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Minds and Machines

Erschienen in:

01.12.2017

Implementation of Moral Uncertainty in Intelligent Machines

verfasst von: Kyle Bogosian

Erschienen in: Minds and Machines | Ausgabe 4/2017

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Abstract

The development of artificial intelligence will require systems of ethical decision making to be adapted for automatic computation. However, projects to implement moral reasoning in artificial moral agents so far have failed to satisfactorily address the widespread disagreement between competing approaches to moral philosophy. In this paper I argue that the proper response to this situation is to design machines to be fundamentally uncertain about morality. I describe a computational framework for doing so and show that it efficiently resolves common obstacles to the implementation of moral philosophy in intelligent machines.

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Titel: Implementation of Moral Uncertainty in Intelligent Machines
verfasst von: Kyle Bogosian
Publikationsdatum: 01.12.2017
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Minds and Machines / Ausgabe 4/2017
Print ISSN: 0924-6495
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-8641
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9448-z

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