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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

30. Statistics Methods Applied in Employee Stock Options

verfasst von : Li-jiun Chen, Cheng-der Fuh

Erschienen in: Handbook of Financial Econometrics and Statistics

Verlag: Springer New York

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Abstract

This study presents model-based and compensation-based approaches to determining the price-subjective value of employee stock options (ESOs). In the model-based approach, we consider a utility-maximizing model in which the employees allocate their wealth among company stock, a market portfolio, and risk-free bonds, and then we derive the ESO formulas, which take into account illiquidity and sentiment effects. By using the method of change of measure, the derived formulas are simply like those of the market value with altered parameters. To calculate the compensation-based subjective value, we group employees by hierarchical clustering with a K-means approach and back out the option value in an equilibrium competitive employment market.
Further, we test illiquidity and sentiment effects on ESO values by running regressions that consider the problem of standard errors in the finance panel data. Using executive stock options and compensation data paid between 1992 and 2004 for firms covered by the Compustat Executive Compensation Database, we find that subjective value is positively related to sentiment and negatively related to illiquidity in all specifications, consistent with the offsetting roles of sentiment and risk aversion. Moreover, executives value ESOs at a 48 % premium to the Black-Scholes value and ESO premiums are explained by a sentiment level of 12 % in risk-adjusted, annualized excess return, suggesting a high level of executive overconfidence.

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Fußnoten
1
The option values are estimated by the calculation in ExecuCompustat database.
 
2
Because the process can be similarly derived from Chang et al. (2008), it is omitted.
 
3
Gabaix and Landier (2008) finds that total market value as a proxy for firm size has the strongest predictive power on compensation. We, however, redo all tests using number of employees as the size proxy and find qualitatively identical results.
 
4
The details of hierarchical clustering with a K-means approach and its performance are presented in Appendix 2.
 
5
See Bettis et al. (2005), Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), Ingersoll (2006), and Bryan et al. (2000).
 
6
The parameters of double exponential are estimated by daily return data from 1992 to 2004. A jump occurs if return goes beyond ±10 %, which relates to an approximately three-standard deviation daily return during this period.
 
7
Nohel and Todd (2005), Ryan and Wiggins (2001), and others show that option values increase with risk, however, they do not study the impact of increased idiosyncratic risk. Carpenter (2000) presents examples where convex incentive structures do not imply that the manager is more willing to take risks. The model used in Chang et al. (2008) is able to capture this result.
 
8
While Panel A shows the results of options that vest immediately, we can also consider the vesting effect and there is no significant qualitative difference.
 
9
For some issues for which there is no time stamp, we assume an issuance date of July 1, inasmuch asthis would be the middle of the fiscal year for the vast majority of firms.
 
10
For cash paid for purchasing additional stock, where direct data is unavailable, we use the change in stock holdings times the year-end stock price to calculate this value.
 
11
Holland and Elder (2006) find that rank-and-file employees exhibit an α close to 10 % and concur that subjective value is decreasing in α because of risk aversion and under-diversification.
 
12
Here, sentiment is estimated from the European option formula. It can also be calculated from the American option formula but with more exhaustive computations. As we mentioned before, sentiment estimated from the European and American ESO formulas have similar patterns. It may not affect the regression results much.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Statistics Methods Applied in Employee Stock Options
verfasst von
Li-jiun Chen
Cheng-der Fuh
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Verlag
Springer New York
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7750-1_30