5. Dimension I: The Content of Substantive Law

Article 88(1) and (2) Treaty of Dakar.

Article 174(1) Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 1 of Decision 608: “toda persona natural o jurídica, de derecho público o privado, con o sin fines de lucro, que oferta o demanda bienes materiales o inmateriales, o servicios en el mercado, así como los gremios o asociaciones que los agrupen”.

Definition of an undertaking: “Dans l’application de la législation communautaire de la concurrence, la notion d’entreprise se définit comme une organisation unitaire d’éléments personnels, matériels, et immatériels, exerçant une activité économique, à titre onéreux, de manière durable, indépendamment de son statut juridique, public ou privé, et de son mode de financement, et jouissant d’une autonomie de décision. (…)”.

Article 211 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Healey, Competitive Neutrality Project, 7 July 2013 <http://​unctad.​org/​meetings/​en/​Presentation/​RPP2013_​Healey_​en.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

Capobianco/Christiansen, Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises, 2011, p. 3, <http://​www.​oecd-ilibrary.​org/​docserver/​download/​5kg9xfgjdhg6.​pdf?​expires=​1385377786&​id=​id&​accname=​guest&​checksum=​5544908D37FAB684​ADDD3EADCFDF4438​> accessed 11 November 2018.

Ibid. According to Capobianco/Christiansen examples for government-created competitive advantages that distort competition are: outright subsidisation, concessionary financing and guarantees, other preferential treatment by government, monopolies and advantages of incumbency, captive equity, exemptions from bankruptcy rules and information advantages. Ibid., pp. 6f. Moreover, also public procurement policies might hinder “competitive neutrality”; see in this regard CUTS CCIER, A Time for Action, 2010, p. 9.

The loyalty clause used to be expressly included in European Law in the former Art. 10 TEC. Although, the TFEU does not entail an explicit provision of it, the principle still exists and is expressed indirectly, for example in the Art. 2(3) TFEU.

For more information on the “loyalty clauses” with regard to the principle of effectiveness, see below Part II, Dimension V: Sect. 9.​3.

Réglement n° 04/2002/CM/UEMOA, relatif aux aides d’Etat à l’intérieur de l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine et aux modalités d’application de l’article 88(c) du traité, entered into force on 1 January 2003.

The Advisory Committee of Competition constitutes an advisory entity in WAEMU competition law enforcement. For more information see below Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​2.​1.​1.

Réglement n° 02/2002/CM/UEMOA, relatif aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles à l’intérieur de l’UEMOA, entered into force on 1 January 2003.

Article 6(2) of Regulation no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA.

Directive n° 01/2002/CM/UEMOA relative à la transparence des relations financières d’une part entre les états membres et les entreprises publiques et d’autre part entre les états membres et les organisation internationales ou étrangères.

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 7 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 42 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

The Andean Committee on the Defence of Free Competition is an advising entity in Andean competition law enforcement, for more information see below Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​2.​1.​2.

Informe de la Tercera Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, 24 and 25 October 2001, p. 2 (available from the author).

Decisión 283, Normas para prevenir o corregir las distorsiones en la competencia generadas por prácticas de dumping o subsidios, 21 March 1991.

Decisión 456, Normas para prevenir o corregir las distorsiones en la competencia generadas por prácticas de dumping en importaciones de productos originarios de Países Miembros de la Comunidad Andina, 4 May 1999.

Decisión 457, Normas para prevenir o corregir las distorsiones en la competencia generadas por prácticas de subvenciones en importaciones de productos originarios de Países Miembros de la Comunidad Andina, 4 May 1999.

Regional competition laws and subsidies and antidumping provisions both contribute to the protection of the common market in the long run. However, they are different legal instruments with distinct objectives. Rules on subsidies and antidumping aim at the protection of national industries and intend to counteract the economic exploitation of national markets by stronger foreign trading partners. On the other hand, a regional competition law framework aims at the protection of the common market, thereby incorporating a different perspective; Falla/Quintana, in: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, Derecho Comunitario Andino, 2003, p. 143, 151.

Resolución 03-CAM-96-Indecopi/Exp.-036, 20 February 1997; Resolución 0182-1997/TDC-Indecopi, 16 July 1997.

Boza, Tailor-Made Competition Policy in a Standardizing World, 2005, p. 83. Other cases involving anticompetitive government measures are the Colombian case Gasocaña Ltda., Norgas S.A. (1997) or the Peruvian Miraflores taxation case (1996). For more information see De León, An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy, 2009, pp. 399ff.; Boza, Tailor-Made Competition Policy in a Standardizing World, 2005 (only Peruvian cases).

Artículo 333: La actividad económica y la iniciativa privada son libres, dentro de los límites del bien común. Para su ejercicio, nadie podrá exigir permisos previos ni requisitos, sin autorización de la ley.

La libre competencia económica es un derecho de todos que supone responsabilidades.

La empresa, como base del desarrollo, tiene una función social que implica obligaciones. El Estado fortalecerá las organizaciones solidarias y estimulará el desarrollo empresarial.

El Estado, por mandato de la ley, impedirá que se obstruya o se restrinja la libertad económica y evitará o controlará cualquier abuso que personas o empresas hagan de su posición dominante en el mercado nacional.

La ley delimitará el alcance de la libertad económica cuando así lo exijan el interés social, el ambiente y el patrimonio cultural de la Nación.

Artículo 334: La dirección general de la economía estará a cargo del Estado. Este intervendrá, por mandato de la ley, en la explotación de los recursos naturales, en el uso del suelo, en la producción, distribución, utilización y consumo de los bienes, y en los servicios públicos y privados, para racionalizar la economía con el fin de conseguir el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de los habitantes, la distribución equitativa de las oportunidades y los beneficios del desarrollo y la preservación de un ambiente sano.

El Estado, de manera especial, intervendrá para dar pleno empleo a los recursos humanos y asegurar que todas las personas, en particular las de menores ingresos, tengan acceso efectivo a los bienes y servicios básicos. También para promover la productividad y la competitividad y el desarrollo armónico de las regiones.

For more information on the competition law in Colombia and Peru, see below Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.2.1.

For more information on the competition law in Bolivia and Ecuador, see below Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.2.2.

Artículo 314: Se prohíbe el monopolio y el oligopolio privado, así como cualquier otra forma de asociación o acuerdo de personas naturales o jurídicas privadas, bolivianas o extranjeras, que pretendan el control y la exclusividad en la producción y comercialización de bienes y servicios.

Mostajo, Prácticas Anticompetitivas y Derecho de la Competencia en Bolivia, 32 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 1, 11ff. (2012).

Stewart, An Empirical Examination of Competition Issues in Selected Caricom Countries, 2004, pp. 8, 73. According to Stewart’s study the only countries that offer direct state aids are Belize, offering price support for rice farmers, and Trinidad and Tobago, granting state aids to its sugar industry.

Article 94(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 32(5) lit. a) and lit. b) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Subsidies are also dealt with apart from Chapter VIII in the Articles 96ff. of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Grenade, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, The Caribbean Community in Transition, 2008, p. 114, 119.

For example: SOCOCIM v Ciment du Sahel (state aids in the cement industry); Total/Mobil (negative clearing for a stock purchase between private oil companies and state-sponsored oil multinational joint venture); West African Commodities (subsidies for oil mills by the Senegalese state); RUFSAC/Sengalese State (concerning the granting exonerations for kraft paper); Farine au Mali (concerning import restrictions on flour originating from Senegal by Mali); CAMEG (Distortions in market of pharmaceutical products caused by preferential treatment of Burkina Faso).

Even in the case of the European “soft harmonization”- approach, in which the EU refrained from obliging member states to harmonize their national competition laws, member states have to refrain from taking legislative or other measures that are capable of counteracting the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

The actual main merger control provisions are contained in Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1, 29 January 2004.

There is an ongoing debate whether the implementation of a merger regulation is advisable in small market economies. One of the main counterarguments refers to limited possibilities to reach economies of scale within a small market economy. However, in the context of regional merger control, the creation of a larger common market intends to abolish or to diminish these inefficiencies. Moreover, the application of the SIEC-test (“significant impediment to effective competition”) (as in the European merger regime) instead of a mere “dominance”-based test appears as a feasible instrument for merger control regulation to adapt to the particular conditions of a small market economy. For more information on merger control in small market economies see: Zúñiga-Feranández, Fusionskontrolle in einer “small market economy” in Lateinamerika, 2009; Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, 2003, pp. 194ff.

