In 2004 the European Union’s cohesion policy entered into its fifteenth year of existence. Since its inception in 1989, the policy has covered a significant part of the European Union (EU) member states’ territory and population. What distinguishes the EU’s cohesion policy from regional development policies undertaken by national governments in Europe and the regional policy implemented by the Community before 1989 is that it represents a revolutionary change in the way development policies are conceived and carried out. While previous regional policy concentrated extensively on the role of the national administrative system or specialized development agencies in the implementation of projects, the present approach is characterized by an extensive involvement of different administrative levels and socio-economic groups in the formulation and implementation of the policy. The other elements that distinguish EU cohesion policy are the planning and implementation components that have been part of the policy from the very beginning, such as, quantified objectives (reducing regional disparities, restructuring regional economies, creating jobs, and stimulating private investment), a legal European framework,1 a specific policy structure (multi-annual planning documents and operational programmes), multi-annual budgets, five specific financial instruments (four Structural Funds2 and the Cohesion Fund) and a multi-level and multi-subject form of interaction in the formulation of decisions and implementation of programmes and projects.
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 which established the European Economic Community (EEC) contained in its preamble a broad goal of ensuring the harmonious development of the economies of the member states by “reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions” (EC Treaties, 1987: 119). The goal was restated in Article 2 of the Rome Treaty through which the member states formally pledged to promote “the harmonious development of economic activities” throughout the Community. However, in a real sense, these statements were expressions of a goal in search of a policy given that no specific regional development policy was part of the Rome Treaty nor, as a consequence, was there any provision in terms of institutional machinery or specific funding to fulfill that goal. The institutions that were designed to have an impact on regional disparities were the European Investment Bank (EIB) to provide low interest loans for national government to undertake infrastructure projects and the European Social Fund (ESF) to provide aid to immigrant workers.
From the very beginning cohesion was conceived as a dynamic policy process that was not only interested in certain “outputs” (the expenditure of money and administrative undertakings) as has been the case with the agricultural policy’s guarantee section but rather with “outcomes” (the impact of the policy on socio-economic levels) in the less developed regions. For cohesion the primary policy outcome is defined as the reduction of regional disparities between the less and more developed areas of the Community. Cohesion policy, therefore, has a territorialized socioeconomic impact; it was never designed to achieve the reduction of disparities between social groups.1
The definition and significance of cohesion has been hotly debated among political scientists and economists since the concept first made its appearance in the Single European Act (SEA), but it was with the subsequent Treaty on European Union (i.e., the Maastricht Treaty) of 1993 (Article B) that economic and social cohesion became one of the three primary economic objectives along with the Single Market and European Monetary Union (EMU). Many had argued that the full opening of national markets to European-wide competition and the elimination of the ability of member states to manipulate exchange rates to compensate for the decline in national and regional competitiveness would have a significant negative impact on less developed areas,1 and therefore, a significant change in the approach adopted by the European Union to the challenges of regional development in an open European market had to be implemented.
The Italian Mezzogiorno, consisting historically of eight regions,1 has contained Objective 1 regions since the beginning of the Community’s cohesion policy in 1989. Even before that year, the Italian South as a whole (rather than the regions as distinct institutions) was the recipient of an extensive national development policy that began in the immediate post-war period. In 1950 Italy inaugurated its ambitious drive to develop the South by creating with law 646 the Cassa per opere straordinarie di pubblico interesse nell’Italia meridionale (Casmez) or “Fund for extraordinary projects of public interest in southern Italy”. As was the case with the EU’s cohesion policy, the primary goal of the Italian national policy was to reduce the gap that differentiated socio-economic levels in terms of wealth, levels of consumption, and employment opportunities present in southern Italy from those that existed in the rest of the country. Reflecting the existing thinking on regional policies at the time that conceived regional development as an instrument to stimulate the growth of specific economic sectors — e.g., manufacturing industry, agricultural production, etc.-, the Casmez was given the responsibility of administrating a national development policy for key economic sectors of the South. The policy was not targeted toward specific regions. Instead, it was sectorially oriented-i.e., it focussed on specific economic sectors as a means of spurring the overall socio-economic development of the southern areas.
Since the 1st of May 2004 the European Union incorporates over half a billion people and extends to the historical limits of the European continent. The enlargement towards the East and South has transformed the Union from the assembly of fifteen nation-states to a union of almost all of the countries that consider themselves to be part of Europe.1 The difference is not just quantitative but it represents a qualitative change in the nature of the EU. The increase of the membership in the European Union to twenty-five member states represents the realization of the vision of a single market for all of Europe and the creation of one political organization that encompasses almost all of the countries found between the Atlantic and the borders of Russia and the Ukraine.2 Enlargement implies not only the prospect of an economically stronger but also a more politically united Europe after a half century of divisions and conflict imposed by the logic of the “cold war”. Enlargement also favours the prospect of increased relations between Europe and its neighbours to the East and to the southern Mediterranean countries. With the further incorporation of Romania and Bulgaria expected to take place in 2007 and the opening up of negotiations for membership with Turkey, the European Union will expand into the most western part of Asia and extend its horizon into the frontiers of the Islamic world.
The composition and structure of the European Union continues to evolve. As discussed in the previous chapter, the borders of the EU have expanded toward the east and south. Ten new member states entered the EU on 1 May 2004, and negotiations are continuing with two candidate states (Bulgaria and Romania) for possible entry within three years. Turkey, the quasi-European state, will start negotiations at the beginning of 2005. One of the most compelling questions concerning the overall composition of the EU is tied to what will happen to the Balkan states (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia). Eventual membership on the part of the five Balkan states depends to a great extent on their ability to manage their internal ethnic conflicts and substitute them with democratic procedures capable of building social cohesion and promoting cooperation among the constituent religious and ethnic groups.
