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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Quest for a Sustainable International Investment Regime: Leveling Up Through Competition (Policy) Rules?

verfasst von : Friedl Weiss

Erschienen in: International Investment Law and Competition Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Competition (policy) rules are ubiquitous as well as an essential element of the legal and institutional framework for the global economy. It is widely recognized that, linked to inclusive and sustainable development, they can best harness foreign direct investment (FDI)’s potential benefits as drivers of economic transformation. Against the background of politically regressive skepticism and growing protectionist retreat from the institutionalized and rule-based liberal practice initiated after the Second World War, this article seeks to retrace the role, utility, design, and interface of the legal regimes governing trade, investment and competition, at the national level and as main pillars and governance ideas of global economic law. It also documents international cooperation in the field of competition policy, as well as proposals for and failed attempts to establish multilateral rules, for trade and FDI. The article concludes with a plea for such rules in an effort to redress existing worldwide inequalities.

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Nächstes Kapitel International Investment Law and Public Procurement: An Overview

The rise of corporate market power and its macroeconomic effects. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2019, www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/03/28/world-economic-outlook-april-2019, pp. 55–76.

Díez FJ, Leigh D, Tambunlertchai S, Global Market Power and its Macroeconomic Implications. International Monetary Fund, WP/18/137, 15 June 2018, www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/15/Global-Market-Power-and-its-Macroeconomic-Implications-45975, pp. 3–5.

Anderson RD, Kovacic WE, Müller AC, Sporysheva N, Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection. WTO, ERSD-2018-12, 21 October 2018, www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.htm, p. 1.

Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications. World Bank Group, Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28493.

“Competition” does not feature in the most recent advanced unedited version of the Report of the Committee for Development Policy of the United Nations’ ECOSOC on its 21st session, E/2019/33, 11–15 March 2019, https://undocs.org/en/E/2019/33.

Conference on Investment for Development: Making it Happen. OECD, 25–27 October 2005, www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/conferenceoninvestmentfordevelopmentmakingithappen.htm.

Schwab K, The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018. World Economic Forum, 2017, www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018, p. 318. The idea of “market efficiency” underlies EU competition law, a regulatory system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted (Protocol No. 27 to the Lisbon Treaty) and which aims at “effective” (or workable) rather than perfect competition, designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such: ECJ Case C-8/08, T-Mobile, June 4, 2009.

In its briefing on “FDI screening. A Debate in light of China-EU FDI flows”, of 17 May 2017 the EP pointed to screening mechanisms operated by Australia, Canada, Japan and the USA and that their deterrence effect on Chinese investors in a growing protectionist climate is likely to have an impact on the EU, Grieger G, PE 603.941, www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282017%29603941.

See e.g. “A Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century” of 19 February 2019: recognizing that “competition rules are essential”, but also calling for a necessary adaptation of the Merger Control Regulation 139/2004 and current merger guidelines so that European companies are enabled to “successfully compete on the world stage”, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Paris, www.gouvernement.fr/en/a-franco-german-manifesto-for-a-european-industrial-policy-fit-for-the-21st-century; this manifesto echoes of course Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s “The American Challenge”, today, probably rebranded “The Chinese Challenge”. See Servan-Schreiber (1967).

Adam Smith, An enlightened life, book review, The Economist, July 28th 2018, p. 64f, www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2018/07/26/rescuing-adam-smith-from-myth-and-misrepresentation.

Friedrich Hayek: intellectual godfather of free-market Thatcherism v. John Maynard Keynes as the patron saint of heavily guided capitalism; Was he a liberal?, The Economist, 18th August 2018, p. 54f. www.economist.com/schools-brief/2018/08/18/was-john-maynard-keynes-a-liberal.

See e.g. the US Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018, giving the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) greater authority to examine deals where foreign investors gain control of critical infrastructure or technology or of personal data.

Koskenniemi M, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. United Nations, A/CN.4/L682, 13 April 2006, http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682, p. 8.

The protection of foreign consumer interests by trade negotiators demanding access to foreign markets was indirect and likewise driven by producer interests (export industries), Petersmann EU, Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System. European University Institute, May 2004, http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/2531, p. 14.