Owen, Competition Policy in Latin America, 13–15 November 2003, Stanford, p. 11 <http://​papers.​ssrn.​com/​paper.​taf?​abstract_​id=​456441> accessed 11 November 2018.

Monti, EC Competition Law, 2007, p. 246; Beckford argues for a flexible interpretation of the abuse of dominant position provision in CARICOM regarding the obligation of Member States to implement a domestic merger control; Beckford, Enforcement of competition law in CARICOM: Perspectives on challenges to meeting regional and multilateral obligations, 20–21 April 2009, Caracas, p. 1. Under European Law before the enactment of Regulation no. 4064/89 in 1989, mergers fell under the scope of application of the provisions governing abuse of dominant position and agreements, see: Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215; Cases 142 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds [1987] ECR 4487.

Art. 4 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA refers to the regulation n° 02/2002/CM/UEMOA. Art. 4(1)(2) of Regulation no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA states “(…) Constituent une pratique assimilable à un abus de position dominante les opérations de concentration qui créent ou renforce une position dominante, détenue par une ou plusieurs entreprises, ayant come conséquences d’entraver de manière significative une concurrence effective à l’intérieur du Marché Commun.” Art. 4(3) Regulation no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA specifies that the notion of “concentration” in Art. 4(1)(2) of the same regulation can also mean the merger of two enterprises.

Décision n° 09/2008/COM/UEMOA portant attestation negative à l’egard du Projet de Concentration entre les Sociétés UNILEVER-CI, SIFCA, COSMIVOIRE, PALMCI, NAUVU, PHCI, SHCI et, SANIA, 22 October 2008, p. 4: “Dans le dispositif de l’UEMOA, le contrôle à priori des opérations de concentration se fait indirectement, suivant les dispositions de l’article 89 b) du Traité qui interdit les pratiques assimilables à l’abus de position dominante.” Further cases that were based on a negative attestation under Article 3 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA, or request for an individual exemption, Article 7 of Regulation no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA and Article 7 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA, comprise Decision no. 06/2004/COM/UEMOA and Decision no. 02/2005/COM/UEMOA regarding the project GAZODUC for the exploitation of natural gas in West Africa. While the former concerned an abuse of dominant position, the latter dealt with state aid provisions; see Décision n° 06/2004/COM/UEMOA portant Decision de ne pas soulever d’objections à l’égard des lois portant diverses dispositions relatives au regime juridique et fiscal unique et harmonise applicable dans la République du Bénin et dans la République Togolaise dans le cadre de la réalisation du projet GAZODUC de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 23 December 2004 and Décision n° 02/2005/COM/UEMOA portant attestation negative à l’égard des accords créant des entreprises communes dans le cadre de la réalisation, de l’exploitation du GAZODUC de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et de la vente du gaz naturel sur les marchés du Bénin et du Togo, 21 January 2005.

Informe de la Tercera Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, 24 and 25 October 2001, p. 2 (available from the author); Falla/Quintana, in: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, Derecho Comunitario Andino, 2003, p. 143, 173.

Informe de la Primera Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/I/Informe/Rev.1, 29 October 1998 (available from the author).

Mechanisms for cooperation are included in Article 37 of Decision 608.

Venezuela withdrew from the AndeanC in 2006.

Concerning the differing merger control systems in the Andean Countries, see Jatar/Tineo, Competition Policy in the Andean Countries: A Policy in Search of its Place, 1997, p. 3 <http://​www.​sice.​oas.​org/​compol/​articles/​cpandea.​asp> accessed 11 November 2018.

Ley 155 de 1959 and Ley 1340 de 2009.

La República, “Mañana empieza en el Congreso foro por una ley antimonopolio”, 4 December 2016, available at <http://​larepublica.​pe/​impresa/​economia/​827590-manana-empieza-en-el-congreso-foro-por-una-ley-antimonopolio> last accessed 5 September 2017; La República, “Proyecto de ley que regula fusions listo en marzo del 2017”, 6 December 2016, available at <http://​larepublica.​pe/​impresa/​economia/​828126-proyecto-de-ley-que-regula-fusiones-listo-en-marzo-del-2017> last accessed 5 September 2017. Regarding older draft merger laws, see Congreso de la República, Proyecto de Ley n° 972/2011-CR, Ley de promoción de la libre competencia y la eficiencia en los mercados para la protección de los consumidores, 28 March 2012.

Sección IV, de la concentración económica, Ley Orgánica de Regulación y Control del Poder de Mercado.

A different prediction gives Cortázar, see Cortázar, Curso de Derecho de la Competencia, 2011, pp. 180ff.

The final draft of the consultancy was originally expected to be finalized by 11 November 2010.

Stewart, An Empirical Examination of Competition Issues in Selected Caricom Countries, 2004; with respect to the banking sector also Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 179.

The two biggest companies on the Caribbean airline market are Caribbean Airlines and Liat. The airline market displays a high level of concentration. Interestingly, in 2009, before the acquisition of Air Jamaica, there was no overlap regarding international services and minimal overlap regarding the East and South CARICOM sub-regions between LIAT and Caribbean Airlines. LIAT is owned by the Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. According to the “Concept Paper Strategic Plan for Air Transport Services in CARICOM” of 11 January 2009 issued by the CARICOM Community <http://​www.​caricom.​org/​jsp/​single_​market/​services_​regime/​concept_​paper_​air_​transport.​pdf> all of the airlines are public sector controlled and all are unprofitable. According to the concept paper, Caribbean airlines is the only airline that is capitalised. Depending on the notion of an “enterprise” the application of Chapter VIII could thus be problematic. Further criticism arose in the context of the subsidised fuel in Trinidad and Tobago that was held to create an unfair competitive advantage for Caribbean Airlines in view of LIAT; Caribbean News Now!, 4 February 2011, “St Vincent Prime Minister accuses Caribbean Airlines of creating unfair competition for LIAT”; Caribbean News Now!, 11 March 2011, “Commentary: CARICOM chairman should act to end airlines standoff”.

Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 179.

Part III of the Fair Trading Act 2006. Regarding Trinidad and Tobago’s position on regional merger control, see also the Communication from Trinidad and Tobago for the World Trade Organization Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/143 of 12 June 2000, in which Trinidad and Tobago recommends to introduce a merger control regulation in the CARICOM.

This mode of entry is often used by financial institutions from Trinidad and Tobago in CARICOM, see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 179.

See below Part III, Sect. 11.​3.

See Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition, 2008, pp. 153f.; Terhechte, International Competition Enforcement Law, 2009, pp. 42ff.

The “effect-doctrine” allows for extraterritorial application of domestic competition law because the application criteria solely relies on the effect on the domestic market and does not require that the action has been performed in the domestic market. However, extraterritorial application of domestic competition law by its nature does not constitute a substitute for regional competition law enforcement. Extraterritorial competition law enforcement fights anticompetitive practices with effects on the domestic markets, leaving aside possible objectives of regional integration. Also from a global perspective, extraterritorial application of competition law—mainly by the active competition law agencies of developed jurisdictions—cannot sufficiently take into account the interests and needs of developing jurisdictions.

Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/07.

Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/07, para. 19.

Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/07, para. 23.

Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/07, para. 43.

Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/07, para. 44ff.

Art. 88 lit. a), b) Treaty of Dakar: “à l’intérieur de l’Union”/“sur le marché commun”.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”, p. 8.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”, p. 1.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”.

Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”.

The specific inefficiencies of the centralized system are dealt with separately in each respective Chapter. To give a few examples, the centralized system suffers from resource constraints on the regional level, conflicts of competences are not resolved because of remaining sectorial or competition law related national provisions. The centralization has led to a decline of national competition law enforcement and cooperation between the regional and national level remains weak. The Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000 also neglected possible conflicts with competition law provisions of other regional trade agreements in the region, such as ECOWAS.

More details on the Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/WAEMU of 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”. See Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 57ff.; Bakhoum, Delimitation and Exercise of Competence between the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and its Member States in Competition Policy, 29/4 W. Comp. 653–681 (2006); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, pp. 18ff.

