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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. Sveriges Riksbank and the Four Criteria

verfasst von : Steffen Elkiær Andersen

Erschienen in: The Origins and Nature of Scandinavian Central Banking

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Since its foundation in 1668, the Riksbank had been governed by the six “fullmägtige”, appointed by and representing the three guaranteeing estates (two from each estate––see Chap. 3). They had a role comparable to non-executive directors. The practical daily affairs were taken care of by six “kommissarier”, each reporting to the relevant fullmägtiga. Some fullmägtige were members of the Assembly of the Estates, but mostly they were not. They reported to the “Sekrete Utskott”, (the “Secret Commission”) i.e. the commission of the Estates dealing with secret matters of state.

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Fußnoten
1
“…men det är det fullmägtige förbjudet att i ombudets närvaro fatta beslut.”
 
2
“Fullmägtige kunna ej i och för sin befattning med Riksbanken emottaga föreskrifter af någon annan än Riksdagen och dess bankoutskott…”
 
3
Stockholms Enkilde Bank had been cautious. The Wallenbergs still remembered the painful experience of 1879, cf. Chap. 3 of this book, and Wetterberg (2009) Pengarna & Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 274.
 
4
For details of this development, see e.g. Steffen Elkiær Andersen (2010) The Evolution of Nordic Finance (Palgrave MacMillan), pp. 254–55.
 
5
cf. Wetterberg (2009) Pengerna och Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), pp. 273–74.
 
6
Wetterberg (2009) Pengarna & Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 274.
 
7
The Kreditkassa was used in the continuing banking problems of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1951 it was reorganized to become Sveriges Kreditbank AB, a fully-fledged government-owned commercial bank. In 1974, Sveriges Kreditbank was merged with the AB Postbank to become the PK Bank, at that time the third largest bank in Sweden (and 100 % government owned). The Postbank was the result of a 1960 merger between the Post Giro Office and the Postsparebank, dating from the 1883. In 1989, the PKbank took over the troubled Nordbanken, and the state ownership was diluted. The combined banks took the name Nordbanken AB, which later merged with the Finnish Merita Bank and later with the Danish Unibank and the Norwegian Cristiania Bank og Kreditkasse into what is today Nordea, headquartered in Stockholm, and the largest Scandinavian bank––and with no government ownership.
 
8
In 1919, the Stockholms Handelsbank had changed its name to Svenska Handelsbank in connection with its acquisition of two provincial banks.
 
9
cf. U. Olsson (1997) I utvecklingens centrum. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken och dess föregångere 1856–1996, (SEB), pp. 138–39.
 
10
cf. W. Bagehot (1873) Lombard Street pp. 196–98, the 1878 edition. Bagehot did not use the term “central bank”, but referred to the Banking Department of the Bank of England. The Note Issuing Department was something else, and should, in Bagehot’s opinion, not be involved in any lending business. It is, of course, impossible to guess what Bagehot would have advocated in cases (i.e. everywhere else) where there was no distinction between a “Note-issuing Department” and a “Banking Department” of a “central bank”.
 
11
“The…view that the Match King had perpetrated the greatest financial fraud in history, quickly became cemented in the public mind”, F. Partnoy (2009) The Match King, Public Affairs, New York, p. 201.
 
12
In 1922 the banking inspector raised questions over the vast loans made by Swedish banks to Kreuger and his companies. An investigation was arranged, and a report was made by a professor from Handelshögskolan in Stockholm, who characterized the Kreuger Group as the largest casino in Sweden (“Sveriges största spekulationsföretag”), cf. Wetterberg (2009) Pengerna och Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 288.
 
13
A detailed survey of the Kreuger Group’s loans from Swedish banks is given in Jan Glete (1981) Kreugerkoncernen och krisen på svensk aktiemarknad (Almquist & Wicksell international), pp. 494–510.
 
14
cf. Wetterberg (2009) Pengerna & Makten, (Sveriges Riksbank), pp. 288–98.
 
15
One of the consequences was a reorganization in 1939 of the Skandinaviska Kredit AB into Skandinaviska Banken AB. In 1972 it merged with Stockholms Enskilda Bank to become the Skandinaviska Enskilda Bank AB (SEB).
 
