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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Private Set Intersection in the Internet Setting from Lightweight Oblivious PRF

verfasst von : Melissa Chase, Peihan Miao

Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We present a new protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) with semi-honest security in the plain model and one-sided malicious security in the random oracle model. Our protocol achieves a better balance between computation and communication than existing PSI protocols. Specifically, our protocol is the fastest in networks with moderate bandwidth (e.g., 30–100 Mbps). Considering the monetary cost (proposed by Pinkas et al. in CRYPTO 2019) to run the protocol on a cloud computing service, our protocol also compares favorably.
Underlying our PSI protocol is a new lightweight multi-point oblivious pesudorandom function (OPRF) protocol based on oblivious transfer (OT) extension. We believe this new protocol may be of independent interest.

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Fußnoten
1
The work  [PRTY19] describes two protocols, one optimized for speed (spot-fast) and one optimized for communication cost (spot-low). Here the comparison is for their fast protocol because the communication optimized one is significantly slower.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Private Set Intersection in the Internet Setting from Lightweight Oblivious PRF
verfasst von
Melissa Chase
Peihan Miao
Copyright-Jahr
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56877-1_2

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