See Art. 5 of Decision 608; Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 8 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

Article 2 of Decision 285. See Prada, Wettbewerbspolitik und Wirtschaftsintegration in den Amerikas, 2001, p. 59; Gallardo/Domínguez, 20 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 36, 47 (2005) <http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​publications/​blc/​boletin_​20_​1_​es.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018; Böttcher, Kartell- und Lauterkeitsrecht in den Ländern der Andengemeinschaft, 2004, p. 50; Mancero-Bucheli, Competition Law of Latin America and the European Union, 2001, p. 79. For more information on reform proposals of Decision 285 see Böttcher, Harmonisierungsbemühungen der Andengemeinschaft im Bereich des Kartellrechts, GRUR Int 217–223 (2003).

Informe de la Segunda Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, 16 and 17 February 2000, pp. 2, 9 (available from the author); Informe de la Tercera Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, 24 and 25 October 2001, pp. 4, 12 (available from the author).

There have been other national competition law regimes that have gained increasing reputation, in particular the Chilean and Brazilian system.

Interview with representatives from the INDECOPI conducted by the author on 19 January 2012 in Lima.

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

Decisión 623 Reglamento de la Fase Prejudicial de la Acción de Incumplimiento, 16 July 2005.

Regarding the action of non-compliance see below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​3.​2.​5.

Tratado de la Creación del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina.

Incentivo de la Cobertura Cambiaria (ICC).

Incentivo Sanitario para Flores (ISF).

Contrary to the European Guidelines on the “effect on trade”-concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the Secretariat General did not have to define the notion of “trade”, because Article 5 of Decision 608 only refers to an effect on member states.

Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/07, para. 12.

“Subject to Articles 175 and 176, the Commission may, in respect of cross-border transactions or transactions with cross-border effects, monitor, investigate, detect, make determinations or take action to inhibit and penalise enterprises whose business conduct prejudices trade or prevents restricts or distorts competition within the CSME.”

Beckford, Enforcement of Competition Law in CARICOM, 35/2 W.I.L.J. 109, 131f. (2010); Beckford, Enforcement of competition law in CARICOM: Perspectives on challenges to meeting regional and multilateral obligations, 20–21 April 2009, Caracas, p. 5.

See Article 169(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas: “The goal of the Community Competition Policy shall be to ensure that the benefits expected from the establishment of the CSME are not frustrated by anti-competitive business conduct”.

The CARICOM Competition Commission generally has an ex officio right to start an investigation. However, it’s competence is limited in the sense that the Commission has to ask a national competition authority to undertake a preliminary examination before it can actually start investigating, Article 176(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. See below, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​1.​2.

See below, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​1.​2.

Actually the wording of Article 176(5) only refers to the situation, in which the CARICOM Competition Commission has initiated an investigation based on its ex officio competence (after having asked the national authority to conduct a preliminary examination) and the member state does not agree with the opinion of the Commission. However, by its wording, Article 176(5) does not cover the situation, in which a national authority conducts an investigation and the CARICOM Competition Commission disagrees with the national agency’s competence.

Lee, Caricom Competition Commission: Enhancing Competition Enforcement in the Caribbean Community, 3–5 June 2009, Zurich, p. 4. However, Beckford points out that the procedure regarding the jurisdictional dispute contained in Article 176 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas is not unambiguous. It is unclear whether the Commission must conduct the investigation until the Caribbean Court of Justice resolves the matter or whether the investigation has to be halted. See Beckford, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, 26–28 May 2010, Brasilia, p. 7.

Despite a lacking national competition authority, representatives from Trinidad and Tobago also participated during the drafting process of Chapter VIII.

Règlement n° 03/2002/CM/UEMOA relatif aux procédures applicables aux ententes et abus de position dominante a l’intérieur de l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine.

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 21 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 21 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

Article 6 of Decision 608.

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 22 <http://​intranet.​comunidadandina.​org/​Documentos/​DTrabajo/​SGdt396.​doc> accessed 11 November 2018.

See in the EU: Commission Notice (EU) of 27 April 2004, Guidelines on the application of 81(3) of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/08.

Informe de la Segunda Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/I/Informe/Rev.2, 16 and 17 February 2000, pp. 18f.: “Artículo 6.- Constituyen conductas restrictivas a la libre competencia sujetas a prohibición absoluta, los acuerdos entre competidores o las recomendaciones a competidores, que tengan como objeto o efecto: (…) Artículo 7- Constituyen conductas restrictivas a la libre competencia sujetas a prohibición relativa: (…) Artículo 8.- (…) Sin embargo, las conductas a que se refiere el Artículo anterior serán objeto de medidas si el presunto responsable no demuestra que los costos derivados de la reducción de la rivalidad en el mercado están justificadas por razones de eficiencia, inversión o innovación.”

In the third reunion of governmental experts the Member States disagreed on the wording of Article 7 and 8 of Decision; Informe de la Tercera Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/I/Informe/Rev.3, 24 and 25 October 2001, pp. 5f.: “[Alternativa A: Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela: Artículo 8- Constituyen conductas de abuso de posición de dominio en el mercado: (…) Estas conductas podrán ser justificadas por razones de eficiencia, inversión o innovación, entre otras.] [Alternativa B: Boliva (en consulta): Artículo 8- Constituyen conductas restrictivas de la libre competencia sujetas a prohibición relativa (…) Se entenderá por conducta sujeta a prohibición relativa, acquella que admita prueba de la inexistencia de efectos restrictivos o, en caso contrario, prueba que dichos efectos restrictivos se encuentran justificados conforme al segundo párrafo del articulo siguente. Artículo 8a.- (…) Sin embargo, dichas conductas no serán objeto de medidas si los presuntos responsables demuestran que los costos derivados de la reducción de la rivalidad en el mercado están justificados por razones de eficiencia, inversión o innovación.]”.

Informe de la Cuarta Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/I/Informe/Rev.4, 1 August 2003, p. 11: “Artículo 7.- Constituyen conductas restrictivas a la libre competencia, sujetas a prohibición absoluta, los acuerdos que tengan como objeto: (…). Artículo 8- Constituyen conductas de abuso de posición de dominio en el mercado: (…).”

Slightly different is the right of the COTED set out in Articles 182 and 183(1), according to which the COTED can enact special rules to certain sectors or enterprises and then suspend them from the “general” Article 177.

Art. 183(2) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 15 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 29 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 10(2) lit. b) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ). For more information on the judgement see below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​1.​1.​1.

In the EU the notification system was abolished with the entry into force of Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.

Respectively, they cover those international anticompetitive practices that have a cross-border effect.

On the discussion regarding legal transplantation, see Berkowitz/Pistor/Richard, Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect, 47 Eur. Econ. Rev. 165–195 (2003); Edwards, Legal Transplants and Economics, 9 Eur. J. Law Reform 243–283 (2007); Gal, The ‘Cut and Paste’ of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel, 9 Eur. J. Law Reform 467–484 (2007); Gal/Padilla, Implications for the Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, 76 Antitrust L.J. 899–927 (2010); Glaeser/Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1193–1229 (2002); Lee, Legal traditions and competition policy, 45 Q. Rev. Econ. & Fin. 236–257 (2005); Mattei, Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 5–45 (1997); Rodriguez, Does Legal Tradition Affect Competition Policy Performance?, 21 Int’l. Trade J. 417–454 (2007); Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 129–145 (2008).

There exists a draft law regarding the facilitation of formalities to engage in commercial activities in Guinea Bissau, the Decreto-Lei n° 3/2005. Community competition law constitutes the only legal competition framework, however, regional law is not well known and the language constitutes a further hurdle for efficient national enforcement and perception. Additionally, there exists national sector regulation.

For example, the national provisions in Ivory Coast covering concentrations are very similar to the WAEMU’s provision. Article 34 of Loi n° 91-999 du 27 decembre 1991 relatif à la concurrence states that concentrations, which significantly attribute to a reenforcement of a dominant position may be subject to a national competition commission’s opinion.

See below Affaire CIBA contre Fédération Sénegalaise des Sociétés d’Assurances (FSSA), Décision n° 01-D-01 of 16 October 2007. For a summary see Weick, Competition Law and Policy in Senegal, 33/3 W. Comp. 521, 530 (2010); Affaire Syndicat des Agences de Voyage et de Tourisme du Sénégal contra Air France, Décision n° 02-D-02 du 27.12.2002. For a summary see Weick, Competition Law and Policy in Senegal, 33/3 W. Comp. 521, 531 (2010).