See e.g. the Ministerial Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee on 15 December 1993, www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/32-dchor_e.htm. Also para. 36 of the Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001 on a mandate for a Working Group on trade, debt and finance, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.

Kingsbury et al. (2005).

See Knill et al. (2008).

International/global economic law is the ideal habitat for scientific (comparative) interdisciplinarity, there being no room for pure theorists: (international) lawyers, political scientists and (political) economists, once reciprocally regarded as “invasive species”, extend their prowess to each others domains.

Hopt (1985), Meessen (2004), p. 228.

The Sherman Act of 1890 is the oldest antitrust law of the US making it illegal for competitors to make agreements with each other that would limit competition; The Clayton Act of 1914 helps American consumers by stopping mergers or acquisitions that are likely to stifle competition; the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC) of 1914 gave a new federal agency authority to investigate and stop unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices; and the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act extends US jurisdiction to restraints overseas that have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on US imports or domestic commerce, or on the export commerce of US exporters; see Address by Wood DP (former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice), The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, DePaul Law Review Symposium on Cultural Conceptions of Competition: Antitrust in the 1990s, 3 February 1995, www.justice.gov/atr/speech/internationalization-antitrust-law-options-future.

Cf. Chapter V of the Havana Charter on restrictive business practices.

Sauvant (2016), p. 9.

Richardson et al. (1998), pp. 375, 376. See also the discussion of the historical arguments for and against a WTO multilateral agreement on competition policy, in Kennedy (2001), p. 610; and by Stiglitz (2000), pp. 31–60.

Lal Das B, Dangers of Negotiating Investment and Competition Rules in the WTO. Third World Network (TWN), 16 TWN Trade & Development Series, 2001.

See, however, the essays of The Weimar Symposium of October 1998 on “The Competition Law of Deregulation” in vol.23 Fordham International Law Journal 2000.

See, e.g. the 1997 Report to the General Council of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, especially Item III of the Work Programme for Meetings at Annex 2 which includes “the relationship between investment and competition policy”, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy – Report (1997) to the General Council. WTO, WT/WGTCP/1, 28 November 1997, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=43538,42759,58169,18158,45943,19500,33826&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=6&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True, p. 4.

Roffe (1999), p. 145.

Mathis J, Sand-Zantman W, Competition and Investment: What do we know from the literature?. Institut d’Economie Industrielle, March 2014, http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/sand_zantman/Competition_and_Investment.pdf.

Kingsbury et al. (2005).

Allee and Peinhardt refer to legal scholars who have singled out ISDS clauses in BITs; Simmons concurs, adding that host DCs are more likely to agree to strict ISDS provisions in harder economic times; Baldwin points to DC’s concern about trade diversion when their competitors engage in closer economic integration; Lupu and Poast corroborate that host countries conclude BITs with specific source countries in order to divert FDI away from competing hosts of FDI by this specific source country.

Gaukrodger D, The balance between investor protection and the right to regulate in investment treaties: A scoping paper. OECD, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2017/02, 24 February 2017, www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/the-balance-between-investor-protection-and-the-right-to-regulate-in-investment-treaties_82786801-en, p. 3.

In his view, “essentially, it’s a transfer of power from public authorities to an arbitration body, where a handful of people would be able to rule whether a country can enact a law or not and how the law must be interpreted.”

[“…investors who want to protect themselves can buy insurance from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a World Bank Affiliate (the US and other governments provide similar insurance)”], cited by Gaukrodger D, The balance between investor protection and the right to regulate in investment treaties: A scoping paper. OECD, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2017/02, 24 February 2017, www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/the-balance-between-investor-protection-and-the-right-to-regulate-in-investment-treaties_82786801-en, p. 6.

Vattenfall against Germany under the Energy Charter Treaty, Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f12%2f12.

Study on Issues Relating to a Possible Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy. WTO, T/WGTCP/W/228, 19 May 2003, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/wgtcp_docs_e.htm.

E.g. on discriminatory customs valuation, government procurement practices and subsidies.

See the Anti-Dumping Codes of the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm.

Address by Wood DP (former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice), The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, DePaul Law Review Symposium on Cultural Conceptions of Competition: Antitrust in the 1990s, 3 February 1995, www.justice.gov/atr/speech/internationalization-antitrust-law-options-future.

