting Day-Ahead Electricity Prices Using Time Series Models’ 2004 KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering 4-A(3), 161 <http://​citeseerx.​ist.​psu.​edu/​viewdoc/​download?​doi=​10.​1.​1.​128.​1894&​rep=​rep1&​type=​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Muñoz and others (n 101) 146; Karakatsani and Bunn (n 111) 768; Nektaria V Karakatsani and Derek W Bunn, ‘Intra-Day and Regime-Switching Dynamics in Electricity Price Formation’ (2008) 30 Energy Economics 1776, 1781.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 7; Maciejowska and Weron (n 99) 1; Karakatsani and Bunn, ‘Forecasting Electricity Prices: The Impact of Fundamentals and Time-Varying Coefficients’ (n 111) 778.

Maciejowska and Weron (n 99) 1; Raviv, Bouwman and Dijk (n 101) 28; Karakatsani and Bunn, ‘Forecasting Electricity Prices: The Impact of Fundamentals and Time-Varying Coefficients’ (n 111) 778. The usage of disaggregated data has been found, mainly in the context of macroeconomic analysis, to improve forecasting performance. See David F Hendry and Kirstin Hubrich, ‘Combining Disaggregate Forecasts or Combining Disaggregate Information to Forecast an Aggregate’ (2011) 29 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 216, 227. See also David F Hendry and Kirstin Hubrich, ‘Forecasting Economic Aggregates by Disaggregates’ European Central Bank Working Paper Series, No 589, 2006, 27 <www.​ecb.​europa.​eu/​pub/​pdf/​scpwps/​ecbwp589.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015; Nikita Perevalov and Philipp Maier, ‘On the Advantages of Disaggregated Data: Insights from Forecasting the U.S. Economy in a Data-Rich Environment’ Bank of Canada Working Paper 2010-10, 18 <www.​bankofcanada.​ca/​wp-content/​uploads/​2010/​05/​wp10-10.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015; Colin Bermingham and Antonello D’Agostino, ‘Understanding and Forecasting Aggregate and Disaggregate Price Dynamics’ (2014) 46 Empirical Economics 765, 786; Thiago Carlomagno Carlos and Emerson Fernandes Marça, ‘Forecasting Brazilian Inflation by its Aggregate and Disaggregated Data: A Test of Predictive Power by Forecast Horizon’ January 2013, 25 <http://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​2214726> accessed 1 December 2015.

Eurelectric, ‘EC Public Consultation: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – A Eurelectric Response Paper’ (19 September 2011) 4 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015 ‘Generally, we would like to stress that information of a single unit’s unavailability is usually not relevant to assist the price formation process. Its main interest may be to provide additional information to cross check the aggregated amount of unavailable capacity by fuel type in each bidding area which remains the most practical information to help market participants forming a view on the relevant market price level. []. Technically, we are of the view that it is not relevant whether it is plant/unit A or B that is producing at a certain moment in time but it is the aggregated volumes (aggregated per production type/fuel and bidding area) that is of interest.’; Ifiec Europe (n 100) 2; Energy Norway, ‘Response to the Commission Consultation on the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (16 September 2011) 4 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Oesterreichs Energie (n 100) 3; Nordenergi, ‘Nordenergi Response to the EC Public Consultation: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 100) 3.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 7; Government of Malta, ‘Malta’s Replies to the Public Consultation on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (5 September 2011) 2 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 8.

Ibid; Karakatsani and Bunn, ‘Forecasting Electricity Prices: The Impact of Fundamentals and Time-Varying Coefficients’ (n 111) 765, 779; Karakatsani and Bunn, ‘Intra-Day and Regime-Switching Dynamics in Electricity Price Formation’ (n 112) 1795; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Comment of the Bundeskartellamt Regarding the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (16 September 2011) 2 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015.

Karakatsani and Bunn, ‘Forecasting Electricity Prices: The Impact of Fundamentals and Time-Varying Coefficients’ (n 111) 779, 783; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Comment of the Bundeskartellamt Regarding the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 119) 2.

According to Art 15 of the Regulation 543/2013, generators are expected to update information on the planned and the unplanned unavailability of plants within one hour after the decision is made or the change in availability respectively.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11) 8 (emphasis added).

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 9.

Ibid.

See Sect. 2.​3.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 8.

Ibid 9.

Ibid 9; Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2; Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW), ‘Position Paper on Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (15 September 2011) 6 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Swissgrid, ‘Response to the European Commission’ s Public Consultation on the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (14 September 2011) 2 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015 (although referring to consumption units).

Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU), ‘Statement: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (15 September 2011) 3 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 10.

Ibid 9.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2; Energy Norway (n 115) 3.

Bundeskartellamt, ‘Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung und -großhandel’ (Chap. 2 n 98) 285.

See Art 18 Regulation 543/2013 ‘The liability of the primary owner of the data, the data provider and the ENTSO for Electricity under this Regulation shall be limited to cases of gross negligence and/or wilful misconduct. In any event they shall not be liable to compensate the person who uses the data for any loss of profit, loss of business, or any other indirect incidental, special or consequential damages of any kind arising from a breach of their obligations under this Regulation.’

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 11.

French Competition Authority, ‘Consultation on Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (5 October 2011) <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015.

See Art 18 Regulation 543/2013. See also in ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice – Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 81) the equivalent provisions of the Guidelines in the comitology phase, i.e. ‘3.7. []. The primary owner of the data shall be responsible for the legality, reliability, integrity, quality, correctness and accuracy of the fundamental data provided. []., 3.8. The data provider, ENTSO-E and the primary owner shall use their best efforts to perform their obligations under these guidelines., 3.9. The liability of data provider, ENTSO-E and primary owner of the data under these guidelines shall be limited to cases of gross negligence and/or wilful misconduct. In any event, data provider and/or primary owner of the data shall not compensate any loss of profit, loss of business, or any other indirect incidental, special or consequential damages of any kind arising from a breach of these guidelines.’ See also Eurelectric (n 115) 4; Union Française de l’Electricité (UFE), ‘European Commission – Public Consultation – Enhanced Data Transparency on Electricity Market Fundamentals – UFE Position Statement’ (19 September 2011) 3 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Nordenergi, ‘Nordenergi Response to the EC Public Consultation: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 100) 3; Association of Electricity Producers (AEP), ‘Response to Commission Consultation on Fundamental Data Transparency’ (16 September 2011) 3 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015 ‘In practice, it will often be extremely difficult to specify the cause and duration of an outage at the time when the trip occurs. Furthermore, the length of an outage will often be determined by factors other than the event which caused it. A requirement to publish outage cause and duration immediately could lead to unreliable information being released to the market, potentially resulting in legal uncertainty. AEP therefore proposes that these requirements should be omitted.’

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 11.

Ibid.

This may be the case particularly for hydropower producers since the obligation to publish individual units’ output is likely to reveal their evaluation of future prices. See Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 3.

Ibid.

Ibid. The disclosure of future expected prices can also affect hydropower producers’ activity on the financial markets. By revealing their evaluation of the value of water their activity on the financial markets becomes highly predictable and less effective.

Energy Norway (n 115) 3.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2.

French Competition Authority (n 137); Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Comment of the Bundeskartellamt Regarding the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 119) 2.

On unavailability of transmission infrastructure see Art 10 Regulation 543/2013.

This information can be analysed together with the aggregated weekly average filling rate of water reservoir and hydro storage plants per bidding zone, which shall be reported on the third working day of the W+1. See Art 16 paras 1(d) and 2(d) Regulation 543/2013 (ex section 4.3.2.7 of the Guidelines in the comitology phase, ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Advice – Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 81)).

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2; Energy Norway (n 115) 3.

French Competition Authority (n 137).

See, for instance, German Electricity Balancing Market (Chap. 2 n 111) para 47.

Leen Vandezande, ‘Design and Integration of Balancing Markets in Europe’ (PhD thesis, Catholic University of Leuven 2011) 35. Pay-as-bid pricing is used, for instance, in France, Germany, Belgium and Spain.

Spanish Competition Authority, ‘Public Consultation on Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (5 October 2011) 1 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Italian Competition Authority, ‘Answer of the Italian Competition Authority to the Public Consultation on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (5 October 2011) 3 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015.

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 572.

Ibid.

Commission, ‘Public Consultation Document – Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 44) Question 5.

O’Donoghue and Padilla (Chap. 3 n 336) 180; Ivaldi and others (Chap. 3 n 232) 12–13. See also Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para 79; John Deere v Commission (Chap. 3 n 44) para 88; Case C-194/99 P Thyssen Stahl v Commission [2003] ECR I-10821, para 87. It can be even the case that the information exchange agreements could lead to collusion even if the market prior to the information exchange agreements was not oligopolistic. See Thyssen Stahl v Commission, para 86.

