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Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations 2/2009

01.06.2009

Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries

verfasst von: Martin S. Edwards

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 2/2009

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Abstract

Public opinions regarding the international economic organizations (IEOs; the IMF, World Bank, and WTO) are understudied. I contrast five lines of argument using a multi-country survey of developing countries, focusing on evaluations of the economy, skills, gender, and ideology and measures of involvement with the organizations themselves. At the individual level, respondents have negative views if they have negative views of the state of the economy. More educated respondents are more likely to have negative views of the IEOs. Women are more likely to have positive views of the IEOs than men. National levels of engagement with the IEOs also affect public evaluations of them. Evaluations of the state of the economy are more influential determinants of IEO evaluations in states that receive IMF and World Bank loans, as well as in states that are active in WTO dispute resolution.

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Fußnoten
1
These findings mirror those in the American and comparative literatures (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewet 1979, 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988).
 
2
Compliance with IMF and World Bank programs is an important issue. For the IMF, Mussa and Savastano (1999) note that between 1973 and 1997, more than a third of all Fund arrangements ended with disbursements of less than half of the original support. World Bank (1997) reports that less than 30% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have a good record of program compliance. As Nsouli et al. (2005:140) note, successfully implemented IMF programs exhibit better performance in inflation and fiscal policy. This is not to imply that noncompliance with IMF programs is costless. Recent work evaluating the catalytic effects of IMF programs (Edwards 2005) notes that program suspensions by the IMF lead to capital flight. Vreeland (2006) provides an extensive overview of the issues surrounding compliance with IMF programs.
 
3
The results of the survey are available at http://​people-press.​org/​reports/​pdf/​165.​pdf, and the codebook and data are available at http://​people-press.​org/​dataarchive/​. The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented here.
 
4
As Hayo (1999) notes, actual knowledge by Europeans about the EU is quite low.
 
5
The appendix contains the exact text of all questions used in the data analysis.
 
6
Not all the surveys were based on random samples. Thus, the analysis presented here relies on weighted data to ensure that urban respondents were not oversampled relative to rural ones.
 
7
Relying on data on flows help mitigate concerns about omitting the degree of program compliance, since the money is only given if the Fund certifies that the conditions have been met. For more on this, see Dreher (2006).
 
8
The VIFs between these national-level regressors were very low (1.81 for model with IMF, 2.73 for model with IBRD flows), which mitigates concerns about collinearity between these aggregate-level variables.
 
9
I also reestimated these models replacing the Freedom House score with the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. The variable is significant in all models and in the same direction as the Freedom House score for education, partisanship, gender, and changes in future economic situation. The variable was significant and in the opposite direction for economic situation and household income.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries
verfasst von
Martin S. Edwards
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2009
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 2/2009
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9057-6

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