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01.06.2012

Dual systems and dual attitudes

verfasst von: Keith Frankish

Erschienen in: Mind & Society | Ausgabe 1/2012

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Abstract

It can be argued that dual-system theorists should adopt an action-based view of System 2 (S2), on which S2 reasoning is an intentional activity. It can also be argued that they should adopt a dual-attitude theory, on which the two systems have distinct sets of propositional attitudes. However, Peter Carruthers has argued that on the action-based view there are no S2 attitudes. This paper replies to Carruthers, proposing a view of S2 attitudes as virtual ones, which are partially realized in S1 attitudes. This view is compatible with, and a natural extension of, the action-based view.

Vorheriger Artikel Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning

Nächster Artikel Intuitive and analytical processes in insight problem solving: a psycho-rhetorical approach to the study of reasoning

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For other action-based views of conscious thought, see Dennett (1991), Frankish (2004, 2009).

Carruthers does not present his argument as one for the incompatibility of the action-based view and dual-attitude theory. He is concerned with self-knowledge, and his aim is to show that (with limited exceptions) we have no conscious propositional attitudes. Nevertheless, his argument bears directly on the compatibility issue.

For more on the nature and extent of these policies, see Frankish (2004).

Note that for a rehearsed utterance to produce a belief that one is committed to something, it need not be heard as a commitment. An utterance heard as a decision or a judgement will produce such a belief, provided one believes that decisions and judgements involve commitment.

For this reason, I have elsewhere referred to S2 beliefs as ‘virtual beliefs’ and ‘superbeliefs’ (Frankish 1998, 2004).

Actually, I doubt that a mediating intention is needed when the action is performed immediately, but I shall not argue this here.

On the case for regarding non-conscious belief as graded, see Frankish (2004).

See Frankish (2004, Chap. 8), for an analysis of akrasia along these lines.

Baars BJ (1988) A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Carruthers P (2006) The architecture of the mind: massive modularity and the flexibility of thought. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Carruthers P (2009) An architecture for dual reasoning. In: Evans JSBT, Frankish K (eds) In two minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 109–127CrossRef

Carruthers P (2011) The opacity of mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRef

Cohen LJ (1992) A essay on belief and acceptance. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Dennett DC (1978) Brainstorms: philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Bradford Books, Montgomery

Dennett DC (1991) Consciousness explained. Little, Brown, New York

Devine PG (1989) Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled components. J Pers Soc Psychol 56(1):5–18CrossRef

Evans JSBT (2011) Thinking twice: two minds in one brain. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Frankish K (1998) Natural language and virtual belief. In: Carruthers P, Boucher J (eds) Language and thought: interdisciplinary themes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 248–269

Frankish K (2004) Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRef

Frankish K (2009) Systems and levels: dual-system theories and the personal–subpersonal distinction. In: Evans JSBT, Frankish K (eds) In two minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 89–107CrossRef

Frankish K (2010) Dual-process and dual-system theories of reasoning. Philos Compass 5(10):914–926CrossRef

Frankish K, Evans J (2009) The duality of mind: an historical perspective. In: Evans JSBT, Frankish K (eds) In two minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–29CrossRef

Wilson TD, Lindsey S, Schooler TY (2000) A model of dual attitudes. Psychol Rev 107(1):101–126CrossRef

Titel: Dual systems and dual attitudes
verfasst von: Keith Frankish
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2012
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Erschienen in: Mind & Society / Ausgabe 1/2012
Print ISSN: 1593-7879
Elektronische ISSN: 1860-1839
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0094-5

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