Commission Nationale de la Concurrence du Sénégal, Rapport Public 2002–2003, 2004, pp. 19f.

Commission Nationale de la Concurrence et de la Consommation (CNCC); Decret n° 2002-605/PRES/PM/MCPEA portant composition attributions et fonctionnement de la Commission Nationale de la Concurrence et de la Consommation.

CUTS, Document préliminaire Burkina Faso sur les scénarios de concurrence, 2008 <http://​www.​cuts-ccier.​org/​7up4/​pdf/​PCP-Burkina_​Faso.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018; CUTS CCIER, A Time for Action, 2010, p. 20.

L’Ordonnance n° 07-025 du 18 juillet 2007 portant organisation de la concurrence.

CUTS CCIER, A Time for Action, 2010, p. 21. More information on Mali’s competition system, see UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, pp. 42f.

CUTS, Document Préliminaire du Mali sur les Scénarios de Concurrence, 2009, p. 42 <http://​www.​cuts-ccier.​org/​7up4/​pdf/​PCP-Mali.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

According to CUTS, participation of private national and foreign enterprises rose from 5% in 1991 up to 85% in 2005. Ibid., p. 17.

L’Ordonnance n° 2013-662 du 20 septembre 2013 relative à la concurrence.

Loi n° 99-011 du 28 décembre 1999 portant organisation de la concurrence au Togo.

Décret n° 2001-207/PR fixant les modalités d’application de la loi de 1999 sur la concurrence.

Décret n° 2001-208/PR portant composition et fonctionnement de la commission nationale de la concurrence et de la consommation.

Commission Nationale de la Concurrence et de la Consommation.

Article 9 of Loi n° 99-011.

Ordonnance n° 92-025 du 7 juillet 1992 portant réglementation des prix et de la concurrence.

Ordonnance n° 20/PR/MFAEP du 5 juillet 1967 portant réglementation des prix et des stocks.

See also Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics, <http://​www.​armp.​bj/>.

Ley 155 de 1959 (Diciembre 24), Diario Oficial No. 30.138 del 22 de enero de 1960, “Disposiciones sobre prácticas comerciales restrictivas”.

Ley 1340 de 2009 (Julio 24), Diario Oficial No. 47.420 del 24 de julio de 2009, “Normas en materia de protección de la competencia”.

Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (SIC), see <www.​sic.​gov.​co>.

Since the legislative reform in 2009 the SIC is the sole authority to enforce competition laws in all sectors. Two specific sector regulators have competition powers with regards to merger control, namely the civil aeronautic authority (aerocivil) and the superintendence of finance (SFC).

In interviews with the author representatives from the private sector and from the SIC considered these three aspects of the reform as the most important changes. For more information on the competition law reform see Uribe Pedrahita, Reforma al Régimen de Libre Competencia en Colombia, 2009; Miranda Londoño, Developments and Perspectives in Colombian Competition Law, 21 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 17 (2006); Cortázar, Hacia un Nuevo Derecho de la Competencia en Colombia, 2003.

The highest fine so far was imposed on a Colombian water utility company in 2014 and reached approximately US$32 million.

Decreto 019 de 2012, (Enero 10), “Por el cual se dictan normas para suprimir o reformar regulaciones, procedimientos y trámites innecesarios existentes en la Administración Pública”.

Decreto 2153 de 1992 (Diciembre 30), Diario Oficial No. 40.704 del 31 de diciembre de 1992, “Decreto por el cual se reestructura la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio y se dictan otras disposiciones”.

Decreto Legislativo N° 1034, “Decreto Legislativo que aprueba la Ley de Represión de Conductas Anticompetitivas” of 24 June 2008, published on 25 June 2008, enacted on 24 August 2008.

Decreto Legislativo N° 701, “Eliman las prácticas monopólicas, controlistas y restrictivas de la libre competencia” of 5 November 1991, published on 7 November 1991.

Article 8 and 9 of Decreto Legislativo N° 1034.

Decreto Legislativo N° 1205 of 23 September 2015.

Article 1 of the Law 155 of 1959: “Quedan prohibidos los acuerdos o convenios (…) y en general, toda clase de prácticas, procedimientos o sistemas tendientes a limitar la libre competencia y a mantener o determinar precios inequitativos”.

Colombia: Article 4 of Law 1340 of 2009: “La Ley 155 de 1959, el Decreto 2153 de 1992, la presente ley y las demás disposiciones (…) constituyen el regimen general de protección de la competencia, aplicables a todos los sectores y todas las actividades económicas.”; SIC Concepto Número 04254 of 1 December 1993; SIC Resolución Número 15661 of the 10 August 1999. Peru: Article 2(1) of the Legislative Decree N° 1034: “La presente Ley se aplica a las personas naturales o jurídicas, sociedades irregulars, patrimonios autónomos u otras entidades de derecho public o privado, estatales o no, con o sin fines de lucro, que en el Mercado oferten o demanden bienes o servicios (…).”. See also 014-93-INDECOPI/CLC of 23 December 1993 regarding the state as economic actor and subject to the competition law.

Article 1 of Law 155 of 1959: “El Gobierno, sin embargo, podrá autorizar la celebración de acuerdos o convenios que no obstante limitar la libre competencia, tengan por fin defender la estabilidad de un sector básico de la producción de bienes o servicios de interés para la economía general”.

SIC, Resolución Número 04332, 25 February 2003.

Article 1 of Decreto 3280, 19 September 2005, “Reglamiento del parágrafo del artículo 1° de la Ley 155 de 1959 para el sector agropecuario”, published in the Diario Oficial No. 46.037, 20 September 2005.

“Oficina Supervisora de la Inversión Privada de las Telecomunicaiones” (OSIPTEL).

Decreto Ley N° 25844 of 19 November 1993, published 25 November 1993 in the Diario Oficial El Peruano; Decreto Supremo N° 27-95-ITINCI of 18 October 1995, published 19 October 1995 in the Diario Oficial El Peruano.

See for example Congreso de la República, Proyecto de Ley n° 972/2011-CR, Ley de promoción de la libre competencia y la eficiencia en los mercados para la protección de los consumidores, 28 March 2012. With regard to prior legislative initiatives regarding the introduction of a merger control see Zúñiga-Feranández, Fusionskontrolle in einer “small market economy” in Lateinamerika, 2009, pp. 169ff. In 2004 and 2008 draft laws on a general merger regulation were unsuccessfully proposed to the Congress in Peru. In cooperation with the Fordham University employees of the INDECOPI received further education on merger regulation in a one-week seminar in 2011. Also in 2005 the INDECOPI proposed a draft legislation that inter alia included a merger regulation. The proposal was sent to the Cabinet of Ministers and to the Congress for discussion, but was rejected. See OECD, A Follow-Up on Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, 2007, p. 25.

La República, “Mañana empieza en el Congreso foro por una ley antimonopolio”, 4 December 2016, available at <http://​larepublica.​pe/​impresa/​economia/​827590-manana-empieza-en-el-congreso-foro-por-una-ley-antimonopolio> last accessed 5 September 2017; La República, “Proyecto de ley que regula fusions listo en marzo del 2017”, 6 December 2016, available at <http://​larepublica.​pe/​impresa/​economia/​828126-proyecto-de-ley-que-regula-fusiones-listo-en-marzo-del-2017> last accessed 5 September 2017.

In Peru, the INDECOPI carried out 15 dawn raids to 76 undertakings between 2013 and 2014. Between 2011 and 2012 dawn raids were directed against 12 companies. In 2014, INDECOPI decided 8 cases on antitrust infringements. For more information see Espinoza Lozada, Peru: National Institute for the Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property, Antitrust Rev. Americas 138–140 (2016). In Colombia, the SIC has also increased the number of dawn raids. The authority is also entitled to impose fines on undertakings that do not cooperate. For more information see Pardo Cuéllar, Colombia: Overview, Antitrust Rev. Americas 114, 114 (2016).

Decreto Supremo N° 29519 of 16 April 2008, “Reglamento de Regulación de la Competencia y Defensa del Consumidor”, published in the Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia N° 3082.

Resolución Ministerial 190/2009, “Reglamento de Regulación de la Competencia en el Marco del Decreto Supremo N° 29519”, 29 May 2009.

