nach oben

Studies in Comparative International Development

Erschienen in:

01.06.2010

Global Pressures, National Policies, and Labor Rights in Latin America

verfasst von: Katrina Burgess

Erschienen in: Studies in Comparative International Development | Ausgabe 2/2010

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of countervailing external pressures on labor rights in 17 Latin American countries. On the one hand, these countries have been urged to reform their labor laws and practices to comply with international labor standards, including protections for the collective rights of workers. On the other hand, they have been pressured to adopt more flexible labor markets, which often undermine collective labor organization. After dividing the countries by the type of political regime that prevailed when the pattern of relations between labor and the state was being established, the paper presents and explains the results of indices created to measure two outcomes: labor standards and labor market flexibility. It then analyzes the impact of four types of external actors (the ILO, national governments pursuing trade agreements, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions) on these outcomes, both de jure and de facto. The paper's main finding is that these actors have had an impact on labor outcomes in the region, but that their influence is heavily mediated by domestic factors, particularly historical legacies of state-labor relations.

Vorheriger Artikel More Rights, Less Power: Labor Standards and Labor Markets in East European Post-communist States

Nächster Artikel Labor Standards and Labor Market Flexibility in East Asia

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Although Hugo Chávez has moved Venezuela in an authoritarian direction, I argue that the regime still qualifies as an electoral democracy because he has carried out his radical restructuring of the political system with the majority support of the electorate.

My categorization borrows heavily from the critical juncture approach to state-labor relations pioneered by David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier (1991). Following the Colliers, I argue that certain patterns of interaction between labor and the state, embodied in both formal and informal institutions, were established during the formative period of early industrialization and working class mobilization in Latin America. I depart from the Colliers, however, in how I categorize my cases. Besides having more than twice as many countries in my sample, I place more emphasis on the terms of labor incorporation (inclusive vs. exclusive) than the agents of incorporation (state vs. parties). Nonetheless, I chose not to limit my categories to exclusionary vs. inclusionary (Murillo 2001) or elitist vs. labor-mobilizing (Roberts 2002) because, while useful, these distinctions leave out important nuances, particularly the degree to which different regimes protected individual and/or collective labor rights.

In Argentina and Bolivia, labor-backed parties adopted pro-worker policies and granted their union allies a privileged position in the labor movement while they controlled the government (1946–1955 in Argentina and 1952–1965 in Bolivia). In Peru, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) did not control the government until the mid-1980s, but it collaborated closely with several administrations in the 1940s and 1950s that granted significant privileges to workers and unions (Collier and Collier 1991).

As illustrated in Table 2, Bolivia's pro-labor legislation was the most seriously weakened by dictatorial rule and the party's alliance with conservative regimes. Nonetheless, the Bolivian Workers' Central continues to wield considerable influence, whereas unions in Peru practically disappeared during the 1980s and 1990s.

Today, Brazil's strongest party is the Worker's Party (PT), but the PT was not founded until 1980.

Although unions were marginalized and often repressed during the authoritarian regime, the military rulers maintained the corporatist structure of the state and protective legislation for individual workers.

In addition, Costa Rica is notorious for promoting solidarista associations, which function like credit unions for workers and tend to be controlled by employers (Frundt 1998: 230, fn. 6).

In Chile, the Allende government was strongly supportive of unions, which enjoyed an organizational boom in the early 1970s, but it did not reform the labor code inherited from conservative governments.

Guatemala did have a brief period of left government prior to US-backed coup in 1954, but most of the gains made by unions were wiped out by the subsequent military-backed regimes.

Nicaragua is an exception to this trend because of legislation passed by the Sandinistas in the 1980s.

An excellent example is the negotiation of “protection contracts” between Mexican unions and employers, which account for the vast majority of collective contracts registered with the labor authorities (Barba García 2004: 112). These contracts, which are often sold to employers without the workers' knowledge, prevent organization of the workplace by a more militant union (Burgess 2004: 41–42).

Guatemala's higher score reflects its high firing costs (101 weeks of pay), which are nearly double the world average (51 weeks of pay).

Nicaragua's low score is especially striking given the decade of rule by the labor-backed Sandinistas.

Only Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela had ratified Convention No. 138 before 1990.

Chile ratified the core conventions on discrimination during the Allende administration.

Recent examples of the ILO's limited ability to block anti-union reforms include the Fujimori administration's passage of a highly restrictive Industrial Relations Act in Peru in 1992 and the Chavez administration's use of a popular referendum to restructure the Venezuelan labor movement in 2000, both of which elicited strong criticisms from the ILO.

The US Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act (CBTPA) in 2000 to replace the CBI. The new legislation extended benefits equivalent to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to several products previously excluded from the agreement, most notably textile and garment products manufactured with US components.

Nicaragua has not participated in the GSP program since 1987, when it lost its privileges pursuant to a proclamation issued by President Reagan. Prior to the Central American Free Trade Agreement, however, it was subject to similar labor provisions as a member of the CBI and the CBTPA.

