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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Relational Contracts and Goods

verfasst von : Josef Wieland

Erschienen in: Relational Economics

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Relational transactions as multivalent cooperation projects are coordinated via specific forms of contracts. By definition, relational contracts are targeted at generating shared value as a cooperation rent. The continuous nature of the relationship between exchange and relational transactions must be considered. Following Ian R. Macneil’s work in contract theory, the motivational and behavioural starting points and indicators of relational contract theory are developed. A specific form of relational transactions, moral or relational goods, is introduced into the discussion.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Discrete Exchanges and Relational Transactions

Nächstes Kapitel Governance and Societal Normativity

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Titel: Relational Contracts and Goods
verfasst von: Josef Wieland
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Relational Economics
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-45111-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-45112-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45112-7_3