Zhan J, G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking: A Facilitator’s Perspective. The E15 Initiative, December 2016, http://e15initiative.org/publications/g20-guiding-principles-for-global-investment-policymaking-a-facilitators-perspective/.

Some 10,000 such agencies operate at national, sub-national even city levels.

IBRD, Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications. World Bank Group, Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28493, p. 6ff.

Investment facilitation and promotion do not feature in 90% of existing IIAs, only in some of the most recent treaties, Zhan J, G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking: A Facilitator’s Perspective. The E15 Initiative, December 2016, http://e15initiative.org/publications/g20-guiding-principles-for-global-investment-policymaking-a-facilitators-perspective/, p. 6.

Industrial policies, tighter screening/monitoring procedures, closer scrutiny of cross-border M&As. Restrictive administrative measures often apply to extractive industries and infrastructure or are based on national security considerations, Zhan J, G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking: A Facilitator’s Perspective. The E15 Initiative, December 2016, http://e15initiative.org/publications/g20-guiding-principles-for-global-investment-policymaking-a-facilitators-perspective/, p. 1.; Chapter IV, Investment and New Industrial policies, World Investment Report 2018, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2130.

Sauvant (2016), p. 9.

Godfrey N, Why is Competition Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?. OECD, OECD Global Forum on International Investment, March 2008, www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/session13competitionpolicy.htm, p. 3.

See generally Wagner-von Papp (2009).

US antitrust laws are there to protect US consumers, US businesses, and US markets, see Address by Wood DP (former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice), The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, DePaul Law Review Symposium on Cultural Conceptions of Competition: Antitrust in the 1990s, 3 February 1995, www.justice.gov/atr/speech/internationalization-antitrust-law-options-future.

Markets are often dominated by big business with close ties to government, and more effective competition reduces opportunities for corruption and creates more space for entrepreneurs and SMEs to grow, Godfrey N, Why is Competition Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?. OECD, OECD Global Forum on International Investment, March 2008, www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/session13competitionpolicy.htm, p. 4.

Paasman BR, Multilateral rules on competition policy: an overview of the debate. International Trade Unit, Division of Trade and Development Finance, CEPAL, Santiago, December 1999, https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/4369/1/S9890697_en.pdf, p. 5.

When asserting anti-trust jurisdiction, most OECD countries require that illegal conduct has some anti-competitive effect within the country: “effects doctrine”.

Antonio Capobianco, Competition Law and Foreign-Government Controlled Investors, Nineth OECD Freedom of Investment Roundtables, Investment Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, January 2009; www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/41976200.pdf; built on the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, some OECD countries have also introduced competitive neutrality arrangements to mitigate or eliminate competitive advantages of SOEs, see Anderson RD, Kovacic WE, Müller AC, Sporysheva N, Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection. WTO, ERSD-2018-12, 21 October 2018, www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.htm, p. 52.

Entry barriers can be classified in 3 groups. 1. Regulatory, imposed by government policies (including investment licensing, tariff and non-tariff measures, antidumping); 2. Structural, barriers due solely to conditions outside the control of market participants, e.g. costs of production (when firms must attain a minimum size to have average cost as low as possible. If the minimum efficient scale is so large that only one firm of that size can serve the entire market, there will be a monopoly, which often occurs with public utilities such as distribution of water, electricity, gas; 3. Behavioral, abuse of dominant position where “relatively large” firms engage in anti-competitive conduct by preventing entry or forcing exit of competitors through various kinds of monopolistic conduct including predatory pricing and market foreclosure (horizontal: barriers imposed through collaborating actions by firms that sell in the same market, often referred to as “naked” restraints of trade, cartel behavior, or collusion, e.g. price-fixing, bid rigging, allocation of territories or customers, output restriction agreements; vertical: restrictions imposed through restrictive contractual agreements between supplier and purchasers/retailers, both in up-and downstream markets, e.g. resale price maintenance.

Roffe (1999), p. 146.

Roffe (1999), p. 147.

Janow (2005), p. 491.