Jennifer Halliday and Paul Seabright, ‘Network Good, Cartels Bad: But How Could Anyone Tell the Difference?’ in Fighting Cartels – Why and How? (Swedish Competition Authority, February 2001) 88 <www.​konkurrensverket​.​se/​en/​publications-and-decisions/​fighting-cartels---why-and-how/​> accessed 1 December 2015.

See, for instance, von Wrede (n 39) 48.

Aberle (n 71) 24; John Deere v Commission (Chap. 3 n 44) para 88.

Ivaldi and others (Chap. 3 n 232) 32–35.

Halliday and Seabright (n 158) 94.

DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (Chap. 2 n 1) para 572; Italian Competition Authority (n 153) 2; Spanish Competition Authority (n 153) 1.

von Wrede (n 39) 48.

O’Donoghue and Padilla (Chap. 3 n 336) 181; Ivaldi and others (Chap. 3 n 232) 50–52.

Commission Notice of 19 October 1996 in Case IV/34.936 – CEPI/Cartonboard, OJ C310/3, paras 10–18; Commission Notice of 17 December 1987 in Case IV/32.076 – European Wastepaper Information Service, OJ C339/7, paras 7–8; Thyssen Stahl v Commission (n 157) para 81; John Deere v Commission (Chap. 3 n 44) para 90; Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I-4529, para 35; Case T-588/08 Dole Food and Dole Germany v Commission [2013] (appeal pending), para 62; Case T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce v European Commission [2013] (not reported) para 303.

Even the exchange of aggregated data may facilitate a collusive outcome depending on the specific market characteristics. See Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (n 157) para 89.

Halliday and Seabright (n 158) 96.

Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (n 157) para 89. See also para 74 ‘Information exchanges between competitors of individualised data regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be considered a restriction of competition by object. In addition, private exchanges between competitors of their individualised intentions regarding future prices or quantities would normally be considered and fined as cartels because they generally have the object of fixing prices or quantities.’

Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Chap. 3 n 246) 151. See also Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (n 157) para 86.

Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Chap. 3 n 246) 151; O’Donoghue and Padilla (Chap. 3 n 336) 183; Kai-Uwe Kühn, ‘Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between Firms’ (2001) 16 Economic Policy 169, 188; Kühn and Vives, Information Exchanges Among Firms and their Impact on Competition (n 133) 53; Overgaard and Møllgaard (n 109) 1254.

Halliday and Seabright (n 158) 97; Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (n 157) para 91; John Deere v Commission (Chap. 3 n 44) para 89.

Overgaard and Møllgaard (n 109) 1257. For a detailed analysis of the case see Svend Albæk, Peter Møllgaard and Per Baltzer Overgaard, ‘Government-assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case’ (1997) 45 Journal of Industrial Economics 429.

Stephen W Fuller, Fred J Ruppel and David A Bessler, ‘Effect of Contract Disclosure on Price: Railroad Grain Contracting in the Plains’ (1990) 15 Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 265.

Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (n 157) para 94 ‘However, the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that even genuinely public exchanges of information may facilitate a collusive outcome in the market.’

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 15. See also Robert H Porter, ‘A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886’ (1983) 14 Bell Journal of Economics 301 for an example of a cartel agreement in the US which relied on monitoring supply or market shares.

Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Chap. 3 n 246) 152; Kühn, ‘Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between Firms’ (n 171) 191.

Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Chap. 3 n 246) 152; Kühn, ‘Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between Firms’ (n 171) 196.

Bundeskartellamt, ‘Comment of the Bundeskartellamt Regarding the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 119) 2; Spanish Competition Authority (n 153) 1; Italian Competition Authority (n 153) 2–3; French Competition Authority (n 137); Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2. See also Eurelectric (n 115) 3; Oesterreichs Energie (n 100) 4; Nordenergi, ‘Nordenergi Response to the EC Public Consultation: Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 100) 3.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Comment of the Bundeskartellamt Regarding the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 119) 2.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2.

Ibid 3.

Ibid; French Competition Authority (n 137).

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 15.

Ibid.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 3.

Ibid; Energy Norway (n 115) 3.

Italian Competition Authority (n 153) 1; Confédération Européenne des Entreprises Locales d’Energie (CEDEC), ‘Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Public Consultation’ (16 September 2011) 4 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU) (n 129) 4.

On the difficulties of dealing with cartels see Mario Monti, ‘Why Should We Be Concerned with Cartels and Collusive Behaviour?’ in Fighting Cartels – Why and How? (Swedish Competition Authority, February 2001) <www.​konkurrensverket​.​se/​en/​publications-and-decisions/​fighting-cartels---why-and-how/​> accessed 1 December 2015.

