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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Soft Law Requirements with Hard Law Effects? The Influence of CSR on Corporate Law from a German Perspective

verfasst von : Alexander Scheuch

Erschienen in: Globalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility and its Impact on Corporate Governance

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a ‘hot topic’ in German corporate law in recent years as witnessed by a surge of recent publications concerning this subject. In Germany, CSR—a ‘foreign’ concept which is usually referred to by its English name—may have been neglected and not taken seriously by many corporate lawyers initially. However, CSR has become virtually impossible to ignore not least due to the European Union’s Directive 2014/95/EU dealing with the disclosure of non-financial information by large public-interest undertakings. CSR, a concept usually associated with classic soft law guidelines, has thus entered the stage of hard law at least in the area of reporting. This development is not only of academic interest, but it obviously affects company directors in significant ways as well. Are we witnessing a ‘paradigm shift’ or even a ‘revolution’ in corporate law? And, most importantly from a director’s perspective, is this accompanied by the establishment of new duties? This chapter aims to explore these questions using German corporate law as an example.

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Vorheriges Kapitel From Transparency to Due Diligence Laws? Variations in Stringency of CSR Regulation in Global Supply Chains in the ‘Home State’ Of Multinational Enterprises

Nächstes Kapitel Analysing the CSR Spending Requirements Under Indian Company Law

See for example, Mülbert (2009), pp. 766–767; Walden (2015), pp. 1, 8.

That is not to say that CSR issues did not arise in connection with the Volkswagen scandal. For instance, Asmussen (2017), pp. 118–123 discusses whether Volkswagen’s failure to live up to its own advertised CSR policies could render its diesel cars defective in a legal sense.

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘CSR Directive’.

The CSR Directive was to be transposed by EU Member States by 6 December 2016. However, the transposition process in Germany was delayed. The Act Transposing the CSR Directive (Gesetz zur Stärkung der nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in ihren Lage- und Konzernlageberichten) was ultimately passed on 11 April 2017 and published in the Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) 2017, Part I, pp. 802–814 on 18 April 2017.

For an overview of existing frameworks see Spießhofer (2014a), pp. 1284–1285; Wehrmann (2015), pp. 57, 71–77.

Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1282.

Hommelhoff (2015), p. 291.

This is, in itself, quite remarkable when compared to other jurisdictions where disclosure of non-financial information is voluntary, see du Plessis (2016), pp. 69–71.

In Germany this has been transposed in ss. 289b–289c German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch—HGB). It has been estimated that approximately 550 German enterprises fall within the scope of the new reporting regulations, see Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 184.

Art. 19a(5) of amended Directive 2013/34/EU.

Art. 19a(6) of amended Directive 2013/34/EU. Germany has opted to give the choice to the enterprises themselves, see s. 289b (4) HGB. For the reasoning behind this see for example Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 228; also see Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 191. It remains unclear whether an auditor who is merely tasked to check whether the non-financial statement has been provided must intervene in cases where s/he notices that information contained in the statement is manifestly false, see Schmidt (2016), p. 392.

Du Plessis and Rühmkorf (2015), pp. 59–60.

See Seibt (2016), p. 2715.

See Roth-Mingram (2015), p. 1344; Saenger (2017), p. 270. This problem is familiar to German corporate lawyers from the context of false declarations of compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code pursuant to s. 161 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz—AktG), see Bayer and Scholz (2015), s.161 r. 100.

See Roth-Mingram (2015), p. 1344; Saenger (2017), p. 270. The German Parliament’s judicial committee has also voiced the opinion that there should be no grounds for a contesting action with regard to the supervisory board’s duties in connection with CSR reporting, see Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 192. In any case, in German stock corporations discharge resolution lack immediate legal consequences according to s. 120(2) AktG.

For a general overview see du Plessis et al. (2017).

See Roth-Mingram (2015), p. 1344; Weller et al. (2016), p. 412; For other possible consequences see for example Seibt (2016), p. 2715.

Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb—UWG.

For a closer look at the implications in the context of unfair commercial practices cf. Spindler (2012), pp. 1133, 1146; also see Boor and Nowrot (2015), pp. 35, 37 (note 7); Nietsch (2016), p. 1333.

See Roth-Mingram (2015), p. 1345; also see for example Birk (2014), pp. 169, 172–173; Köhler (2014), pp. 161, 165–66; Seibt (2016), p. 2715.

The official reasoning for the Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016) makes no mention of such ‘consumer enforcement’. A notable case in which a consumer protection organisation brought action in connection with an enterprise’s CSR communication activities involved the German store chain Lidl, but it was settled before a judgment was passed, see Rühmkorf (2016), p. 395; Birk (2011), p. 197. The American landmark case regarding false CSR advertising is Kasky v Nike, 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002).

See Roth-Mingram (2015), pp. 1344–45; also Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 232.

See for example Asmussen (2017), pp. 119–120.

Seibt (2016), p. 2715.

See Asmussen (2017), pp. 121–123.

Again, see Asmussen (2017), p. 120.

For fines regarding administrative offences see s. 334 HGB, for criminal offences see s. 331 HGB; also see Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 193; Kumm and Woodtli (2016), pp. 229–231.

Saenger (2017), p. 269.

Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 49.

See Art. 19a(1)(b) of amended Directive 2013/34/EU. Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 188 assert that the mere absence of due diligence measures need not be explained as long as a policy exists.

Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 52.

See supra Sect. 2.1.

In Germany, the business judgment rule has been codified in s. 93(1)(2) AktG; also see infra Sect. 3.3.2.

In other words, directors must examine which of the matters are relevant for their enterprise. This is correctly pointed out by Hommelhoff (2014), pp. 137, 138.

S. 93(1)(2) AktG requires as part of the business judgment rule that directors act ‘on the basis of adequate information’; also see for example du Plessis and Rühmkorf (2015), p. 61.

Goette (2013), s. 161 r. 40.

See Hommelhoff (2014), p. 137; Podszun (2014), pp. 51, 63 speaks of an ‘indirect duty to establish and enforce a CSR policy’, a description that is at least ambiguous. I would concur only if it is meant in the sense described under infra Sect. 3.3.4.

See Schön (2016), p. 285.

Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 52. Also cf. Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 185; Rühmkorf (2015), p. 60; Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1284.

Art. 19a(1) subpara. (2) of amended Directive 2013/34/EU.

I certainly agree with Hommelhoff (2015) when he asks the rhetorical question ‘Which enterprise in the textiles trade will dare to report that it does need to create provisions to prevent child labour?’, pp. 291, 293. Seibt (2016), p. 2708 classifies this mechanism as paternalistic nudging.

This is what Hommelhoff (2015) does, pp. 291, 295.

Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 49; also see Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 187; Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 219; Rühmkorf (2015), p. 61.

For instance, Seibt (2016), p. 2707 points out that corporate reputation management is an integral part of directors’ responsibilities at least in corporations that are particularly ‘exposed’ to certain shareholders.

Bayer and Scholz (2015), s. 161 r. 49 with further references.

See supra Sect. 2.2.

We take a closer look at this at infra Sect. 3.3.

Again this is most prominently voiced by Hommelhoff (2014), p. 137.

See for example, Saenger (2017), p. 270.

See supra Sect. 2.3.

This is presumably what Schön (2016), p. 293 means when he states that under the CSR Directive enterprises must now ‘involuntarily voluntarily’ bind themselves.

Roth-Mingram (2015), p. 1344; Saenger (2017), p. 270; Weller et al. (2016), p. 411.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof—BGH), 16 February 2009. 180 BGHZ 9, 23–24 Kirch/Deutsche Bank; also see Goette (2013) s. 161 r. 43; Lutter (2016) r. 1847.

Hommelhoff (2014), pp. 137, 144.

For an overview see Sandrock et al. (2017).