Nine articles (46–54) of the Charter deal with competition issues; Art. 50(1) referred to practices such as: price-fixing, discriminating against particular enterprises, limiting production or fixing production quotas, preventing by agreement the development or application of technology or inventions, extending the use of intellectual property rights etc. Final Act and Related Documents, UN documents E/Conf 2/78, www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf.

Art. VI GATT; several WTO agreements prohibit “less favorable treatment” to imported relative to domestic “like” products and services: Arts III:4 GATT; 2.1 TBT; XVII GATS; the Appellate Body examines whether a measure results in a modification of the conditions of competition between them: AB Report, US-Clove Cigarettes (Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, adopted 24 April 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS406/AB/R), para. 87; AB Report, US-COOL (Panel Reports, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/R/WT/DS386/R, circulated to WTO Members 18 November 2011), para. 267; and related case law directly address private parties’ restrictive business practices: TBT, AGP, Articles VIII, IX GATS, Article 9 TRIMS, Articles 8, 31, 40 TRIPS, cf. Roffe (1999), p. 149; Kennedy (2001), p. 12, 602.

GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833, adopted 23 October 1958, BISD 7S/60.

Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8, 10, 11/AB/R (1996); Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75,84/AB/R (1999); Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87,110/AB/R (1999).

Provisions of the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement, known as the Fourth Protocol to the GATS, stipulate competitive safeguards to prevent major suppliers from engaging in anticompetitive conduct; Art. VIII:1, and VIII:2 of the GATS provide that monopoly service providers must not act inconsistently with the national treatment obligation of Art. XVII GATS or with their scheduled commitments; and require WTO Members to ensure that domestic monopolies do not abuse their monopoly positions. Art. 9 TRIMs requires the Council for Trade in Goods to review the operation and to propose possible amendments to it including provisions on competition policy by the end of 1999; the proscription approach in these agreements differs from that in the TRIPS agreement which imposes affirmative obligations to introduce intellectual property laws and to provide for minimum levels of protection and for their effective enforcement.

See preambles of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO and of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS); commitments to competition policy also feature in WTO Accession Protocols and in the work of the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB); see also treatment of competition issues relating to State trading enterprises (STEs), dual pricing practices and government procurement in WTO Accession Protocols, Marhold and Weiss (2018).

Kireyev and Osakwe (2018), pp. 299–319.

Paasman lists: 1. Difficulty of enforcing laws against foreign-based companies; 2. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions; 3. Extraterritoriality; 4. Anti-competitive behavior of state-owned companies, Paasman BR, Multilateral rules on competition policy: an overview of the debate. International Trade Unit, Division of Trade and Development Finance, CEPAL, Santiago, December 1999, https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/4369/1/S9890697_en.pdf, pp. 29–30.

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Need for Integrating Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO World Trade and Legal System 7, Occasional Paper, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, WTO Series No. 3 (1996).

Weiss (1999), passim.

Janow (2005), p. 31.

Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings. OECD, C(2014)108 – C/M(2014)10, 16 September 2014, www.oecd.org/competition/international-coop-competition-2014-recommendation.htm.

General Assembly resolution 35/63, Restrictive Business Practices, A/RES/35/63 (5 December 1980), www.un.org/documents/ga/res/35/a35r63e.pdf.

At CPLG’s annual meetings member economies update each other about their respective competition policies and laws, including recent cases and discuss challenges to competition policy and advocacy efforts.

Of the total of 280 RTAs notified to the WTO, 155 have chapters or provisions on competition policy, cf. Appendix Table 1. The Treatment of Competition Policy in RTAs: Basic Coverage of Agreements with Dedicated Chapters, Anderson RD, Kovacic WE, Müller AC, Sporysheva N, Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection. WTO, ERSD-2018-12, 21 October 2018, www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.htm, p. 28ff.

For a detailed discussion of regional approaches to addressing competition policy in RTAs see Anderson RD, Kovacic WE, Müller AC, Sporysheva N, Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection. WTO, ERSD-2018-12, 21 October 2018, www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.htm.

