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Erschienen in: Annals of Finance 1/2014

01.02.2014 | Research Article

Multi-firm voluntary disclosures for correlated operations

verfasst von: Miles B. Gietzmann, Adam J. Ostaszewski

Erschienen in: Annals of Finance | Ausgabe 1/2014

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Abstract

We study the no-arbitrage theory of voluntary disclosure (Dye, J Account Res 23:123–145, 1985, and Ostaszewski and Gietzmann, Rev Quant Financ Account 31: 1–27, 2008), generalized to the setting of \(n\) firms, simultaneously and voluntarily, releasing at the interim-report date ‘partial’ information concerning their ‘common operating conditions’. Each of the firms has, as in the Dye model, some (known) probability of observing a signal of their end of period performance, but here this signal includes noise determined by a firm-specific precision parameter. The co-dependency of the firms results entirely from their common operating conditions. Each firm has a disclosure cutoff, which is a best response to the cutoffs employed by the remaining firms. To characterize these equilibrium cutoffs explicitly, we introduce \(n\) new hypothetical firms, related to the corresponding actual firms, which are operationally independent, but are assigned refined precision parameters and amended means. This impounds all existing correlations arising from conditioning on the other potentially available sources of information. In the model the actual firms’ equilibrium cutoffs are geometric weighted averages of these hypothetical firms. We uncover two countervailing effects. Firstly, there is a bandwagon effect, whereby the presence of other firms raises each individual cutoff relative to what it would have been in the absence of other firms. Secondly, there is an estimator-quality effect, whereby individual cutoffs are lowered, unless the individual precision is above average.

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Fußnoten
1
The Dye theory is suited to an equity-valuation focus, as use of the Dye cutoff can be justified by no-arbitrage arguments—as discussed in Sect. 2.1, especially Eq. (8). This distinguishes the approach from the alternative focus on how disclosure costs determine a cutoff—see Bayer et al. (2010) for an overview of this literature.
 
2
The alignment of managerial and investor interests in respect of truthful disclosure is arranged in Townsend (1979) and in Krasa and Villamil (1994) through the inclusion of incentive compatibility conditions.
 
3
See for example McNeil et al. (2005), Section 2.2.4.
 
4
Proof available from the authors.
 
5
This establishes a condition validating the replacement of \(X\) by \(E[X|T]\), suggested also by Acharya et al. (2011) in their footnote 2.
 
6
This scale factor allows us to study firms standardized to unit mean.
 
7
So \(T_{i}\) is standardized to have unit mean. For \(\alpha _{i}\ne 0,\) this is equivalent to a signal generated from \(X^{\alpha _{i}}\) by multiplication with noise; it suffices to replace such a signal by an alternative version obtained by a suitable power and scaling transformation.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Multi-firm voluntary disclosures for correlated operations
verfasst von
Miles B. Gietzmann
Adam J. Ostaszewski
Publikationsdatum
01.02.2014
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Annals of Finance / Ausgabe 1/2014
Print ISSN: 1614-2446
Elektronische ISSN: 1614-2454
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-012-0222-1

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