nach oben

Artificial Intelligence and Law

Erschienen in:

01.06.2010

Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law

verfasst von: Trevor Bench-Capon, Henry Prakken

Erschienen in: Artificial Intelligence and Law | Ausgabe 2/2010

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This paper studies the use of hypothetical and value-based reasoning in US Supreme-Court cases concerning the United States Fourth Amendment. Drawing upon formal AI & Law models of legal argument a semi-formal reconstruction is given of parts of the Carney case, which has been studied previously in AI & law research on case-based reasoning. As part of the reconstruction, a semi-formal proposal is made for extending the formal AI & Law models with forms of metalevel reasoning in several argument schemes. The result is compared with Rissland’s (1989) analysis in terms of dimensions and Ashley’s (2008) analysis in terms of his process model of legal argument with hypotheticals.

Vorheriger Artikel A hybrid formal theory of arguments, stories and criminal evidence

Nächster Artikel Doing justice to rights and values: teleological reasoning and proportionality

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

This paper is an extended and revised version of Bench-Capon and Prakken (2009).

California v. Carney, 471 US 386 (1985).

Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 (1925).

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364 (1976).

United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977).

United States v. Ross 456 US 798 (1982).

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971).

The advice given at the North Carolina Justice Academy (http://www.jus.state.nc.us/NCJA/legdec94.htm) states “If the motor home is parked on the curtilage of a residence (the area immediately surrounding the home that is so intimately tied to it that it is accorded Fourth Amendment protection) it may not be searched without a warrant or consent.”

Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972). In this capital punishment case Marshall actually rejected a value, retribution, that the founders had regarded as important.

For example, Burger’s dissent in Furman insists that retribution is a legitimate value, recognised by the founders, and able to motivate legislation.

Stevens in fact argues that it would have been possible to obtain a warrant in Carney.

The capacity to be “quickly moved” was clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception.

There is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulations inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. This is intended to represent Burger’s argument in South Dakota v. Opperman, quoted above.

This is intended to represent Burger’s finding in Carney that the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle. This is the test that was introduced in this case to identify situations where a mobile home could be searched without a warrant.

The examples in Ashley (2008) paraphrase the actual exchange. An extract from the transcript can be found in Rissland (1989).

Also a paraphrase of the extract quoted in Rissland (1989).

We use this example rather than the example given in Ashley (2008), since that example greatly condenses the actual exchange. The justice hypothesises that a tent is pitched next to the van. It is not clear to us whether the justice thinks the tent should be subject to search, which would be a case of the test being too narrow, or that it should not, despite the fact that it can be readily moved, and that insufficient weight is given to privacy considerations in the proposed test.

Amgoud L, Bodenstaff L, Caminada M, McBurney P, Parsons S, Prakken H, van Veenen J, Vreeswijk G (2006) Final review and report on formal argumentation system. Deliverable D2.6, ASPIC IST-FP6-002307

Ashley K (2008) A process model of legal argument with hypotheticals. In: Francesconi E, Sartor G, Tiscornia (eds) Legal knowledge and information systems. JURIX 2008: the twentyfirst annual conference. IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp 1–10

Bench-Capon T (1991) Knowledge based systems applied to law: a framework for discussion. In: Bench-Capon T (eds) Knowledge based systems and legal applications. Academic Press, London, pp 329–342

Bench-Capon T (2009) Towards computational modelling of Supreme Court opinions: Furman v Georgia. In: Atkinson K (eds) Modelling legal cases. Vol. 5 of IDT Series. Huygens Editorial, Barcelona, pp 63–75

Bench-Capon T, Prakken H (2009) A case study of hypothetical and value-based reasoning in US Supreme-Court cases. In: Governatori G (eds) Legal knowledge and information systems. JURIX 2009: the twenty-second annual conference. IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp 11–20

Bench-Capon T, Sartor G (2003) A model of legal reasoning with cases incorporating theories and values. Artif Intell 150:97–143MATHCrossRef

Bex F (2009) Evidence for a good story. A hybrid theory of arguments, stories and criminal evidence. Doctoral dissertation Faculty of Law, University of Groningen

Dung P (1995) On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, and n-person games. Artif Intell 77:321–357MATHCrossRefMathSciNet

Gordon T, Walton D (2009) Legal reasoning with argumentation schemes. In: Proceedings of the twelfth international conference on artificial intelligence and law. ACM Press, New York, pp 137–146

Hage J (1996) A theory of legal reasoning and a logic to match. Artif Intell Law 4:199–273CrossRef

Hage J (2004) Comparing alternatives in the law. Legal applications of qualitative comparative reasoning. Artif Intell Law 12:181–225CrossRef

Hamfelt A (1995) Formalizing multiple interpretation of legal knowledge. Artif Intell Law 3:221–265CrossRef

Kowalski R, Kim J (1991) A metalogic programming approach to multi-agent knowledge and belief. In: Lifschitz V (eds) Artificial intelligence and mathematical theory of computation: papers in Honour of John McCarthy. Academic Press, Boston, pp 231–246

Lessig L (1993) Fidelity in translation. Texas Law Rev 71(6):1165

Lewis D (1973) Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford

Loui R, Norman J (1995) Rationales and argument moves. Artif Intell Law 3:159–189CrossRef

Mackie J (1973) Truth, probability and paradox. OUP, OxfordMATH

Modgil S (2009) Reasoning about preferences in argumentation frameworks. Artif Intell 173:901–934MATHCrossRefMathSciNet

Modgil S, Prakken H (2010) Reasoning about preferences in structured extended argumentation frameworks. In: Baroni G, Simari G (eds) Computational models of argument. Proceedings of COMMA 2010. IOS Press, Amsterdam

Prakken H (2002) An exercise in formalising teleological case-based reasoning. Artif Intell Law 10:113–133CrossRef

Prakken H (2010) An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments. Argument Comput 1

Prakken H (2011) Reconstructing Popov v. Hayashi in a framework for argumentation with structured arguments and Dungean semantics. Knowl Eng Rev. Available at: http://www.cs.uu.nl/groups/IS/archive/henry/ker09.pdf (to appear)

Prakken H, Sartor G (1997) Argument-based extended logic programming with defeasible priorities. J Appl Non-class Logics 7:25–75MATHMathSciNet

Rissland E (1989) Dimension-based analysis of hypotheticals from Supreme Court oral arguments. In: Proceedings of the second international conference on artificial intelligence and law. ACM Press, New York, pp 111–120

Routen T, Bench-Capon TJM (1991) Hierarchical formalizations. Int J Man Mach Stud 35(1):69–93CrossRef

Sartor G (2009) Legal policies and theories of legality: from bananas to Radbruch’s formula. Ratio Juris 22:218–243CrossRef

Titel: Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law
verfasst von: Trevor Bench-Capon
Henry Prakken
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2010
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Artificial Intelligence and Law / Ausgabe 2/2010
Print ISSN: 0924-8463
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-8382
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-010-9094-8

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Premium Partner