For a detailed review of these labor law reforms in El Salvador and Guatemala, see Frundt 1998. In response to renewed GSP pressures in 2000, Guatemala made further reforms to its labor code in 2001.

In Guatemala, GSP pressure contributed to the first recognition of a union and a collective bargaining agreement in an export processing plant (AFL-CIO 2003: 58), an agreement between the largest coffee growers' association and two peasant unions (Frundt 1998: 156), the reinstatement of banana workers unjustly fired for union activities, and the conviction of assailants who had beaten union leaders (Compa and Vogt 2000–2001). In Honduras, GSP pressure prompted an agreement between the USTR and the government of Honduras to improve implementation of its labor code, which was followed by a 3-month work suspension against a Korean factory for labor violations (Frundt 1998: 204–205).

Regional groupings such as Mercosur and the Andean Community have also incorporated ILO-inspired labor provisions into their agreements, but the bodies created to promote labor rights tend to be advisory with little or no enforcement capacity. In other words, they are closer to the ILO model than the NAFTA model.

Specifically, complaints relating to union autonomy are excluded from consideration by the Evaluation Committee of Experts (AFL-CIO 2003).

The NAALC does include some basic guarantees related to labor justice (Vega Ruiz 2009: 14), but these have not led to meaningful improvements in the very weak enforcement of labor rights in Mexico.

Chile and Mexico have also negotiated FTAs with the European Union, but labor standards are notably absent from these agreements.

For details on improvements in legislation and enforcement made in anticipation of US FTAs with countries in Central America and the Andean region, see EIU 2006; Frundt 2002: 28–29; and Anner 2008. Some improvements in enforcement, especially in national inspection systems, have continued after the negotiation of US FTAs (Vega Ruiz 2009), but it is not clear what factors are motivating these changes.

Bolivia promised to increase protections against child labor, and Brazil promised to reduce restrictions on union organization. The other references to CLS were vague promises to improve worker protection and/or increase enforcement of existing standards.

For example, the Letters of Intent provided by Uruguay in 1999 and Argentina in 2000 included promises to decentralize collective bargaining.

Murillo's study does not include Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay, presumably because they did not enact any labor law reforms during the 1990s.

In Peru, the collapse of the Fujimori regime in 2000 prompted efforts to reverse some of the radically anti-labor reforms enacted during the 1990s, but employers have successfully blocked attempts by the Congress to pass a new General Labor Law. Thus, the 1991 Employment Promotion Act still governs employment protection, although Congress passed a law in 2002 regulating part-time and temporary help, and the García administration recently decreed restrictions on outsourcing (EIU 2007).

Argentina also created an unemployment insurance program in 1991. As in Venezuela, the program conformed to the IFIs' conception of appropriate worker protection but proved inadequate to address Argentina's high unemployment and growing informal sector.

The government also created an unemployment fund that requires employers to contribute 4% of each worker's monthly wage.

Murillo characterizes Paraguay as having no reform of individual labor law in the 1990s, but Bronstein's analysis suggests that its reform was comparable to that of El Salvador.

For example, the IMF criticized the government's plan to allow collective bargaining at the inter-company level in a July 2001 Article IV Consultation report, arguing that it would reduce labor market flexibility (AFL-CIO 2003: 194).

The IMF did encourage flexibilizing reforms in Uruguay, particularly with regard to public employees (IMF 2002), but the government did not take its advice.

An estimated 67% of the labor force works in the informal sector in Bolivia, compared with 43% in Mexico (ILO 2006).

Specifically, the competitive pressures associated with open markets and greater dependence on foreign investment have contributed to downward pressure on wages, wage dispersion within global production chains, increased informality (partly as a result of the high costs of severance pay and/or social security in the formal sector), and the incorporation of flexibilizing measures into collective contracts.

The standard deviation for DJF is 10.2, compared with only 4.3 for DFF.

Even after removing the outliers, we continue to find very little correlation between de jure labor standards and flexibility (R = 0.19).

Between 1990–1995 and 1996–2000, unionization rates dropped from 27% to 5% in El Salvador and from 11% to 4% in Guatemala (ILO 2002: 61).

AFL-CIO. Justice for all. Washington: American Center for International Labor Solidarity; 2003.

AFL-CIO. CAFTA won't fix Central America's deeply flawed labor laws. Global Fairness. 2004.

Anner M. The impact of labor law reform in Latin America: when more protection is not enough. Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; Chicago; 2005.

Anner M. Meeting the challenges of industrial restructuring: labor reform and enforcement in Latin America. Lat Am Polit Soc. 2008;50(2):33.

Bakvis P. Giving workers the business: World Bank support for labor deregulation. Multinatl Monit. 2006;28(4):22–8.

Barba García H. La contratación colectiva en México. In: La reforma que necesitamos. México: UNAM; 2004.

