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Erschienen in:
Where Are the Shareholders’ Mansions? CEOs’ Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Shareholder Activism in Canada: The Emergence of a New Tool for Improving Corporate Governance Practices

verfasst von : Vanessa Serret, Sylvie Berthelot

Erschienen in: Corporate Governance

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Shareholder democracy is gaining ground the world over. This chapter analyses the emergence of shareholder activism in Canada as a tool for improving corporate governance practices and explains the reasons underlying the recent apparition of activism in this country. In addition, it describes the nature of proposals according to filer type and targeted firms, which in turn provides a complete overview of shareholder democracy since its early beginnings and from 2000 to 2009. Finally, a review of activism in other countries offers some elements of comparison.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Public Listed Firms: An Overview
Nächstes Kapitel Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings in the U.S.
Fußnoten
1
Marler and Faugère (2010); Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011); Buchanan et al. (2010); Greenwood and Schor (2009); Gillan and Starks (2007); Ertimur et al. (2010); Klein and Zur (2009); Brav et al. (2008a; b); Smith (1996).
 
2
Huynh (2010); Poulsen et al. (2010); Betch et al. (2009); Conyon and Sadler (2010); Cziraki et al. (2010); Franks and Mayers (2001); Crespi and Renneboog (2010); Buchanan et al. (2010).
 
3
Serret and Berthelot (2012); Bates and Hennessy (2010); Wang et al. (2005).
 
4
The proposal project can be omitted by the stock market authorities in the case of nonconformity to the set legal framework or the directors of the firm can even decide not to submit it to the vote.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Shareholder Activism in Canada: The Emergence of a New Tool for Improving Corporate Governance Practices
verfasst von
Vanessa Serret
Sylvie Berthelot
Copyright-Jahr
2012
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Corporate Governance

Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31578-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-31579-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2012

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_4

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