Ley del Sistema de Regulación Sectorial (SIRESE), Ley N° 1600 of 28 October 1994; Otero, El Derecho de la Competencia en Bolivia, 2/2 Rev. Derecho Comp. 15–31 (2006); Ochoa Urioste, Régimen General del Derecho de la Competencia en Bolivia, 26 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 8, 9 (2009); Lozano, La Decisión 608 de la CAN y sus Implicaciones en Bolivia, 21 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 43, 44ff. (2006).

There have already been concrete competition law projects in 2003. However due to changes in the government and social conflicts, the project has never been introduced in the Parliament. See Urquieta Arias, in: CUTS International, Competition Regimes in the World, 2006, p. 546, 547.

Several unpublished documents of different entities express their opinions regarding the current competition law project. The Vice Minister of Internal Trade and Exportations is in favour of the creation of a new, mixed (dealing with competition law and consumer rights protection such as the Peruvian INDECOPI) competition authority, which would institutionally be part of and organically dependent on the Ministry. On the other hand, the current competent authority, the Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Empresas (AEMP) wants to keep its competence to deal with general competition law issues independently.

Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Empresas (AEMP).

According to Article 44 of Decree no. 0071 of 9 April 2009.

Superintendencia de Empresas. Nevertheless, the AEMP still exercises all functions with regard to competition law enforcement.

Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado. For more information see <http://​scpm.​gob.​ec/>.

The deadline for appointment of the Superintendent set out in the law was actually 13 April 2012.

The Subsecretariat of Competition organisationally belonged to the to the Ministry of Industries and Productivity.

Decreta n° 1614, Normas para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 de la CAN, 14 March 2009.

El Comercio, 10 December 2012, “Ecuador busca en China propuestas para su nueva agencia antimonopolio” <http://​www.​elcomercio.​com/​negocios/​Pekin-China-Pedro_​Paez-Superintendencia​_​de_​Control_​del_​Poder_​de_​Mercado_​0_​826117390.​html> accessed 11 November 2018.

Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. CONECEL.

Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado, Expediente No. 002-SCPM-CRPI-2013, 30 April 2013.

Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado, Expediente No. SCPM-CRPI-2014-024, 30 April 2013.

The “Junta de Regulación” is an executive body composed of the highest state authorities, or their delegates, in charge of Production, Economic Policy, Strategic Sectors and of Social Development, whose main function is (inter alia) to issue binding rules (e.g. Exemptions according to Art. 28 LORCPM) without altering the existing provisions in the law, Article 35 LORCPM.

Sampson/Sampson, in: Mehta/Evenett, Politics Triumphs Economics?, 2009, pp. 327, 327f.

Sampson/Sampson, in: Mehta/Evenett, Politics Triumphs Economics?, 2009, p. 327, 331.

See for example Barbados.

Sampson/Sampson, in: Mehta/Evenett, Politics Triumphs Economics?, 2009, p. 327, 355.

Chapter 326B Fair Trading Commission Act: “An Act to provide for the establishment of a Fair Trading Commission to safeguard the interests of consumers, to regulate utility services supplied by service providers, to monitor and investigate the conduct of service providers and business enterprises, to promote and maintain effective competition in the economy, and for related matters.”

Chapter 326C Fair Competition Act: “An Act (a) to promote and maintain and encourage competition; (b) to prohibit the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition and the abuse of dominant positions in trade in Barbados and within the Caricom Single Market and Economy; (c) to ensure that all enterprises, irrespective of size, have the opportunity to participate equitably in the market place; and (d) for connected matters.”

Statements made by representatives of the Fair Trading Commission during an interview with the author, 23 October 2012 in Bridgetown.

Jamaica Stock Exchange v Fair Trading Commission, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 92/97 of 2001; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: Jamaica, 2005, p. 33.

The Council is responsible for the organisation of legal education and to safeguard standards of professional conduct of lawyers in Jamaica. For more information see <http://​www.​generallegalcoun​cil.​org/> last accessed 30 August 2017.

The FTC’s institution was held to be in breach of natural justice. For more information see below in this Chapter.

Part IV of the Barbados Fair Competition Act.

Section 3(2) of the Fair Competition Act.

Long title of the Fair Competition Act.

Stephenson, Role, Function and Development of Jamaica’s Competition Law and Policy, 12–13 October 1999, Port-of-Spain, p. 12; Malahoo, Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The Jamaican Experience, 2000, p. 23; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: Jamaica, 2005, p. 47.

In this sense in May 2005, the Minister of Commerce, Science and Technology, the Honorable Phillip Paulwell, directed the Fair Trading Commission to “take steps to divest itself from matters in relation to consumer issues and concentrate on competition issues”.

There is only one more competitor in the telecommunications market besides Digicel and Claro, namely Lime.

The Privy Council is a relict from colonial times. It is a court based in Great Britain, but also serves as appellate court for some member states of the CARICOM. For more information see Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​3.​2.​1.

Fair Trading Commission v Digicel Jamaica Limited, Privy Council Appeal No. 0059 of 2016.

The Fair Trading Commission cannot make any decisions and enforce them. It can only make recommendations, which it then has to enforce before the courts.

Investigation into the acquisition of Oceanic Digital (Jamaica) Limited by Digicel Jamaica Limited, Pursuant to Section 17 of the Fair Competition Act Staff Report December 8, 2011, Case no. 6997-11, p. 42.

Malahoo, Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The Jamaican Experience, 2000, p. 7; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: Jamaica, 2005, p. 36.

Malahoo, Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The Jamaican Experience, 2000, p. 8; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: Jamaica, 2005, p. 36.

“Where a court or tribunal is seized of an issue whose resolution involves a question concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, the Court or tribunal concerned may, before delivery of its judgement in the matter in writing request the designated authority to refer the question to the Court for an advisory opinion to be given.”

Malahoo, Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The Jamaican Experience, 2000, p. 7. Unfortunately, regarding Jamaica’s compliance with Chapter VIII, it is still lagging behind with the obligatory amendments to its national competition legislation, see below Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.​2.​2.

Guyana Act. No. 11 of 2006, Competition and Fair Trading Act 2006.

The Fair Trading Act has not been fully proclaimed yet. Some parts’ proclamation is still pending.

In this context, Gal notes that “the size of the economy is negatively correlated with the height of the legal threshold it employs.”, Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, 2003, p. 231. The Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Act does only challenge mergers of enterprises that exceed fifty million dollars, Section 14.1 lit. b)(i) of the Fair Trading Act.

See website of the Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Commission, <http://​tandtftc.​org/>.

Ministry of Trade and Industry, A Competition Law for Trinidad and Tobago, A Proposal for a Fair Trading Act, Green Paper, 1997, p. 3.

See for example special provisions on interlocking directorship, the merger threshold or the definition of monopoly power. Yet, in relation to other Caribbean states, Trinidad and Tobago would not be classified as small market economy.

The Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Act does not speak of “dominant position”, but “monopoly power”.

Statements made by representatives from the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Trinidad and Tobago during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, 30 October 2012.

The Jamaica Fair Trading Commission was held to be in breach of natural justice, see Jamaica Stock Exchange v Fair Trading Commission, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 92/97 of 2001.

Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 179. While the exemption might not cause difficulties on the national level, because the Financial Regulatory Body can also control possible anticompetitive practices on that sector, the exemption of the particular sectors from national competition law is probable to create problems with regard to the cross-border monitoring and enforcement of regional competition law in case of cross-border anticompetitive effects. See for a general analysis of the aspects of exemptions in regional competition law systems, Part III, Dimension I: Sect. 12.1.4.

Section 5(1) lit. a) and lit. b) of the Fair Trading Act.

Section 26(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Act, 2006.

Section 48 of the Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Act, 2006.

See on the competition law initiatives in Belize, “Belize Competition Project”, available at <http://​www.​bcc.​org.​bz/> last accessed 5 September 2017.

Synopsis of Submitted Competition Legislation, October 2012. The paper is not published, but was prepared for the highest level of government in Belize. Statements made by John Rivero, Directorate for Foreign Trade (available from the author).

Statements made by Jenny Karmin, representative from the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Suriname, in an Email to the author in December 2012.

Statements made by Jenny Karmin, representative from the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Suriname, in an Email to the author in December 2012.

Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

The OECS has two additional associated member states, namely Anguilla, British Virgin Islands.

For more information see <http://​www.​oecs.​org/> accessed 11 November 2018.