Provisions based on the NAFTA model require both the adoption or maintenance of “competition laws that prescribe anticompetitive business conducts” and the taking of “appropriate action with respect to such conduct”; most of those in RTAs involving EU or EFTA countries contain an obligation to adopt or maintain competition laws which also “effectively address anticompetitive practices”; only about 34% of RTAs with dedicated provisions provide for RTA dispute settlement, most merely for consultations, Anderson RD, Kovacic WE, Müller AC, Sporysheva N, Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection. WTO, ERSD-2018-12, 21 October 2018, www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.htm, pp. 31, 33.

Chapter 16 on Competition Policy, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, 2018), upon withdrawal of the US.

Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (2014) contains chapters on investment (but not on ISDS) and on competition and consumer protection, albeit from the perspective of SOEs.

Arts 1, 2(2) and note attached to the latter of the U.S. 2012 Model BIT acknowledges that SOEs often gain special privileges, thought to mean that the US approves certain instances of differential treatment between foreign and domestic investors, Dai T, Discriminatory Application of Competition Law and International Investment Agreements. RIETI, 15-E-125, November 2015, www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/15110008.html, p. 6.

Even the comprehensive “International Investment Law. A Handbook”, by Bungenberg et al. (2015), does not feature a single entry in its index on “competition” eo nomine.

Dube C, The Relationship between Competition and Investment. CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation, #3/2009, 2009, http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/The_Relationship_between_Competition_and_Investment.pdf, p. 3.

At least 135 countries are now considered equipped with active competition regimes, Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos (2016), p. 86.

Janow (2005), p. 489.

Kennedy (2001), p. 585.

Janow (2005), p. 488.

Export cartels are authorized under the competition laws of many countries.

Kennedy (2001), p. 592.

Hudec (1999), pp. 79, 83, cited by Kennedy (2001), p. 593.

Para. 25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration defined the focus of future work of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) launched at the Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference 1996; Fox (2003), p. 911.

For a summary of the pros and cons of linking competition policy to the WTO see Janow (2005), pp. 506–508.

The WTO is also lagging behind PTAs in addressing issues of the digital economy, see Joint statement of 76 WTO Members of 25 January 2019 launching negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WTO, WT/L/1056, 25 January 2019, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=251085,251084,251083,251082,251086,251022,251023,251024,251025,251037&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=4&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=False&HasSpanishRecord=False.

For a discussion of competition policy provisions in ASEAN blocwide and regional agreements see Banda OGD, Whalley J, Beyond Goods and Services: Competition Policy, Investment, Mutual Recognition, Movement of Persons, and Broader Cooperation Provisions of Recent FTAs involving ASEAN Countries. NBER, Working Paper 11,232, March 2005, www.nber.org/papers/w11232.

100

See “A Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century”, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Paris, www.gouvernement.fr/en/a-franco-german-manifesto-for-a-european-industrial-policy-fit-for-the-21st-century.

101

OECD, WTO, UNCTAD.

102

Kennedy (2001), p. 599.

103

See the Korean Communication submitted to the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment: “One can generalize that trade policy determines the relevant market for competition policy, and investment policy determines the relevant players in the market. Therefore, investment policy cannot attain its competition objective unless the effect of trade policy in determining the relevant market is carefully considered”, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy—Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment—Communication from the Republic of Korea—Relationship between Investment and Competition Policy, WTO, WT/WGTCP/W/109; WT/WGTI/W57, 22 October 1998, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=37675,38270,24496,22122&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True, p. 6.

104

G20 represents more than two-thirds of global FDI, Zhan J, G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking: A Facilitator’s Perspective. The E15 Initiative, December 2016, http://e15initiative.org/publications/g20-guiding-principles-for-global-investment-policymaking-a-facilitators-perspective/, p. 3.

105

Kingsbury and Schill (2010).

106

Wälde (2009), pp. 514, 543.

107

Schneidermann (2016), p. 23.

108

WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 1997–2003, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/wgtcp_docs_e.htm. Anderson RD, Kovacic WE, Müller AC, Sporysheva N, Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection. WTO, ERSD-2018-12, 21 October 2018, www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.htm, pp. 58, 60.

109

110

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Titel: Quest for a Sustainable International Investment Regime: Leveling Up Through Competition (Policy) Rules?
verfasst von: Friedl Weiss
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: International Investment Law and Competition Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-33915-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-33916-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33916-6_1