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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Red Tape, Corruption and ICT

verfasst von : Poulomi Bhattacharya, Vivekananda Mukherjee

Erschienen in: Digitalisation and Development

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on that aspect of ICT which reduces the length of red tape and analyses the desirability of introduction of ICT from the stakeholders’ perspective. In a theoretical model, we show that the support for such a reform depends on the stakeholders’ profile, the nature of the public good/service and the initial length of red tape. The implementation of ICT in delivery of public goods/services may create demand for an honest regime. However, paradoxically, the support for ICT reform is expected to be lower in countries marred with long red tape and entrenched corruption. The chapter also provides empirical support for the theoretical results.

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Vorheriges Kapitel ICTs and Effectiveness of Governance: A Cross-Country Study

Nächstes Kapitel Role of Technology in Governance and Development: The Case of e-Uparjan in Madhya Pradesh

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

See Banerjee (1997), Saha (2001) and Guriev (2004) on this.

Look at the lauding of India on this count in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), 2017–18 (Schwab 2017).

India has slipped a few places in the recent edition of Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2018).

Examples would be delivery of free food, hospital beds for people below the poverty line etc.

In a competitive bureaucracy, these two tasks are done by two different officials. An analysis of a competitive bureaucracy remains as our future research agenda.

Alternatively, the amount of bribe could also be determined through Nash bargaining where the corrupt official would share the bribe surplus with the applicant. But with alternative bribe conventions, the results would remain unchanged.

In a companion paper, we relax this assumption of the model.

Ideally, an official detected of such a practice will be liable to punishment. However, to keep things simple here, we assume that the expected punishment is zero, which can be relaxed in an extended version of the model. But it is also true that the expected punishment for the corrupt officials is close to zero in many countries, especially in the developing part of the world.

WBES (2006–18) attaches scores for respective responses which are given in parenthesis against each option.

See Svensson (2005).

PFH stands for preference for honest regime.

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Titel: Red Tape, Corruption and ICT
verfasst von: Poulomi Bhattacharya
Vivekananda Mukherjee
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Buch: Digitalisation and Development
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-9995-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-13-9996-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9996-1_13

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