2010 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
New Outside Blockholders, Performance, and Governance in Germany
verfasst von : Friedel Drees
Erschienen in: Motives for and Consequences of Minority Equity Purchases
Verlag: Gabler
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Many theoretical analyses argue that the involvement of large shareholders in monitoring or control activities has the potential to limit agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Noe (2002)). Empirical support for this argument has been provided by a number of studies (e.g. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Holderness (2003)). Results are, however, still ambiguous.