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The Review of International Organizations

Erschienen in:

01.12.2008

Outside and inside competition for international organizations—from analysis to innovations

verfasst von: Bruno S. Frey

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 4/2008

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Abstract

The analysis of the competitive environment of international organizations has been neglected in scholarly research. Both the external and the internal type of competition in international organizations are rather weak and their performance is far from ideal. To strengthen both types of competition, several tentative proposals are advanced. They range from the introduction of an international competition agency, competition rules, a monitoring institute, voucher systems, matching contributions, popular participation rights by citizens to the use of prediction markets and institutionalized devil’s advocates. These proposals are put forward to stimulate discussion and to advance new ideas about the design of international organizations.

Vorheriger Artikel The political economy of international organizations

Nächster Artikel Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions

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For an extensive, but incomplete list see “List of International Organizations” in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_international_organizations; Non-governmental organizations; International_organization) all accessed January 29th, 2008.

For the extensive literature on the voluntary provision of international public goods see, e.g., Murdoch and Sandler (1997) and Barrett (2007).

The term “competition” starts from the premise that international organizations are independent units, each seeking the best outcome for itself. In contrast, “inter-organizational networking” (Biermann 2008) implies that it is a beneficial “response to challenges of transnational character that single organizations (and states) cannot master on their own” (p. 173).

An exception are large scandals, which decision makers of international organizations go through great trouble to avoid, and even more so, to suppress the surfacing of the respective information.

For the institution of direct democracy see, e.g., Kriesi (2005), for econometric analyses of their consequences on production see Kirchgässner et al. (1999), and on happiness Frey and Stutzer (2002), Frey (2008).

I owe this proposal to Felix Oberholzer-Gee.

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Titel: Outside and inside competition for international organizations—from analysis to innovations
verfasst von: Bruno S. Frey
Publikationsdatum: 01.12.2008
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 4/2008
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-008-9045-2

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