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1997 | Buch

Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries

herausgegeben von: Miguel A. Kiguel, J. Saul Lizondo, Stephen A. O’Connell

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK

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'...the most definitive study of the subject, assembling an all-star cast to address the many outstanding questions and succeeding beyond expectations in combining elegant theory and state of the art econometrics to reach very sensible policy conclusions.' - Mohsin S. Khan, Deputy Director, Research Department, International Monetary Fund ' This book fills an important vacuum in the literature of the economic consequences of parallel markets and should prove of great value to students of economic development and to policy-makers in developing countries as they struggle to reform their exchange rate and trade incentive systems. Here they will find all that they need to know.' - Vittorio Corbo, Professor of Economics, Universidad Catolica de Chile 'A most comprehensive treatment of the relationships between parallel foreign exchange markets and macroeconomic policies, both across countries and over time. The book substantially enhances our understanding of how these systems work in practice and will be of great interest to policy-makers, researchers and graduate students of economic policy.' - Samuel M. Wangwe, Professor of Economics, University of Dar es Salaam and Executive Director, Economic and Social Research Foundation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania This book examines extensive empirical evidence on the macroeconomic implications of parallel exchange rates in developing countries. Eight case-studies from Africa, Latin America, and Turkey provide detailed evidence on the emergence of parallel exchange rates, their impact on macroeconomic performance, and the criteria for successful exchange-rate unification. A chapter on European dual exchange rates summarizes the contrasting experience of industrial countries. An overview chapter lays out the analytical framework, assesses the evidence, and draws policy conclusions.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
0. Overview
Abstract
This book brings together a set of case studies of parallel foreign exchange systems, defined as systems in which a market-determined exchange rate, typically applying to financial transactions but often to a portion of trade transactions as well, coexists with one or more official, typically managed exchange rates. Such arrangements are extremely common among developing countries. At the end of 1993, 25 percent of the 158 developing country members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had separate official exchange rates for some portion (or all) of their capital account and/or invisible transactions. Fully 82 percent maintained restrictions on payments for capital account transactions and, of this group, 60 percent maintained restrictions on current transactions as well. Of the 100 developing countries listed in the World Currency Alert, nearly 20 percent had black markets with premia above 25 percent.
Miguel A. Kiguel, J. Saul Lizondo, Stephen A. O’Connell
1. Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries: Lessons from Eight Case Studies
Abstract
Parallel foreign exchange systems are those in which a market-determined exchange rate, typically applying to financial transactions but often to a portion of trade transactions as well, coexists with one or more pegged exchange rates. Such arrangements are common in developing countries. In some cases governments respond to a balance of payments crisis by creating a legal parallel (or dual) foreign exchange market for financial transactions. The objective is to avoid the short-term effects of a depreciation of the exchange rate on domestic prices while maintaining some degree of control over capital outflows and international reserves. In other cases, extensive controls on foreign exchange restrict access to official markets and lead to the emergence of an illegal parallel market. The illegal market then grows in importance as the authorities respond to a deteriorating balance of payments by tightening and extending exchange controls.
Nita Ghei, Miguel A. Kiguel, Stephen A. O’Connell
2. Parallel Markets and the Effectiveness of Exchange Controls in Argentina: 1981–9
Abstract
Argentina’s history of exchange controls and parallel exchange markets dates from the beginning of the 1930s and has persisted, with occasional episodes of liberalization, nearly to the present. The most recent unbroken period of exchange controls in Argentina lasted from early 1982 to the end of 1989 and coincided with one of the most turbulent periods of macroeconomic crisis in Argentina’s history. Faced with balance of payments problems, accelerating inflation, and severe private sector indebtedness, the authorities imposed exchange controls as an alternative to a mix of real devaluation and fiscal adjustment that would have secured long-term stability, but at the cost of short-term contraction. In the absence of fundamental reforms, the macroeconomic crisis deepened, leading to the hyperinflations of mid-1989 and the first quarter of 1990. This hyperinflation, in turn, generated balance of payments pressures so strong as to force the abandonment of exchange controls and the floating of the currency in December 1989.
Steven B. Kamin
3. Dual Exchange Rates: the Mexican Experience, 1982–7
Abstract
On 6 August 1982, after a run against the peso left the Bank of Mexico with no foreign exchange reserves, a stabilization program to deal with the balance of payments crisis was announced. One important part of this stabilization program was the institution of a dual exchange rate system. The exchange regime consisted of a ‘preferential’ rate and a ‘general’ rate. The preferential rate applied to current account transactions while the general exchange rate applied to capital account transactions. The Central Bank set the preferential rate at 49.13 pesos per dollar and announced a daily devaluation of 4 cents. In contrast, the general rate was allowed to float. Immediately after the announcement, the general rate was equal to 75.33 pesos per dollar, implying a depreciation of 54.4 percent.