Apparently, the EU now sees compliance as a minimum ‘ingredient’ of CSR, see inter alia http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/corporate-social-responsibility (accessed 25 November 2016); this view is shared by Sjåfjell and Richardson (2015), pp. 312, 315; for an extensive discussion on whether CSR is purely voluntary by definition see Rühmkorf (2015), pp. 10–13; also see Walden (2015), pp. 1, 15–16; for a differing view see Boor and Nowrot (2015), pp. 35–36.

Kort (2012), p. 926; Spindler (2012), pp. 1133–1134; Wehrmann (2015), pp. 57–61.

Walden (2015), p. 1.

In these fields, CSR rules could, at most, have a ‘supporting’ effect, particularly where hard law exists but enforceability is problematic. For this view see Podszun (2014), pp. 51, 61.

This question has also been posed by Spießhofer (2016), p. 370; also see Nietsch (2016), p. 1334.

See Kort (2012), p. 927; Walden (2015), pp. 1, 18–20.

This is pointed to by many authors, for example Boor and Nowrot (2015), pp. 35, 40; Rühmkorf (2016), p. 395; Spießhofer (2014a), pp. 1281, 1282, 1287; Walden (2015), pp. 1, 7, 16.

Wehrmann (2015), pp. 57, 61. For an extensive look at the liability of German enterprises for human rights violations in foreign jurisdictions see Weller et al. (2016), pp. 387–420.

Walden (2015), pp. 1, 7. This may indeed correspond with the assessment by Kort (2012), p. 928 who does not recognise any novel elements in CSR compared to business practices that have existed for centuries; also see Nietsch (2016), p. 1334.

Rühmkorf (2016), p. 393; Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1287; Walden (2015), pp. 1, 22.

See supra Sect. 3.1.

Strohn (2016), p. 5.

See Walden (2015), pp. 1, 15–16; Griss (2014), pp. 271, 272 refers to Georg Jellinek’s designation of law as an ‘ethical minimum requirement’.

For instance, Podszun (2014), pp. 51, 65 considers the motivations for CSR activities as ‘secondary’.

Wernicke and Stöbener de Mora (2016), p. 379 voice this concern as well.

This reaction has been vividly described by Saenger (2017), p. 266. We have already witnessed a similar effect regarding CMS, see Hauschka and Herb (2016), p. 371.

See Saenger (2017), p. 266; Wehrmann (2015), p. 82.

Hauschka and Herb (2016), p. 371.

See for example the groundbreaking work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), pp. 305–60.

For a brief introduction to these issues, see Thaler and Sunstein (2009), p. 40.

For some takes on the issue, see Kahneman (2012), p. 175; Hossain and List (2012), pp. 2151–2167.

This argument is brought forth e.g. by Schön (2016), pp. 284–285.

See Rühmkorf (2016), pp. 393–394 with further references.

Wernicke and Stöbener de Mora (2016), p. 381.

Haan and Achten (2016), p. 396 (note 12).

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups, COM (2013) 207 final.

Spießhofer (2016), p. 367.

See Schön (2016), p. 284.

Wernicke and Stöbener de Mora (2016), p. 381.

For an extensive look at these issues see Spießhofer (2016), pp. 367–370; also see Boor and Nowrot (2015), pp. 47–48.

See Spießhofer (2016), pp. 369–370.

Grabosch (2016), p. 385.

German Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht—BVerwG), 16 October 2013. Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 33(8), p. 527.

See Spießhofer (2016), pp. 369–370.

This is the position taken by Grabosch (2016), p. 385.

This problem is pointed out by Spießhofer (2016), p. 369.

Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1285; Villiers and Mähönen (2015), pp. 214–215.

Spindler (2012), p. 1148.

See Directive 2014/95/EU, recital 3; a high degree of flexibility is also stressed by the German legislator, Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 46.

Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), pp. 52–53; also see Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 224.