“CONSCIOUS of the need for a national competition authority to be established and empowered to investigate allegations of anti-competitive business conduct within an OECS Member State and monitor compliance with the national competition law of that OECS Member State:

CONSCIOUS also of the need to establish a sub-regional competition authority with competence over matters arising within an OECS Member State, and not over matters that involve more than one OECS Member State, even if they are both OECS Member States;”, Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission.

Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission.

“RECOGNISING that: (…) there is a scarcity of relevant resources and limited economic activity in the OECS Member States;”, Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission.

Article 8 of the Agreement Establishing the Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission.

Article 9 of the Agreement Establishing the Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission.

Horna/Kayali, in: Alvarez/Wilse-Samson, Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2007, p. 21, 31.

Fox, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 273, 276.

Gerber, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 253, 253.

Fox, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 273, 275.

In more detail, see above Part I, Chap. 2.

In the European Union, the common market is based on the four basic freedoms, free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour.

In the European Union the former treaty emphasized in Art. 3 lit. g) EC Treaty the creation and promotion of a common market. However, it is interesting to note that the EU’s process of integration was not only based on economic considerations, but entailed political intentions as well. After World War II, the European States expressed their political will to guarantee peace and stability by creating common economic relations without questioning the sovereignty of the member states, especially regarding the regulation of sensitive domains. See Govaere, De l’état régulateur souverain aux organisations d’intégration régionale promotices, protectrices et intermédiaires, XVII R.I.D.E. 313, 317 (2003). However, since then the objective of economic integration and the creation and maintenance of the common market has been an important objective of European competition law. The underlying objectives of competition law inter alia determine the actual enforcement. In this vein, per se condemned behaviour, as for example absolute territorial protection, may be allowed for a certain period of time in order to promote product diversity. As regards the prohibition of absolute territorial protection, see ECJ, Decision of 13 of July 1966, Case 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig [1966]. Now, under the European guidelines on vertical restraints, restrictions of passive sales generally fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) if the restrictions are necessary in order to enter a new market, Commission Notice (EU) of 19 May 2010, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, [2010] OJ C 130/07, para. 61.

Article 4 of the Treaty of Dakar.

Bakhoum, Delimitation and Exercise of Competence between the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and its Member States in Competition Policy, 29/4 W. Comp. 653, 655 (2006); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, p. xi.

Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 13; Bakhoum, A Developing-Country Perspective on “Global Competition”, 28 October 2011, Chicago, p. 6; Gerber, Global Competition, 2010, p. 250; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, p. 4.

Monti, EC Competition Law, 2007, p. 51. See generally on economic integration in the European Union, Govaere, De l’état régulateur souverain aux organisations d’intégration régionale promotices, protectrices et intermédiaires, XVII R.I.D.E. 313, 313 (2003).

Preamble of Regulation no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA, Preamble of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA, Preamble of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA: “DESIREUX de renforcer l’efficacité et la compétitivité des activités économiques et financières des Etats membres dans le cadre d’un marché ouvert, concurrentiel et favorisant l’allocation optimale des ressources;”.

Article 2 of Decision 608: “La presente Decisión tiene como objectivo la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en el ámbito de la Comunidad Andina, buscando la eficiencia en los mercados y el bienestar de los consumidores”.

Preamble of Decision 608.

Falla/Quintana, in: Pontificia Católica del Peru, Derecho Comunitario Andino, 2003, p. 143, 145; Cortázar, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 133, 135.

Gallardo/Domínguez, 20 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 36, 46 (2005) <http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​publications/​blc/​boletin_​20_​1_​es.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

Among the most important to mention are the bilateral trade agreement between the United States and Peru and the bilateral trade agreement between the United States and Colombia.

Article 169(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 169(1)lit. a) to (c) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Kusha Haraksingh, the Chairman of the CARICOM Competition Commission, said at the 6^th United Nations Conference to Review the UN Set on Competition Policy in Geneva, Switzerland, 9 November 2010: “Given the primacy attributed to the goal of sustainable development in CARICOM, it is understandable that the litmus test of a successful competition policy would come to reside in the benefits delivered to the consumer”.

Article 2 of the Treaty of Dakar and its preamble accordingly reemphasize the promotion of economic integration as the objective of the WAEMU, in addition to the already proceeding monetary integration. See the Treaty of Dakar’s preamble: “Convaincus de la nécessité d’étendre en conséquence au domaine économique la solidarité qui les lie déjà sur le plan monétaire,(…)”. The objective of economic integration is further accentuated in Article 4 of the Treaty of Dakar, which names the reinforcement of the economic and financial activity of the member states in an open and competitive market as an objective of the Treaty of Dakar. See Article 4 of the Treaty of Dakar: “Sans préjudice des objectifs définis dans le Traité de l’UMOA, l’Union poursuit, dans les conditions établies par le présent Traité, la réalisation des objectifs ci-après:

a) renforcer la compétitivité des activités économiques et financières des Etats membres dans le cadre d’un marché ouvert et concurrentiel et d’un environnement juridique rationalisé et harmonisé;

b) assurer la convergence des performances et des politiques économiques des Etats membres par l’institution d’une procédure de surveillance multilatérale;

c) créer entre les Etats membres un marché commun basé sur la libre circulation des personnes, des biens, des services, des capitaux et le droit d’établissement des personnes exerçant une activité indépendante ou salariée, ainsi que sur un tarif extérieur commun et une politique commerciale commune;

d) instituer une coordination des politiques sectorielles nationales, par la mise en oeuvre d’actions communes et éventuellement de politiques communes notamment dans les domaines suivants: ressources humaines, aménagement du territoire, transports et télécommunications, environnement, agriculture, énergie, industrie et mines;

e) harmoniser, dans la mesure nécessaire au bon fonctionnement du marché commun, les législations des Etats membres et particulièrement le régime de la fiscalité.”

Preamble of the Treaty of Dakar: “Affirmant la nécessité de favoriser le développement économique et social des Etats membres, grâce à l’harmonisation de leurs législations, à l’unification de leurs marchés intérieurs et à la mise en oeuvre de politiques sectorielles communes dans les secteurs essentiels de leurs économies,(…)” and Article 4 of the Treaty of Dakar.

For the regional competition law objectives in the WAEMU, see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.3.1.1.

The objectives encompass consumer welfare as well as efficiency considerations instead of a formal market integration, see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.3.1.1.

Article 1 of Acuerdo de Integración Subregional Andino, “Acuerdo de Cartagena”.

ALALC was a regional organization in Latin America, which was created on 18 February 1960 with the Treaty of Montevideo. Participating member states were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela. In 1980 ALALC was replaced by the ALADI (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración). For more information see <http://​www.​aladi.​org/>. In February 2010 incentives for a new Latin American organization emerged with the creation of the CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños) in Mexico. CELAC consists of 33 member states, not including Canada and the United States of America. For more information see: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 December 2011, “Lateinamerika rückt zusammen” <http://​www.​sueddeutsche.​de/​politik/​gruendungsgipfel​-fuer-neuen-staatenbund-lateinamerika-rueckt-zusammen-1.​1225684>.

Salmón Gárate, in: Pontificia Católica del Peru, Derecho Comunitario Andino, 2003, p. 21, 22; Böttcher, Kartell- und Lauterkeitsrecht in den Ländern der Andengemeinschaft, 2004, pp. 28, 29; Baumann/Bustillo/Heirman/Macario/Máttar/Pérez, Los procesos de integración de los países de América Latina y el Caribe 2000–2001, 2002, pp. 29, 30.

García-Belaunde, El Sueño de Bolívar: De la Federación de los Andes a la Comunidad Andina, 2000 <http://​www.​comunidadandina.​org/​documentos/​docIA/​IA27-9-00.​htm> accessed 11 November 2018.

García-Belaunde, El Sueño de Bolívar: De la Federación de los Andes a la Comunidad Andina, 2000 <http://​www.​comunidadandina.​org/​documentos/​docIA/​IA27-9-00.​htm> accessed 11 November 2018.

Informe de la Segunda Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/II/INFORME, 16 and 17 February 2000, p. 1 (available from the author).

Francés/Palacios, in: San Martino de Dromi/Rubio/de Navarro, Integración Eurolatinoamericana, 1998, p. 485, 494.

