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Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 4/2010

01.05.2010 | Original Research

Managerial motivation and timing of open market share repurchases

verfasst von: Zahn Bozanic

Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | Ausgabe 4/2010

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Abstract

There are two major mechanisms by which managers distribute cash to shareholders: through dividends and share repurchases. Historically, dividends have been the preferred method, but in recent years, share repurchases have become more popular, with more firms using repurchases than dividends to distribute cash. During the sample period of 2004–2006, 6.5 billion shares were repurchased for a total dollar volume amount of $222 billion. Using a unique dataset on actual monthly share repurchases, this paper investigates when and why managers repurchase shares in the open market. The paper finds evidence that firms which make repurchases are jointly timing their repurchases to perceived undervaluation and the presence of discretionary cash flow. In addition, the paper finds evidence which supports that (1) firms in competitive industries tend to repurchase less, (2) firms tend to substitute repurchases for anti-takeover provision adoption, and (3) firms attempt to manage earnings upward through the use of repurchases.

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Fußnoten
1
Due to the SEC’s “safe harbor” provisions adopted in 1982 (Rule 10b-18) firms are relatively immune from allegations of market manipulation so long as repurchases are carried out under the SEC’s guidelines.
 
2
Pursuant to Rule 10b-18, effective December 17th, 2003, amended Regulation S–K (viz., 17 CFR §229.703) requires publicly traded firms to disclose repurchases on a monthly basis in 10-Q and 10-K disclosures for periods ending on or after March 15, 2004 (regardless of whether or not repurchases are part of a previously announced repurchase program).
 
3
Since this paper focuses on announcements rather than actual repurchases, it sidesteps the issues involved with measuring actual share repurchases; in doing so, however, the paper may be capturing short-term effects only since announcing a repurchase program does not commit the firm to repurchase. On the other hand, Ikenberry, et al. (1995) do investigate the long-term effects of share repurchases. They find large abnormal long-run BHAR’s for high B/M repurchasers, though their analysis too focuses on announcements rather than actual share repurchases.
 
4
Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms close to zero earnings are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation to avoid losses through real activities manipulation, such as sales (acceleration, price discounts, or lenient credit terms), reductions in discretionary expenditures (R&D, advertising, maintenance), or overproduction to lower COGS via lower unit costs.
 
5
The inferences remain unchanged by the use of Rogers (1993) robust industry-clustered standard errors.
 
6
The results are robust to modifying LEADRET to account for dividends and splits.
 
7
As G-index data are not available on an annual basis, I use the most recent number as reported by the IRRC.
 
8
With respect to the latter, there is a statistically significant correlation with the sample data of 0.68. Although high, as one would expect, it is far from perfect—providing some evidence of bias in the indirect Compustat measure. With respect to the former, there is a statistically significant correlation with the sample data of 0.36—demonstrating even more bias in the indirect CRSP measure of the number of shares repurchased.
 
9
The results are robust to match-adjusted independent variables which are matched on sales, assets, and industry using propensity score matching.
 
10
Although mathematically one would expect earnings to mechanically increase as a result of the repurchase event, this test corroborates the notion that firms around the zero-earnings threshold are more likely to repurchase in order to escape having to report negative earnings.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Dittmar AK, Dittmar R (2006) The timing of stock repurchases. (Working Paper) Dittmar AK, Dittmar R (2006) The timing of stock repurchases. (Working Paper)
Zurück zum Zitat Easterbrook FH (1984) Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. Am Econ Rev 74(4):650–659 Easterbrook FH (1984) Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. Am Econ Rev 74(4):650–659
Zurück zum Zitat Jensen MC (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Am Econ Rev 76(2):323–329 Jensen MC (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Am Econ Rev 76(2):323–329
Zurück zum Zitat Rogers WH (1993) Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Tech Bull 13:19–23 Rogers WH (1993) Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Tech Bull 13:19–23
Zurück zum Zitat White H (1980) A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48(4):817–838. doi:10.2307/1912934 CrossRef White H (1980) A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48(4):817–838. doi:10.​2307/​1912934 CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Managerial motivation and timing of open market share repurchases
verfasst von
Zahn Bozanic
Publikationsdatum
01.05.2010
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting / Ausgabe 4/2010
Print ISSN: 0924-865X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7179
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-009-0145-8

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