Modeling and Optimization of Proactive Management of the Production Pollutions in the Conditions of Information Asymmetry

On the basis of the constructed mathematical model, an analysis is made of which of the instruments for regulating industrial emissions of enterprises - environmental standards or quotas sold for industrial emissions of pollutants - allows minimizing the total costs of the strategy of environmental regulation. The necessity of taking into account the asymmetry of information support of the optimization process is shown. It has been proved that the environmental policy regulator, aiming to limit the aggregate level of emissions of a given pollutant by several enterprises, can minimize total costs by applying enterprise-specific environmental standards. The system of quotas sold for production emissions allows minimizing the total costs of the strategy of environmental and economic regulation only if the costs of the environmental audit are the same for all enterprises. It is established that in the event that the cost of implementing penalties varies between enterprises, the competitive market for emission allowances will not minimize the total costs of providing the total amount of emissions for a certain level, allowing a certain degree of non-compliance with environmental requirements.