According to Francés/Palacios intraregional trade in the European Union amounted up to 35% of all exportations in the first years of integration. Ten years later intraregional trade even reached a 50% share according to Francés/Palacios; Francés/Palacios, in: San Martino de Dromi/Rubio/de Navarro, Integración Eurolatinoamericana, 1998, p. 485, 494.

Marcos, in Fox/Sokol, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, 2009, p. 453, 454.

Francés/Palacios, in: San Martino de Dromi/Rubio/de Navarro, Integración Eurolatinoamericana, 1998, p. 485, 488.

Article 2 of Decision 608.

In the same vein, the territorial scope of application in Article 5 of Decision 608 does not refer to general cross-border effects or effects on the common market, but lists specific scenarios, in which a conduct or its effect crosses national boundaries.

European Commission, Andean Community Regional Strategy Paper 2007–2013, 2007, p. 8 <http://​www.​eeas.​europa.​eu/​andean/​rsp/​07_​13_​en.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

Baumann/Bustillo/Heirman/Macario/Máttar/Pérez, Los procesos de integración de los países de América Latina y el Caribe 2000–2001, 2002, pp. 34ff. <http://​www.​eclac.​org/​publicaciones/​xml/​5/​11175/​lcl1780e.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018; Rodríguez, in: Inter-American Dialogue, Integrating The Hemisphere, 1997, p. 10, 10.

Signed on 12 April 2006 and entered into force on 1 February 2009. For more information see <http://​www.​sice.​oas.​org/​ctyindex/​PER/​PERagreements_​e.​asp> accessed 11 November 2018.

Signed on 22 November 2006 and entered into force on the 15 May 2012. For more information see <http://​www.​sice.​oas.​org/​ctyindex/​COL/​COLagreements_​e.​asp> accessed 11 November 2018. Ecuador also negotiated with the United States with regard to a preferential trade agreement, but the parties did not reach an agreement.

Signed on 21 December 2012 and entered into force on 1 March 2013 in Peru and on 1 August 2013 in Colombia; for more information see <http://​www.​fdcl.​org/​wp-content/​uploads/​2012/​04/​CELEX_​22012A122101_​EN_​TXT.​pdf>.

European Commission, Andean Community Regional Strategy Paper 2007–2013, 2007, p. 8 <http://​www.​eeas.​europa.​eu/​andean/​rsp/​07_​13_​en.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

Article 13(2)(1) und (2) of the Preferential Trade Agreements between Peru–US and Colombia–US.

Article 13(2)(4) of the Preferential Trade Agreements between Peru–US and Colombia–US.

However, one has to recall that Colombia and Peru at the moment of the signing and entry into force of the bilateral trade agreements already possessed national competition law policy, laws and institutions.

El Comercio Perú, 23 May 2010, “Evo Morales critica a Europa por “dividir” a la Comunidad Andina con TLC”. According to the article, the President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, criticized the trade agreement between the European Union and Peru and between the European Union and Colombia.

See for example Article 13(2)(4) of the Preferential Trade Agreement between Peru–US, which explicitly refers to the AndeanC’s regional competition law structure. See also Title VIII of the Preferential Trade Agreement between Peru and Colombia and the European Union.

Article 2 of Decision 608.

Horna/Kayali, in: Alvarez/Wilse-Samson, Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2007, p. 21, 52.

Horna/Kayali, in: Alvarez/Wilse-Samson, Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2007, p. 21, 28.

According to Horna/Kayali the United States accounts for 26% of Peru’s exports and 19% of its overall imports. Horna/Kayali, in: Alvarez/Wilse-Samson, Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2007, p. 21, 52.

Preamble of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 171: “Integration is not an option for these territories; it is a necessity for survival in the world-economy.”. See also Beckford, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 185, 187: “Market integration is one of the central objectives of competition policy under the RTC”.

Article 169(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Since 1971, United Nation has recognized the category of “Least Developed Countries” (LDCs) for States that are disadvantaged with regard to their development progress and which therefore are particularly vulnerable to poverty. For more information see <http://​unctad.​org/​en/​Pages/​ALDC/​Least%20​Developed%20​Countries/​Research-and-Policy-Analysis-on-LDCs.​aspx> accessed 11 November 2018.

See for example Preamble of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas: “Acknowledging further that some Member States, particularly the Less Developed Countries, are entering the CSME at a disadvantage by reason of size, structure and vulnerability of their economies; and (…) [c]onscious further that disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors will require a transitional period to facilitate adjustment to competition in the CSME; [c]ommitted to establish effective measures, programmes and mechanisms to assist disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors of the Community”.

Article 1 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 51(2) lit. a), lit. c), lit. e) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 51(2) lit. h) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Article 56(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

The same cement company, which also filed a complaint against the CARICOM Competition Commission. In total, there were three cases involving the TCL company before the Court of Justice.

Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2009; Trinidad Cement Limited v The State of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 2 of 2009. Another case before the Caribbean Court of Justice concerning the Common External Tariff is Hummingbird Rice Mills Ltd v Suriname and The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2011.

According to studies conducted by the CARICOM Secretariat from 2009 to 2012, the CSME is operating at about 64% level of compliance, the free movement of skills at 66% and the free movement of goods at 80%, <http://​www.​csmeonline.​org/​en/​news/​item/​137-csme-operating-at-about-64-level-of-compliance> accessed 11 November 2018.

According to studies conducted by the CARICOM Secretariat from 2009 to 2012, the right of establishment operates at about a 64% level of compliance and the free movement of services at 37%, <http://​www.​csmeonline.​org/​en/​news/​item/​137-csme-operating-at-about-64-level-of-compliance> accessed 11 November 2018. A representative of the CSME-Unit of the CARICOM Secretariat argued that the lack of compliance in these areas was in particular due to the difficulties to monitor compliance.

Executive Summary of the Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2010, p. 1 <http://​www.​caricom.​org/​jsp/​community_​organs/​ctir_​2010_​executive_​summary.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

Executive Summary of the Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2010, p. 2 <http://​www.​caricom.​org/​jsp/​community_​organs/​ctir_​2010_​executive_​summary.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

Stewart, An Empirical Examination of Competition Issues in Selected Caricom Countries, 2004, pp. 112ff. For more information on anti-competitive practices in the tourism sector of small market economies, see Rodriguez/Murdy, Anti-Competitive Practices in the Tourism Industry: The Case of Small Economies, 4/10 J. Business & Economics Research 43, 43ff. (2006).

Pollard, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM Single Market and Economy Genesis and Prognosis, 2007, p. 91, 97.

Article 2 of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement.

For more information on the status and incorporation of the Dominican Republic, see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 181.

Article 1 lit. a) of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement.

Article 4 of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement.

Article 127(1) of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement.

Article 127(1) of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement.

Article 127 of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement only uses the term “may” instead of “shall”. Article 130 of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement does not refer to specific enforcement cooperation, but cooperation in the sense of technical assistance and capacity building.

The provisions on cooperation are only drafted in non-mandatory term, albeit this would help developing countries to enforce competition law bearing in mind their lack of resources and lack of expertise. Developing countries are especially struggling with anticompetitive practices by international firms with “deep pockets”. In the CARICOM, this “power asymmetry” is particularly visible in the tourism sector, which is the leading economic sector in the Commonwealth Caribbean region. However, the sector is dominated by international and partly Jamaican tour operators, see Stewart, An empirical examination of competition issues in selected Caricom countries, 2004, pp. 114ff. The CARIFORUM-EC EPA does not cover the issue of jurisdictional constraint to investigate foreign firms, see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 183.

Pollard, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM: Policy Options for International Engagement, 2010, p. 467, 476.

In 2009, the Regional Negotiating Machinery was transformed into a specialized department of the Secretariat General and was renamed Office of Trade Negotiations. For more information see <http://​www.​crnm.​org/> accessed 11 November 2018.

Pollard, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM: Policy Options for International Engagement, 2010, p. 467, 476.

Honourable Judge at the Caribbean Court of Justice.

Pollard, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM: Policy Options for International Engagement, 2010, p. 467, 476.

Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 184.

Jenny/Horna, in: Brusick/Alvarez/Cernat, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2005, p. 281, 320.

Horna/Kayali, in: Alvarez/Wilse-Samson, Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2007, p. 21, 31.