S. 289d HGB; explicitly stated by Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 52. Regarding the obligation to explain, see Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 189.

See Roth-Mingram (2015), p. 1343; Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1283.

Directive 2014/95/EU recital 22 refers to fundamental rights, in particular the freedom to conduct a business.

Grundgesetz—GG.

100

Schön (2016), p. 288.

101

Regarding the controversy surrounding the corporate objective, see infra Sect. 3.3.1.

102

See Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1287.

103

Wernicke and Stöbener de Mora (2016), pp. 375, 379.

104

See e.g. Fleischer (2015), s. 76 r. 29–42; for an international perspective see du Plessis and Rühmkorf (2015), pp. 52–54.

105

See Hommelhoff (2015), p. 292; Kort (2012), p. 930; Mülbert (2009), p. 772; Spindler (2012), p. 1141. Whether a later change requires a unanimous shareholder resolution is a controversial question, see Spindler (2012), p. 1141.

106

Hommelhoff (2014), pp. 140–141.

107

Hommelhoff (2015), pp. 291–292.

108

See supra Sects. 3.2.3–3.2.5.

109

Directive 2014/95/EU recital 6.

110

Directive 2014/95/EU recitals 1–3.

111

Government Draft for the Act Transposing the CSR Directive (2016), p. 31.

112

See Roth-Mingram (2015), pp. 1343–1344; also see Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 219; Seibt (2016), p. 2709.

113

See Schön (2016), pp. 282, 287–288.

114

See Saenger (2017), p. 265.

115

Spindler (2012), p. 1139 with further references; also see Mülbert (2009), p. 772.

116

Spindler (2012), pp. 1139–1140 [translated from German]. Walden (2015), p. 10 (note 41) also states that the practical differences between the shareholder value and stakeholder approaches are negligible.

117

This view is also expressed by Schön (2016), pp. 286–287.

118

For a closer look at this question from a German perspective cf. Walden (2015), pp. 27–31; also see Spindler (2012), pp. 1138–1142. In a common law context the question would likely be associated with the discussion on shareholder primacy and judgments such as Dodge v Ford Motor Co., 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919). However, oftentimes CSR and profit are not strict alternatives, as will later be addressed.

119

See Wernicke and Stöbener de Mora (2016), p. 379 (note 46); this has been discussed especially regarding a duty to follow the German Corporate Governance Code’s recommendations, see Bayer and Scholz (2015), s. 161 r. 50; for the parallel issue of defining a corporate objective see supra Sect. 3.3.1.

120

As indicated above (supra Sect. 3.3) it is hard to draw a definite boundary to the discussion under supra Sect. 3.3.1. There are certainly points of contact to the corporate objective as directors are obliged to pursue this objective.

121

Hommelhoff (2015), pp. 291–292, 98.

122

See Kort (2012), p. 927.

123

Schön (2016), pp. 287–288.

124

This term was coined by Birgit Spießhofer, see inter alia Spießhofer (2016), p. 370.

125

Wernicke and Stöbener de Mora (2016), p. 381.

126

Grabosch (2016), p. 385.

127

See, regarding the UN Guiding Principles, Spießhofer (2014b), pp. 2475–2476; see also Wehrmann (2015), p. 65.

128

For other private frameworks see for example Schaub (2016), s. 276 r. 81; Grabosch (2016), p. 385.

129

For an overview see Förster (2016), s. 823 r. 339–340.

130

See Saenger (2017), p. 265; du Plessis and Saenger (2017).

131

See BGH, 1 March 1988, 103 BGHZ 338, 341–342; also see BGH, 11 December 1979. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 33(22):1220; BGH, 3 February 2004. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 57(20):1450.

132

Bayer and Scholz (2015), s. 161 r. 24; Spindler (2015), s. 161 r. 68.

133

BGH, 17 June 2014. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 67(34):2495.

134

See supra Sect. 3.2.4.

135

Ohly and Liebenau (2014), pp. 205–206.

