2. Public Choice Issues in International Collective Action: Global Warming Regulation

Although there is a growing literature on scientific estimates and regulatory instruments for international efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions, the underlying political collective action processes have been neglected. We focus on the impact of uncertainty in assessing the benefits and costs of global warming regulation on constituencies and politicians in the bargaining countries. Uncertainty arises due to basic information problems about emissions and their link to global warming, the possible range of temperature changes, and their likely effects across the planet. These information problems also create uncertainty in calculating the net effects of global warming, determining its effective regulation, and assessing compliance by sovereign countries that may be differentially affected. We outline a two-stage analytical framework that describes the positions taken by representatives of negotiating countries and the internal public choice tradeoffs facing politicians when constituents are faced with differential and uncertain effects. We apply the framework to the Montreal Protocol to Control Substances that Damage the Ozone Layer of 1987 for insights in analyzing the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. Additional information will reduce uncertainty over time, and until uncertainty is lowered we conclude that limited regulatory efforts are most likely to generate internal political support within negotiating countries for international collective action.