Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Erschienen in:
The Institutional Design of Competition Authorities: Debates and Trends Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Procurement Procedures and Bid-Rigging in Brazil

verfasst von : César Mattos, Ph.D.

Erschienen in: Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Law 8,883/93, the so-called “procurement law”, includes the main provisions related to the purchases of the Brazilian government. Some key changes to this legislation have been introduced since 2002, altering the whole format of the auctions for the sake of government procurement. Our goal in this article is to assess the impact of the new rules of procurement on bid-rigging and steering of contracts. On the one hand, the transition from a first-price sealed bid auction to an (English) open bid auction facilitated cartels. On the other hand, electronic auctions introduced a welcome bidder anonymity, which had the opposite effect. The article also comments on the impact of some other new rules on the possibility of bid-rigging in Brazilian government procurement like the introduction of the possibility for post-auction negotiation on prices and the change in the time for checking bidder eligibility.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Vorheriges Kapitel Antitrust and Compulsory Licensing in BRICS and Developing Countries
Nächstes Kapitel The Nature and Use of Economic Evidence in Competition Enforcement (with Special Emphasis to the Case of South Africa)
Fußnoten
1
Se the report of the Brazilian competition Agency, CADE on the case, http://​www.​cade.​gov.​br/​upload/​HC%20​Vers%C3%A3o_​P%C3%BAblica.​pdf
 
2
From the point of view of economic theory, all modalities are auctions, which should not be mistaken for this specific modality, as defined by law.
 
4
Assuming the calls for technical and financial eligibility are sufficient to eliminate opportunists, which is not the case.
 
5
Article 4, subsection XVIII.
 
6
In addition to anonymity, Klemperer (2008) recommends that float values be prohibited and that minimum increases be determined for each bid, so as to hinder communication via bids.
 
7
Pursuant to article 46 of Law No. Lei 8,666/93 “services of a predominantly intellectual nature, in particular the project development, calculations, inspections, oversight, management, and engineering consulting in general and, especially, the development of preliminary technical studies and basic and executive project designs.”
 
Literatur
Klemperer, P. (2004). Auctions: Theory and practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Klemperer, P. (2008). Competition policy in auctions and “bidding markets”. In P. Buccirossi (Ed.), Handbook of antitrust economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Marshall, R., & Marx, L. (2010). The economics of collusion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2009). Guidelines for fighting bid rigging in public procurement.
Weishaar, S. (2013). Cartels, competition and public procurement. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Procurement Procedures and Bid-Rigging in Brazil
verfasst von
César Mattos, Ph.D.
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Buch
Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-30947-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-30948-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4_6