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Erschienen in: Public Choice 3-4/2013

01.12.2013

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

A principal-supervisor-agent model

verfasst von: Urs Steiner Brandt, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2013

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Abstract

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of truth-telling by the supervisor. Overall, this analysis points to the risks of flawed incentives and the lack of institutional independence among principal, agent, supervisor and client. Our main policy recommendations as a result of these findings are that OLAF should be placed outside the Commission, and that whistleblowers should receive adequate protection.

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Fußnoten
1
For a critical examination of the usefulness of applying the principal-agent model to analyze the EU, see Kassim and Menon (2003) and Hodson (2009).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?
A principal-supervisor-agent model
verfasst von
Urs Steiner Brandt
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2013
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0095-5

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