136

See Kort (2012), p. 927.

137

Walden (2015), pp. 10, 32; also see Hauschka and Herb (2016), p. 372. BGH, 6 December 2001. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 55(21):1586 has also stated that due to the solidification of goodwill through CSR measures there is no sharp dividing line between altruistic and (long-term) selfish actions.

138

Kort (2012), p. 930; the profit may, however, be hard to determine exactly, see Saenger (2017), p. 262; also see Mülbert (2009), p. 768.

139

See Spießhofer (2014a), p. 1286; Spindler (2012), p. 1137.

140

Walden (2015), p. 26.

141

German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch—BGB), s. 138.

142

BGB, s. 826.

143

Admittedly, the dividing line between this discussion and the one under supra Sect. 3.3.2 is quite blurry as an undeniable link to directors’ duties exists, but as indicated under supra Sect. 3.3 a division is attempted nonetheless to promote a useful categorisation for the sake of future research and debate.

144

Walden (2015), p. 22.

145

See supra Sect. 3.2.3.

146

Armbrüster (2015), s. 138 r. 11; Wendtland (2016), s. 138 r. 1–2.

147

See Armbrüster (2015), s. 138 r. 20–22; for the significance in the CSR context see for example Boor and Nowrot (2015), p. 39.

148

See Armbrüster (2015), s. 138 r. 15.

149

The Act has already been mentioned in this chapter, see supra Sect. 2.1. Note that under Sect. 2.1 it was evaluated whether false reporting on CSR constitutes a violation of the Act Against Unfair Commercial Practices. In contrast, we are now considering whether certain ‘irresponsible’ business practices (especially in other jurisdictions) may be seen as a violation of the Act, particularly UWG, s. 3(1) and s. 4 no. 11.

150

See Grabosch (2016), p. 385; for a detailed examination see Kocher (2005), pp. 648–651; Podszun (2014), pp. 74–76; Weber and Weber (2008), pp. 899–906.

151

Grabosch (2016), p. 385 believes that a comparable case would arguably be decided differently today.

152

See in particular, Ohly and Liebenau (2014), pp. 205–206.

153

Ohly and Liebenau (2014), p. 207.

154

For a more detailed discussion (also on whether commissioning the law on unfair commercial practices to promote CSR would be advisable in the future) see Ohly and Liebenau (2014), pp. 207–209.

155

Supra Sect. 3.3.2.

156

Walden (2015), pp. 20–21 [translated from German]; see Koch (2016), s. 76 r. 15.

157

For the role of proxy firms regarding compliance with the DCGK’s recommendations, see Bayer and Scholz (2015), s. 161 r. 7.

158

See supra Sect. 3.3.2.

159

See supra Sect. 2.3.

160

Walden (2015), p. 23 correctly points out that a violation of non-legal obligations can constitute a violation of directors’ duties if it leads to a loss of trust of business partners or a loss of public reputation.

161

See Sect. 3 supra.

162

Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 219.

163

Kumm and Woodtli (2016), p. 219.

164

For the similar problem in case of a violation of reporting duties see supra Sect. 2.1.

165

See supra Sect. 3.2.1.

166

Cf. Nietsch (2016), p. 1334; Rühmkorf (2016), p. 395.

167

See for example Haan and Achten (2016), pp. 397–398; Wehrmann (2015), p. 81; this fact is also pointed out by Nietsch (2016), p. 1335.

168

Rühmkorf (2016), p. 394.

169

Rühmkorf (2016), p. 395.

170

See supra Sect. 3.2.3.

171

See supra Sect. 3.2.1.

172

Art. 3 of Directive 2014/95/EU.

173

See Blöink and Halbleib (2017), p. 195.

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Titel: Soft Law Requirements with Hard Law Effects? The Influence of CSR on Corporate Law from a German Perspective
verfasst von: Alexander Scheuch
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Globalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility and its Impact on Corporate Governance
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69127-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-69128-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69128-2_9

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