Burkina Faso: Article 1 of Loi n° 15/94 du 15 Mai 1994 relative à la concurrence; Senegal: Article 1 and 2 of Loi n° 1994/63 du 22 Août 1994 sur les prix, la concurrence et le contentieux économique; Mali: Article 3 of L’Ordonnance n° 07-025 du 18 Juillet 2007 portant organisation de la concurrence; Togo: Article 1 of Loi n° 99-011 du 28 Décembre 1999 portant organisation de la concurrence au Togo; Bénin: Article 3 of L’Ordonnance n° 20/PR/MFAEP du 5 Julillet 1967 portant réglementation des prix et des stocks; Ivory Coast: Article 1 of Loi n° 91-999 du 27 Décembre 1991 relative à la concurrence.

Burkina Faso: Article 1 of Loi n° 15/94 du 15 Mai 1994 relative à la concurrence, Decree n° 2003-615/PRES/PM/MCOEMFB du 13 Novembre 2003 portant réglementation des prix et produits, biens et services soumis à contrôle; Senegal: Article 23 of Loi n° 1994/63 du 22 Août 1994 sur les prix, la concurrence et le contentieux économique; Mali: Article 3 of L’Ordonnance n° 07-025 du 18 Juillet 2007 portant organisation de la concurrence; Togo: Article 1(2) of Loi n° 99-011 du 28 Décembre 1999 portant organisation de la concurrence au Togo; Bénin: Article 4 of L’Ordonnance n° 20/PR/MFAEP du 5 Julillet 1967 portant réglementation des prix et des stocks; Niger: Article 5 of Ordonnance n° 92-025 du 7 Juillet 1992 portant réglementation des prix et de la concurrence; Ivory Coast: Article 2(1) of Loi n° 91-999 du 27 Décembre 1991 relative à la concurrence.

For example in Senegal: CUTS, Vers des régimes efficients de la concurrence par le renforcement des capacités dans des pays sélectionnés d’Afrique de l’Ouest, 2009, p. 28 <http://​www.​cuts-ccier.​org/​7up4/​pdf/​PCP-Senegal.​pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.

For example: Burkina Faso: Articles 23 and 24 of Loi relative à la concurrence, Loi 33-2001 du 4 décembre 2001; Mali: Articles 36ff. of L’Ordonnance n° 07-025/P-RM du 16 Juillet 2007 portant Organisation de la concurrence.

This for example corresponds to the experiences of the Jamaican Fair Trading Commission, see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.3.1.

See above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.3.1.

Article 2 of Decision 608 of 2005.

Article 1 of Legislative Decree N° 1034: “Finalidad de la presente Ley.- La presente Ley prohibe y a sanciona las conductas anticompetitivas con la finalidad de promover la eficienciy económica en los mercados para el bienestar de los consumidores”.

Statement made during several interviews conducted with representatives of the Bolivian competition agency by the author in January/February 2012 in La Paz, Bolivia.

See also National Development Plan of the Republic of Ecuador: National Plan for Good Living, 2009 to 2013, Building a Plurinational and Intercultural State, p. 24: “The Fundamental Law strengthens the State by recovering its planning, regulating and redistributing role, and as a guarantor of public matters. It is not a simplistic statist vision in which the role of the market is merely replaced by the role of the State. On the contrary, by strengthening and expanding rights and recognizing participation as an essential element in the construction of the new society, the Constitution seeks to strengthen society and not merely the State.”. See also Article 304 of the New Constitution of Ecuador of 2008: “La política comercial tendrá los siguentes objetivos: Evitar las prácticas monopólicas y oligopólicas, particularemente en el sector privado, y otras que afecten el funcionamiento en los mercados.”. See also Article 335 of the New Constitution of Ecuador of 2008: “El Estado regulará, controlará e intervendrá, cuando sea necesario, en los intercambios y transacciones económicas; y sancionará la explotación, usura, acaparamiento, simulación, intermediación especulativa de los bienes y servicios, así como toda forma de perjuicio a los derechos económicos y a los bienes públicos y colectivos. El Estado definirá una política de precios orientada a proteger la producción nacional, establecerá los mecanismos de sanción para evitar cualquier práctica de monopolio y oligopolio privados, o de abuso de posición de dominio en el mercado y otras prácticas de competencia desleal.”. For general information on the Ecuadorian competition law, see Quevedo, El Derecho de la Libre Competencia en el Nuevo Marco Constitucional del Ecuador, 2011 and Andrade, Lineamientos para un Régimen Jurídico de la Competencia en el Ecuador, 16/2 Rev. Jur. Univ. Católica 13, 13ff. (2003).

Article 314 of the Bolivian Constitution of 2009: “Se prohíbe el monopolio y el oligopolio privado, así como cualquier otra forma de asociación o acuerdo de personas naturales o jurídicas privadas, bolivianas o extranjeras, que pretendan el control y la exclusividad en la producción y comercialización de bienes y servicios.”

El Telégrafo, 25 March 2013, “Hay intereses muy poderosos que quieren evitar un cambio – Entrevista con Pedro Páez, Superintendente de control del poder de mercado” <http://​www.​telegrafo.​com.​ec/​economia/​item/​hay-intereses-muy-poderosos-que-quieren-evitar-un-cambio.​html>.

Revista Gestión, Economía y Sociedad, N° 225, March 2013, pp. 22–26, “La codicia no puede ser el único moto del país: Pedro Páez” <http://​scpm.​gob.​ec/​entrevista-a-pedro-paez-superintendente-de-control-de-poder-del-mercado-revista-gestion/​>.

The Washington Consensus refers to a package of economic policy prescriptions that were promoted by institutions located in Washington D.C., such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in order to enhance economic stability and growth of developing countries that had been under economic crises.

Botta, The Role of Competition Policy in the Latin American Regional Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Caricom, Andean Community and Mercosur, 21–22 October 2011, St. Gallen, p. 22; see also Peña, in: Marsden, Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust, 2006, pp. 732, 743f.

Peña, in: Marsden, Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust, 2006, p. 732, 744. According to Peña, indirect price control even took place in Peru.

For example, before Ecuador enacted its domestic competition law, it actually supported the adoption of a regional competition policy. After the implementation of the national competition law, Ecuador refrained from further supporting Decision 608.

In 2012, Bolivia also joined the MERCOSUR. It also holds close economic relations with Venezuela. It is to be noted that Venezuela was willing to “abandon” the AndeanC (it withdrew from the AndeanC in 2006) to become a member of the MERCOSUR. For more information see The New York Times, 8 December 2005, “South American Trade Blocs Moves to Admit Venezuela” <http://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2005/​12/​08/​business/​worldbusiness/​08trade.​html?​_​r=​0>.

In contrast to the WAEMU, in which there are attempts to reconcile the WAEMU with the ECOWAS and OHADA, because the memberships of participating states overlap.

Competent for these sectors are regulatory bodies, the Telecommunication Authority in Trinidad and Tobago and the Office of Utility Regulation in Jamaica. See generally on the telecommunications sectors in CARICOM member states Stewart, in: Schatan/Avalos, Condiciones y Políticas de Competencia, 2006, p. 331, 375.

See below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.​1.​2 and Part II, Dimension V: Sect. 9.​2.​4.

The probable superior relevance of the consumer welfare approach in CARICOM competition law was also highlighted by the Chairman of the CARICOM Competition Commission, Kusha Haraksingh in an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 2012. The future actions of the CARICOM Competition Commission will demonstrate how the objectives set out in Article 2 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas will be balanced and applied.

Feature Address by the Honourable David Thompson Q.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Barbados at the Opening Ceremony of the Convocation of the CSME, Lloyd Erskine Sandiford Conference Centre, Bridgetown, Barbados, 9 October 2009: “(…) I believe this capacity constraint, and not disinterest in the CSME, is responsible for any examples of irregular application of the provisions across the Community.” He further mentions particular problems in the field of the free movement of labour and the different levels of development. For more details on the “State of play in economic integration” in the CARICOM, see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 161, 173ff.

This is the case in the financial sector of Trinidad and Tobago, see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 161, 179.

The most drastic example for the unequal economic power among member states within a RTA is the CARICOM, in which Trinidad and Tobago and respective firms (to a certain extent also Barbados) constitute the economically most powerful players within the CSME, see Smith-Hillman, The Prospect of a Caribbean Competition Policy, 40 J. W. Trade 405, 407 (2006). For a general overview of CARICOM intra-regional trade, see Ibid., p. 414.