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2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

7. Preference Paradox and Nonlinear Expected Utility Theory

verfasst von : Professor Kazuhisa Takemura

Erschienen in: Behavioral Decision Theory

Verlag: Springer Japan

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Abstract

The previous chapter explained that expected utility theory included counterexamples called the Allais paradox (Allais 1953) and the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961). The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes are interpreted as deviations from the independence axiom. This chapter first explains the relations between these paradoxes and the independence axiom.

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Metadaten
Titel
Preference Paradox and Nonlinear Expected Utility Theory
verfasst von
Professor Kazuhisa Takemura
Copyright-Jahr
2014
Verlag
Springer Japan
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54580-4_7

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