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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random-Oracle Model

verfasst von : Jelle Don, Serge Fehr, Christian Majenz, Christian Schaffner

Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The famous Fiat-Shamir transformation turns any public-coin three-round interactive proof, i.e., any so-called \(\Sigma {\text {-protocol}}\), into a non-interactive proof in the random-oracle model. We study this transformation in the setting of a quantum adversary that in particular may query the random oracle in quantum superposition.

Our main result is a generic reduction that transforms any quantum dishonest prover attacking the Fiat-Shamir transformation in the quantum random-oracle model into a similarly successful quantum dishonest prover attacking the underlying \(\Sigma {\text {-protocol}}\) (in the standard model). Applied to the standard soundness and proof-of-knowledge definitions, our reduction implies that both these security properties, in both the computational and the statistical variant, are preserved under the Fiat-Shamir transformation even when allowing quantum attacks. Our result improves and completes the partial results that have been known so far, but it also proves wrong certain claims made in the literature.

In the context of post-quantum secure signature schemes, our results imply that for any \(\Sigma {\text {-protocol}}\) that is a proof-of-knowledge against quantum dishonest provers (and that satisfies some additional natural properties), the corresponding Fiat-Shamir signature scheme is secure in the quantum random-oracle model. For example, we can conclude that the non-optimized version of Fish, which is the bare Fiat-Shamir variant of the NIST candidate Picnic, is secure in the quantum random-oracle model.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Revisiting Post-quantum Fiat-Shamir

Nächstes Kapitel Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

E.g., the underlying computational hardness assumption does not hold anymore in the context of a quantum adversary.

In the (quantum) random-oracle model, statistical security considers a computationally unbounded attacker with a polynomially bounded number of oracle queries.

The paper [LZ19] was put on eprint (ia.cr/2019/262) a few days after our eprint version (ia.cr/2019/190).

Alternatively, we may understand \(|\phi _0\rangle \) as an auxiliary input given to \(\mathcal A\).

If it is the final output that is measured then there is nothing left to reprogram.

We consider \(|\mathcal{Y}|\) to be superpolynomial in the security parameter, so that \(\frac{1}{2(q+1)|\mathcal{Y}|}\) is negligible and can be neglected. In cases where \(|\mathcal{Y}|\) is polynomial, the presented bound is not optimal, but an improved bound can be derived with the same kind of techniques.

Informally, these modifications mean that we let \(\mathcal A\) make one more query to get H(x) into register

https://static-content.springer.com/image/chp%3A10.1007%2F978-3-030-26951-7_13/487852_1_En_13_IEq164_HTML.gif

, and \(\tilde{G}_x^{H(x)}\) would then check that

https://static-content.springer.com/image/chp%3A10.1007%2F978-3-030-26951-7_13/487852_1_En_13_IEq166_HTML.gif

indeed contains H(x).

We recall that in case z is a quantum state, V is given by means of a measurement.

In other words, \(\mathcal A\) is then non-uniform quantum polynomial-time with quantum advice.

In fact, that is how the Fiat-Shamir transform was originally conceived in [FS87]. Only later [BG93] adapted the idea to construct a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system.

See also Theorem 25 in [Unr17] for a different proof technique.

[ABB+17]

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Titel: Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random-Oracle Model
verfasst von: Jelle Don
Serge Fehr
Christian Majenz
Christian Schaffner
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-26950-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-26951-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_13

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