See, for instance, O’Donoghue and Padilla (Chap. 3 n 336) 177.

Jones and Sufrin (Chap. 3 n 77) 673. See also Overgaard and Møllgaard (n 109) 1243.

Case C-199/92 P Hüls AG v Commission [1999] ΕCR I-4287, para 160; Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73, 55/73, 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, para 174; Case 172/80 Züchner [1981] ECR 2021, para 14; Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission (Wood Pulp II) [1993] ECR I-1307, para 71.

Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission (Wood Pulp II) (n 192) para 71; Commission Decision of 6 August 1984 in Case IV/30.350 – Zinc Producer Group, para 75.

Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission (Wood Pulp II) (n 192) paras 72, 126; Hüls AG v Commission (n 192) para 160; Züchner (n 192) para 14.

Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission (Wood Pulp II) (n 192) para 126. See also Case IV/30.350 – Zinc Producer Group (n 193) para 75; Commission Decision of 13 July 1994 in Case IV/33.833 – Cartonboard, para 73.

Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission (Wood Pulp II) (n 192) para 126. See also Case IV/30.350 – Zinc Producer Group (n 193) para 76.

Italian Competition Authority (n 153) 1–2; Energy Norway (n 115) 3.

O’Donoghue and Padilla (Chap. 3 n 336) 176.

Commission, ‘DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses – Public Consultation’ December 2005, paras 43–50 <http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​antitrust/​art82/​discpaper2005.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015; Guidance on abusive exclusionary conduct, para 4.

O’Donoghue and Padilla (Chap. 3 n 336) 176.

See Sect. 2.​4.​4.

Jones and Sufrin (Chap. 3 n 77) 724.

See Art 16 paras 1(b) and 2(b) Regulation 543/2013.

See Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italian Competition Authority), Decision No 23623 – REPOWER ITALIA-PREZZO DISPACCIAMENTO ENERGIA ELETTRICA CENTRO SUD, 30 May 2012 <www.​agcm.​it/​concorrenza/​intese-e-abusi.​html> accessed 1 December 2015; Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italian Competition Authority), ‘Electricity market: Repower Italia, EGL Italia and Tirreno Power penalised for agreement restricting competition’ Press Release, 14 June 2012 <www.​agcm.​it/​en/​newsroom/​press-releases/​2000-electricity-market-repower-italia-egl-italia-and-tirreno-power-penalised-for-agreement-restricting-competition.​html> accessed 1 December 2015. For an analysis of the decision see Peter Willis and Simone Cadeddu, ‘Italian Ancillary Services Cartel Highlights Risks of Electricity Market Transparency’ 24 July 2012 <www.​twobirds.​com/​en/​news/​articles/​2012/​italian-ancillary-services-cartel-highlights-risks-of-electricity-market-transparency> accessed 1 December 2015.

The Italian Competition Authority noted that in some instances even the publication of aggregated information facilitated the operation of the cartel, where it allowed the parties to infer each other’s conduct.

Art 17 Regulation 543/2013.

Nord Pool Spot, ‘The Power of Transparency: Annual Report 2012’ 6 <www.​nordpoolspot.​com/​globalassets/​download-center/​annual-report/​annual-report_​nord-pool-spot_​2012.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015; Nord Pool Spot, Trading <www.​nordpoolspot.​com/​TAS/​> accessed 1 December 2015.

Nord Pool Spot, ‘The Power of Transparency: Annual Report 2012’ (n 208) 26. It also operates in cooperation with NASDAQ OMX Commodities the N2EX power market in UK and a bidding area in Germany named KONTEK.

Ibid 6.

Nord Pool Spot, Trading (n 208).

On the price calculation and for more information see Nord Pool Spot, The power market <www.​nordpoolspot.​com/​How-does-it-work/​Day-ahead-market-Elspot-/​Price-formation-in-Nord-Pool-Spot/​> accessed 1 December 2015.

Erik Hjalmarsson, ‘Nord Pool: A Power Market Without Market Power’ Göteborg University, Working Paper in Economics No 28, July 2000 <https://​gupea.​ub.​gu.​se/​bitstream/​2077/​2838/​1/​gunwpe0028.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015, who points out that very low market concentration in Norway is enough to ensure competitive behaviour in the joint Norwegian-Swedish market even though Sweden has a high degree of market concentration.

Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P Tangerås, ‘Market Power in the Nordic Electricity Wholesale Market: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence’ (2009) 39 Energy Policy 3681, 3682. On national market concentration in Europe see Commission, ‘Energy Markets in the European Union in 2011’ Staff Working Document SWD(2012) 368 final, 15 November 2012 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20121217_​energy_​market_​2011_​lr_​en.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Nordenergi, ‘Commission draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 68) 1.

The Energy Transparency Award (ETA) is an event organised annually by the Florence School of Regulation to award the outstanding contribution of a company or an institution to the transparency of energy markets in Europe. Companies or institutions are nominated and evaluated according to eight criteria: Effectiveness, efficiency, reproducibility, innovation, simplicity of design and implementation, responsiveness to users’ needs, leverage and contribution to market oversight improvement. The first ETA in 2010 was assigned to Nord Pool Spot. See Florence School of Regulation, Energy Transparency Award 2010 <http://​fsr.​eui.​eu/​LoyoladePalacio/​Activities/​Eta/​Pasteditions/​Eta2010.​aspx> accessed 1 December 2015. According to the Selection Committee ‘Nord Pool was the first cross-border electricity market operator in Europe and in the world. It has inspired the creation of cross-border energy markets all over the world and it has been a model for market operators everywhere. The simplicity, efficiency and transparency of Nord Pool has been recognized and emulated for more than 15 years now. Nord Pool Spot runs the largest electricity market in the world: in 2009 it had a turnover of 288 TWh representing a value of EUR 10.8 billion. This success is due to a large extent to the high degree of transparency cultivated by Nord Pool management, shareholders and regulators. The Selection Committee warmly congratulates Nord Pool Spot for its past achievements and encourages its management, shareholders and stakeholders to keep the innovation and transparency track they have so successfully pursued, for the benefit of energy consumers and energy undertakings in the Nordic countries and in Europe.’

Nord Pool Spot, ‘Market Conduct Rules’ (Trading Appendix 5, effective since 16 June 2015) section 5.​2(a) <www.​nordpoolspot.​com/​globalassets/​download-center/​rules-and-regulations/​market-conduct-rules-trading-effective-from-16-june-2015.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Ibid, section 5.​4.

Ibid, section 5.​3.

Ibid, section 5.​4.

Wind power is unpredictable by nature and thus can cause significant imbalances between day-ahead contracts and the actually produced volume which often need to be offset in the intraday market.

All the published data is available on the website of Nord Pool Spot to be accessed at <www.​nordpoolspot.​com> under ‘Power system data’.

Leigh Hancher, ‘Network Codes: Some Legal Issues’ (Competition in the Energy Sector 2013, Brussels, 14 November 2013).

Nordenergi, ‘Commission draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 68) 2.

Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, ‘The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority’s Response to the Public Consultation on Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (13 September 2011) 1 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Energy Norway (n 115) 4.

Energy Norway (n 115) 4; Nordenergi, ‘Upcoming Draft Rules for Electricity Market Transparency in the Committee on the Implementation of Legislation on Conditions of Access to the Network for Cross Border Exchanges in Electricity – the Electricity Cross Border Committee’ (23 August 2012) 2 <http://​nordenergi.​org/​wp-content/​uploads/​2012/​05/​Nordenergi%E2%80%99s-views-on-the-upcoming-Draft-Rules-for-Electricity-Market-Transparency1.​pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.

Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (n 225) 1; Association of European Power Exchanges (Europex), ‘Response to the DG Energy Public Consultation on Enhanced Data Transparency on Electricity Market Fundamentals’ (16 September 2011) 9 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Nordenergi, ‘Upcoming Draft Rules for Electricity Market Transparency in the Committee on the Implementation of Legislation on Conditions of Access to the Network for Cross Border Exchanges in Electricity – the Electricity Cross Border Committee’ (n 226) 2.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100); Energy Norway (n 115) 3.

Fridolfsson and Tangerås (n 214) 3681.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2; Energy Norway (n 115) 3. However, the effect of having more or less hydropower available on the potential for market power in a power market remains unclear. See Hjalmarsson (n 213) 24.

See Sect. 4.2.2.3.5.

Several empirical studies of market power on Nord Pool find no evidence of blatant and systematic exploitation of system level market power. For a review of recent empirical studies see Fridolfsson and Tangerås (n 214) 3684ff.

Norwegian Competition Authority (n 100) 2–3; Nordenergi, ‘Upcoming Draft Rules for Electricity Market Transparency in the Committee on the Implementation of Legislation on Conditions of Access to the Network for Cross Border Exchanges in Electricity – the Electricity Cross Border Committee’ (n 226) 1–2.

