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Erschienen in:
2009 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Pareto, Anonymity or Neutrality, but Not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives
verfasst von : Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Erschienen in: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We would like to express our indebtedness to Peter for his pioneering work in social choice theory and our pleasure in co-authoring with him.
1
More specific to this paper, Peter had early doubts about rules that required preference information on all alternatives in order to socially rank two alternatives. Addressing independence he writes (see Fishburn, 1973):
If in fact the social choice can depend on infeasibles, which infeasibles should be used? For with one set of infeasibles, feasible
x
might be the social choice, whereas feasible
y ≠ x
might be the social choice if some other infeasible set were adjoined to [feasible set]
Y
. Hence, the idea of allowing infeasible alternatives to influence the social choice introduces a potential ambiguity into the choice process that can be at least alleviated by insisting on the independence condition.