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Erschienen in:
2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Plan Recognition, Indefinites, and the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary
verfasst von : Hsiang-Yun Chen
Erschienen in: Logic, Rationality, and Interaction
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Planning and plan recognition are arguably essential to all rational, co-operative activities, and linguistic communication is no exception. Recently, Lewis (2012) argues that recognizing the importance of plan helps settle a debate regarding the semantics and pragmatics of indefinites. More specifically, Lewis argues against the dynamic approach (e.g. Kamp (1981), Heim (1982), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), Kamp and Reyle (1993), and Asher and Lascarides (2003)), according to which indefinites are subject to a
semantic
“Novelty” condition; instead, she offers a neo-Gricean account and analyzes Novelty as a pragmatic, cancelable implicature. I argue that Lewis’ analysis is inadequate. Her pragmatic picture not only rests on dubious assumptions concerning plan recognition, but offers no real explanation of the alleged counterexamples against the dynamic theories. Moreover, I provide evidence that supports a more semantic analysis of the Novelty condition.