Graciela L. Kaminsky
4. Adoption, Management, and Abandonment of Multiple Exchange Rate Regimes with Import Control: the Case of Venezuela
Abstract
In February 1983 Venezuela adopted a multiple exchange rate regime as part of a package designed to deal with a balance of payments crisis. The idea was to ease the process of adjustment to a lower level of oil income and financial flows, so as to avoid more drastic measures. Initially, the program generated a rapid improvement in the current account while maintaining relatively low inflation, but it produced a surprisingly high and growing exchange premium. On two occasions, in February 1984 and in December 1986, the government was forced to devalue the official rate, not because of insufficient reserves, but due to the unsustainable level of the exploding premium. In February 1989, after 6 years of experimentation — in which the parallel exchange rate depreciated by a factor of 10 — and in the midst of a new balance of payments crisis, the government decided to abandon the regime and adopt a unified floating arrangement. This change was followed by a 9 percent drop in GDP and by a 60 percent jump in the price level.
Ricardo Hausmann
5. Macroeconomic Aspects of Multiple Exchange Rate Regimes: the Case of Ghana
Abstract
In April 1983 Ghana began a series of exchange rate policy reforms that by 1988 had transformed the exchange rate regime from one in which a rigidly fixed official exchange rate operated alongside a thriving black market to one in which market forces determined exchange rates on an official auction and on legalized foreign exchange bureaus. Concurrent with the exchange rate reforms, controls on imports were progressively removed, culminating in 1989 in the abolishing of import licensing, which had operated in Ghana since 1961. The black market for foreign exchange, while not completely eradicated, is now a shadow of its former self, confined to the fringes of the foreign exchange bureaus and motivated more by a desire on the part of dealers to avoid taxes rather than exchange and trade controls.
Yaw Ansu
6. The Parallel Market Premium for Foreign Exchange and Macroeconomic Policy in Sudan
Abstract
The last two decades in Sudan have witnessed the emergence and subsequent expansion of an active parallel economy. Parallel economic activities have been primarily concentrated in the foreign sector of the economy, in the form of misinvoicing and smuggling of exports and imports and diversion of remittances from Sudanese nationals working abroad (SNWA) to the parallel market for foreign exchange. Foreign exchange transactions in this market have taken place at a freely determined parallel exchange rate.
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi
7. Exchange Controls and the Parallel Premium in Tanzania, 1967–90
Abstract
Developments in Tanzania’s parallel foreign exchange market have mirrored the evolution of macroeconomic policy in that country since its independence in 1961. At independence, Tanzania operated a relatively open trade and payments regime supported by conservative monetary and fiscal policies. These policies survived the introduction of the Tanzanian shilling in 1965, but the Arusha Declaration of 1967 generated a fundamental reorientation under the rubric of self-reliance and African socialism. In the two decades following the Arusha Declaration, the exchange rate in Tanzania’s illegal parallel foreign exchange market rose at a rate of nearly 2.5 percent per month, more than three times as rapidly as the official exchange rate. By early 1986, the parallel rate exceeded the official rate by more than 800 percent.
Daniel Kaufmann, Stephen A O’Connell
8. The Parallel Market Premium and Exchange Rate Unification: a Macroeconomic Analysis for Zambia
Abstract
The economy of Zambia, 1964–90, provides an example of a large and thriving black market for foreign exchange. The Zambian black market has survived a long sequence of policy reforms aimed at achieving a more flexible exchange rate and price system and liberalizing trade and financial flows. Despite aggressive policies in these areas, especially with regard to the exchange rate, the black market premium (defined as the ratio of the black rate to the official rate minus one) remains high. For the 1970–88 period, the premium averaged 100 percent; it exceeded 400 percent by 1990.
Janine Aron, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi
9. Black Market Exchange Rates in Turkey
Abstract
Black markets for foreign exchange have had an uninterrupted existence in Turkey’s history. The nature of the black market, however, showed a dramatic change with the onset of path-breaking, market-oriented economic reforms in the 1980s. From a position of very significant activity before 1980, both the level of activity and the premium on foreign exchange in the black market declined throughout the 1980s, becoming negligible as the Turkish lira gained convertibility in 1989. The importance of the Turkish experience is that a successful unification was achieved without an immediate threat of reversal.
Sule Özler
10. European Dual Exchange Rates
Abstract
In the early 1970s, many European countries faced a difficult predicament. Uniform fixed exchange rates allowed speculative capital movements to deliver large international reserve fluctuations, yet abandoning fixed exchange rates in favor of flexible rates could possibly deliver large exchange rate fluctuations that would disrupt trade. Between 1971 and 1974, several European countries, such as Belgium, France, and Italy, used a dual exchange market as a temporary middle-ground between the fixed and flexible rate extremes. Such an arrangement involved the formal establishment of separate exchange markets, with separate exchange rates, for current and capital account transactions.
Nancy P. Marion
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries
herausgegeben von
Miguel A. Kiguel
J. Saul Lizondo
Stephen A. O’Connell
Copyright-Jahr
1997
Verlag
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Electronic ISBN
978-1-349-25520-7
Print ISBN
978-1-349-25522-1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25520-7