Bronstein AS. Societal change and industrial relations in Latin America: trends and prospects. Int Labour Rev. 1995;134(2):163–87.

Bronstein AS. Labour law reform in Latin America: between state protection and flexibility. Int Labour Rev. 1997;136(1):5–27.

Burgess K. Parties and unions in the new global economy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2004.

Caraway T. Freedom of association: battering ram or Trojan horse? Rev Int Polit Econ. 2006;13(2):210–32.CrossRef

Charnovitz S. Caribbean basin initiative: setting labor standards. Mon Labor Rev. 1984;107:54–7.

Collier R, Collier D. Shaping the political arena: critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991.

Compa L, Vogt JS. Labor rights in the generalized system of preferences: a 20-year review. Comp Labor Law Policy J. 2000–2001;22:199–238.

Cook ME. Toward flexible industrial relations? Neoliberalism, democracy, and labor reform in Latin America. Ind Relat. 1998;37(3):311–36.CrossRef

Cook ME. The politics of labor reform in Latin America. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press; 2006.

EIU. Country Commerce Reports. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited; various countries and years.

Frundt HJ. Trade conditions and labor rights: US initiatives, Dominican and Central American responses. Gainesville: University Press of Florida; 1998.

Frundt HJ. Central American unions in the era of globalization. Lat Am Res Rev. 2002;37(3):7–53.

Haagh L. The emperor's new clothes: labor reform and social democratization in Chile. Stud Comp Int Dev. 2002;37(1):86–115.CrossRef

Harvey PJ. US GSP labor rights conditionality: “aggressive unilateralism” or a forerunner to a multilateral social clause? In: Workers in the global economy. Ithaca: Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations Project Papers; 2001.

Human Rights Watch. CAFTA's weak labor rights protections: why the present accord should be opposed. Human Rights Watch briefing papers; 2004.

IMF. Letter of intent/memoranda of economic and financial policies; various countries and years. Available at: www.imf.org/external/np/loi/mempub.asp?view=loi&sort=cty.

ILO. World labour report 1997–98: industrial relations, democracy and social stability. Geneva: ILO; 1997.

ILO. 2002 Labour overview: Latin America and the Caribbean. Lima: Organización Internacional de Trabajo; 2002.

ILO. Panorama laboral 2006. Lima: Organización Internacional de Trabajo; 2006.

ISCLC. Summary of Public Communications. Available at: http//new.naalc.org/index.cfm?page=226.

Library of Congress. Honduras: a country study. Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; 1993.

Marshall A. Labour market behavior in Latin America: new patterns? Paper presented at the 21st Conference of the International Working Party on Labour Market Segmentation, Bremen, Germany; September 9–11, 1999.

Marshall A. Labour market policies and regulations in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: programmes and impacts. Prepared for the ILO’s project on employment challenges in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: a comparative study in the framework of the global employment agenda. Geneva: ILO; 2004.

Murillo MV. Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2001.CrossRef

Murillo MV. Partisanship amidst convergence: the politics of labor reform in Latin America. Comp Polit. 2005;37(4):441–58.CrossRef

Roberts KM. Social inequalities without class cleavages in Latin America's neoliberal era. Stud Comp Int Dev. 2002;36(4):3–33.CrossRef

Salas C. Reporte laboral de México: 2007 anual. México: Instituto de Estudios del Trabajo, Global Policy Network; 2008. Available at: http://www.gpn.org.

Schamis HE. Reconceptualizing Latin American authoritarianism in the 1970s: from bureaucratic-authoritarianism to neoconservatism. Comp Polit. 1991;23(2):201–20.CrossRef

US Department of the Treasury. 2002 report to congress on labor issues and the international financial institutions. Washington: Office of the Under Secretary for International Affairs, US Department of Treasury; 2003.

US/Leap. GSP fact sheet and briefing on the Guatemala case. Chicago: US/Labor Education in the Americas Project; 2001.

Vega Ruiz ML. Labour administration: to ensure good governance through legal compliance in Latin America. Working document number 1. Geneva: International Labor Organization; 2009.

World Bank. Country assistance strategy; various countries and years.

World Bank. World development report 2009. Washington: World Bank; 2009.

Titel: Global Pressures, National Policies, and Labor Rights in Latin America
verfasst von: Katrina Burgess
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2010
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Erschienen in: Studies in Comparative International Development / Ausgabe 2/2010
Print ISSN: 0039-3606
Elektronische ISSN: 1936-6167
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-010-9063-y

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2010

International Institutions and Workers’ Rights: Between Labor Standards and Market Flexibility

Labor Standards and Labor Market Flexibility in the Middle East: Free Trade and Freer Unions?

A Tribute to Marsha Pripstein Posusney, 1953–2008

Labor Standards and Labor Market Flexibility in East Asia

More Rights, Less Power: Labor Standards and Labor Markets in East European Post-communist States

Globalization and Labor in Four Developing Regions: An Institutional Approach

Premium Partner