nach oben

Erschienen in:

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

14. Multilevel Democracy: A Comparative Perspective

verfasst von : Fritz W. Scharpf

Erschienen in: Configurations, Dynamics and Mechanisms of Multilevel Governance

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Treating electoral accountability as a necessary institutional precondition of both input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy, the chapter explores its realization in several variants of multilevel government. Whereas US “dual federalism” and German “joint-decision federalism” differ significantly in the allocation of governing powers and in coupling or decoupling of governing processes, they are highly effective in establishing the political accountability of governments to electorates on both levels. By contrast, both the EU and the European Monetary Union (EMU) lack a politically accountable government. And whereas EU legislation might draw upon the democratic legitimacy of national governments, the present EMU regime must be able to control and override the exercise of national governing powers by democratically accountable national governments.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Popular Federalism for a Compound Polity? The Federalism of the Antifederalists and Implications for Multilevel Governance

Nächstes Kapitel On Cross-Level Responsiveness in Multilevel Politics: A Comparison of Airport Expansions in Germany, Switzerland and the UK

Hanna Pitkin captured the gist of John Stuart Mill’s theory of representative democracy, distinguishing between “apparent” and “real” interests and equating the latter with the public interest, in a metaphor: “Only the wearer can tell if the shoe pinches. But this does not mean that the wearer knows in advance which shoe will pinch him; in fact, it is much more likely that a shoe specialist will know this better than he” (Pitkin 1967, p. 204). The optimistic assumption is, of course, that by the time of the next election the citizen-wearers will reward the competent government-shoemaker.

That does not apply to the legislative “codification” of Treaty-based ECJ decisions. Given the legal uncertainty created by the constitutional status of rules announced in particular cases, governments have a common interest in systematizing, generalizing and limiting their impact (Schmidt 2018).

Benz, A., & Sonnicksen, J. (2017). Patterns of Federal Democracy: Tensions, Friction, or Balance Between Two Government Dimensions. European Political Science Review, 9(1), 3–25.CrossRef

Benz, A., Scharpf, F. W., & Zintl, R. (1992). Horizontale Politikverflechtung. Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen. Frankfurt: Campus.

Bickerton, C., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(4), 703–722.CrossRef

Braun, B. (2017). Two Sides of the Same Coin? Independence and Accountability of the European Central Bank (Resource Document). Brussels: Transparency International. https://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf. Accessed 23 August 2018.

Braun, B., & Hübner, M. (2018). Fiscal Fault, Financial Fix? Capital Markets Union and the Quest for Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Euro Area. Competition & Change, 22(2), 117–138.CrossRef

Burkhart, S. (2008). Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von “Divided Government” in Deutschland. Frankfurt: Campus.

Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dunn, J. (1988). Trust and Political Agency. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (pp. 73–93). London: Blackwell.

Elsässer, L., Hense, S., & Schäfer, A. (2017). “Dem Deutschen Volke”? Die ungleiche Responsivität des Bundestages. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 27(2), 161–180.CrossRef

Elsässer, L., Hense, S., & Schäfer, A. (2018). Government of the People, by the Elite, for the Rich: Unequal Responsiveness in an Unlikely Case (MPIfG Discussion Paper 18/5). Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Falkner, G. (Ed.). (2011). The EU’s Decision Traps: Comparing Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Føllesdal, A., & Hix, S. (2006). Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3), 533–562.CrossRef

Friedrich, C. J. (1937). Constitutional Government and Politics: Nature and Development. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Gress, F., Fechtner, D., & Hannes, M. (Eds.). (1994). The American Federal System: Federal Balance in Comparative Perspective. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Grimm, D. (2016). Europe’s Legitimacy Problem and the Courts. In D. Chalmers, M. Jachtenfuchs, & C. Joerges (Eds.), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity (pp. 236–241). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Henning, C. R., & Kessler, M. (2012). Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union (Petersen Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 12-1).