EEX, Products <www.​eex.​com/​en/​products> accessed 1 December 2015.

EEX, Power Spot Market <www.​eex.​com/​en/​products/​energy/​power/​power-spot-market> accessed 1 December 2015.

Ibid.

Ibid.

EEX Transparency Platform <www.​transparency.​eex.​com/​en/​> accessed 1 December 2015.

EEX Transparency Platform, Market Information <www.​eex-transparency.​com/​homepage/​news/​market-information> accessed 1 December 2015.

Ibid.

Lassource (n 45) 32.

Florence School of Regulation, Energy Transparency Award 2012 <http://​fsr.​eui.​eu/​LoyoladePalacio/​Activities/​Eta/​Pasteditions/​Eta2012.​aspx> accessed 1 December 2015. According to the Selection Committee ‘The European Energy Exchange’s Transparency in Energy Markets Platform showed over the last three years how important this kind of systematic, well organised data dissemination is for the efficient functioning of energy markets. It also shows the potential and usefulness of more systemic and sophisticated EU-wide market monitoring. The pro-active role of EEX should also be emphasised in this context. Therefore, the Selection Committee decided to award the 2012 Energy Transparency Award to the European Energy Exchange Transparency Platform.’

EEX Transparency Platform (n 238).

Ibid.

Generation from wind and solar was not included in the information provided on previous day generation. Information on expected and actual wind and solar generation was provided aggregated per bidding area/country and per balance area under statutory publication requirements. Aside from the information that was publically available on the EEX transparency platform, market participants could buy information products offered by the EEX such as the Daily Transparency Report which support the analysis of fundamental data of the transparency platform through a large and comprehensive offer of tables and graphics. Data was provided aggregated per generation type. See von Wrede (n 39) 155. Similar power data services upon payment of subscription fees are provided by Nord Pool Spot. See Nord Pool Spot, Power Data Services <www.​nordpoolspot.​com/​services/​Power-Data-Services/​> accessed 1 December 2015.

Production and cross-border data is currently provided for facilities across Austria, Slovakia, Germany, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. See Genscape, Power RT Europe Platform <http://​info.​genscape.​com/​europe-power-rt> accessed 1 December 2015. See also ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11) 23.

von Wrede (n 39) 55.

ERGEG, ‘ERGEG Draft Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency – Initial Impact Assessment’ (n 11) 23.

Confédération Européenne des Entreprises Locales d’Energie (CEDEC) (n 188) 4; Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU) (n 129) 4; EDF, ‘EC Consultation – Guidelines on Enhanced Data Transparency on Electricity Market Fundamentals’ (16 September 2011) 6 <https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​energy/​sites/​ener/​files/​documents/​20110916_​electricity_​contributions.​zip> accessed 1 December 2015; Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) (n 128) 6.

von der Fehr, ‘Information Provision in Electricity Markets: An Economic Analysis’ (n 88) 13.

E.ON Establishes Transparency in the Energy Market, Availabilities <www.​eon-schafft-transparenz.​de> accessed 1 December 2015; EnBW, Urgent Market Messages (UMMs): Geplante und ungeplante Nichtverfügbarkeiten <www.​enbw.​com/​content/​de/​der_​konzern/​enbw_​trading/​kraftwerksdaten/​index.​jsp> accessed 1 December 2015; RWE, Transparency Drive <www.​rwe.​com/​web/​cms/​en/​59928/​transparency-drive/​germany/​power-generation-online/​> accessed 1 December 2015. Apart from the capacity availability, RWE has also been publishing the actual generation output of individual units.

Bundeskartellamt, ‘Comment of the Bundeskartellamt Regarding the Guidelines on Fundamental Electricity Data Transparency’ (n 119) 3 ‘Since an ex-ante publication on a unit-by-unit level is no precondition for a proper functioning of the electricity generation market, there is no need to increase the transparency for market participants compared to the already practiced publication of real fundamental data. Existing “transparency platforms” as already installed in Germany provide relevant information for market participants to manage electricity generation properly and at the same time pay due respect to the prerequisites of secret competition.’

Italian Competition Authority (n 153) 2. This would be the case for France where generation is dominated by EDF and generation data is published on a unit by unit basis. See Union Française de l’Electricité (UFE) (n 138) 1; EDF (n 249) 1.

In Spain, for instance, the contested information is published initially in an aggregated format while unit by unit information is published with a three month lag. See Spanish Competition Authority (n 153) 2.

Ibid.