Hesse, K. (1962). Der unitarische Bundesstaat. Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller.

Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2016). Beyond Integration Theory: The (Anti-) Constitutional Dimension of European Crisis Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(6), 1350–1366.CrossRef

Lehmbruch, G. (1976). Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Lehmbruch, G., Singer, O., Grande, E., & Döhler, M. (1988). Institutionelle Bedingungen ordnungspolitischen Strategiewechsels im internationalen Vergleich. In M. G. Schmidt (Ed.), Staatstätigkeit. International und historisch vergleichende Analysen (pp. 251–283). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.CrossRef

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Macdonald, T. (2008). Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Representation Beyond Liberal States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. London: Verso.

Matthijs, M. (2016). Powerful Rules Governing the Euro: The Perverse Logic of German Ideas. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(3), 375–391.CrossRef

Mayntz, R., & Scharpf, F. W. (1975). Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Menéndez, A. J. (2017). The Crisis of Law and the European Crisis: From the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat to the Consolidating State of (Pseudo-) Technocratic Governance. Journal of Law and Society, 44(1), 56–78.CrossRef

Moravcsik, A. (2002). In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), 603–624.CrossRef

Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.CrossRef

Riker, W. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

Roßteutscher, S., & Schäfer, A. (2016). Asymmetrische Mobilisierung: Wahlkampf und ungleiche Wahlbeteiligung. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 57(3), 455–483.CrossRef

Schäfer, A. (2015). Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit: Warum die sinkende Wahlbeteiligung der Demokratie schadet. Frankfurt: Campus.

Scharpf, F. W. (1988). The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration. Public Administration, 66(3), 239–278.CrossRef

Scharpf, F. W. (1991). Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder: Westview Press.

Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Scharpf, F. W. (2000). Interdependence and Democratic Legitimation. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (pp. 101–120). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Scharpf, F. W. (2001). Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe. Scandinavian Political Studies, 24(1), 1–26.CrossRef

Scharpf, F. W. (2011). Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis, and the Preemption of Democracy. Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy, 9(2), 163–198.

Scharpf, F. W. (2013). Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis. In K. Armingeon (Ed.), Staatstätigkeiten, Parteien und Demokratie (pp. 567–596). Wiesbaden: Springer. Also available as (Discussion Paper 12/6). Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.CrossRef

Scharpf, F. W. (2016). Forced Structural Convergence in the Eurozone—Or a Differentiated European Monetary Community (MPIfG Discussion Paper 16/15). Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Society.

Scharpf, F. W. (2017). De-constitutionalization and Majority Rule: A Democratic Vision for Europe. European Law Journal, 23(5), 315–334.CrossRef

Scharpf, F. W. (2018a). International Monetary Regimes and the German Model (MPIfG Discussion Paper 18/1). Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Scharpf, F. W. (2018b). There Is an Alternative: A Two-Tier European Currency Community (MPIfG Discussion Paper 18/7). Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Schmidt, S. K. (2018). The European Court of Justice and the Policy Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Schmidt, V. A. (2016). Reinterpreting the Rules “by Stealth” in Times of Crisis: A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis and the European Central Bank and the European Commission. West European Politics, 39(5), 1032–1052.CrossRef

Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is… and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, Summer, 2(3), 3–16.CrossRef

Skocpol, T. (1995). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Skocpol, T. (1996). Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tsebelis, G. (2015). Lessons from the Greek Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(1), 25–41.CrossRef

White, J. (2015). Emergency Europe. Political Studies, 63(2), 300–318.CrossRef

Williams, B. (2005). Realism and Moralism in Political Theory. In B. Williams (Ed.), In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (pp. 1–17). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Titel: Multilevel Democracy: A Comparative Perspective
verfasst von: Fritz W. Scharpf
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Configurations, Dynamics and Mechanisms of Multilevel Governance
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-05510-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-05511-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05511-0_14

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Premium Partner