16
Between 1939 and 1945 Sweden had an all party coalition government led by a social democratic prime minister.
 
17
On the governance of the Riksbank, see Sect. 8.2.3 below.
 
18
cf. Knut Wicksell (1898) Geldzins und Güterpreise.
 
19
”…den svenska penningpolitiken skulle inriktas på att med till buds stående medel bevara- den svenska kronans inhemska köpkraft.” Here quoted from G. Wetterberg (2009) Pengarna & Makten, Sveriges Riksbank, pp. 299–300.
 
20
Wetterberg (2009), p. 300.
 
21
Ivar Roth was head governor of Sveriges Riksbank 1929–1948, and IMF president 1951–56.
 
22
The statement is extensively quoted in K. Kock (1961) Kreditmarknad och räntepolitik I + II (Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank) Bd. I, p. 115.
 
23
“…eftersom statens makt över penningväsendet aldrig har delegerats och icke rimeligvis bör delegerats åt något underordnat borgan, hur upphöjt som helst, så är det oavvisligt att riksbanken ständigt behöver hålla sig i kontakt med statsmaktens närmaste representant på detta område, nämligen finansministern…Ledningen av penningpolitiken …måsta ligga hos landets regering.” Here quoted from Wetterberg (2009) Pengerna & Makten, Sveriges Riksbank, p. 307.
 
24
“Ansvaret för konjunkturpolitiken måste…primärt åvila centralbanken, då det knappast kan särskiljas från ansvaret för valutans vård. Finanspolitikens användning som konjunkturpolitisk instrument kan därför endast bli av supplerande art och bör helst indgå som ett led i den av centralbanken ledda politiken.” Here quoted from Wetterberg (2009), p. 308.
This quotation, as well as the quotation given in note 23 above can also be found in K. Koch (1961) Kreditmarknad och räntepolitik I + II (Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank), Part I, pp. 113–14.
 
25
In 1971, the two-chamber system was replaced by a one-chamber Riksdag.
 
26
“Med efterkrigstidens stabile majoriteter fölorade Riksbankkens särställning mycket av sin praktiska betydelse.” Wetterberg (2009) Penningarna och Makten, (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 415.
 
27
“…skal socialdemokratin förstärka och hålla fast vid samhällets rätt att begränsa enskilde finansinteressens möjlighet att efter sitt omdömme och behag styra räntepolitiken och penningpolitiken.” E. Wickforss (1948) Frihet – för vem? (Socialdemokratisk skriftserie nr. 18, Tidens förlag), p. 27. Here quoted from L. Jonung. Kreditregleringens uppgang och fall in L. Werin, Ed. (1993) Från räntereglering till inflationsnorm, (SNS), p. 325.
 
28
cf. L. Jonung Riksbankens politik 1945–90 in L. Werin, Ed (1993) Från räntereglering till inflationsnorm (SNS), p. 403.
 
29
cf. L.Jonung Riksbankens politik 1945–90 in L. Werin, Ed. (1993) Från räntereglering till inflationsnorm, pp. 339–85. Based on protocols from the meetings and interviews with some of the participants , Jonung gives several examples showing the nature of the meetings with the Riksbank.
 
30
cf. Larsson & Sjögren (1995) Vägen till och från bankkrisen (Carlssons), p. 135, and Statistisk Årbok.
 
31
“Gör som Ni vill. Jag begriper ändå ingenting”. K.-O. Feldt (1991) Alla dessa dagar – i regeringen 1982–90 (Nordstedts förlag), p. 260.
 
32
The merged bank was renamed Nordbanken, which later merged with the Finnish Merita Bank to become Nordea, which initially had the Swedish government as its largest shareholder because of the state-owned Nordbank. The Swedish government’s shares in Nordea have since been sold.
 
33
In 2005, Stefen Ingves was appointed Riksbankchef as from January 1, 2006.
 
34
Wetterberg (2009) Penningarna & Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 427.
 
35
Wetterberg (2009) Penningarne & Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 428.
 
36
Wetterberg (2009) Penningarne & Makten (Sveriges Riksbank), p. 428.
 
37
“Sveriges Riksbank which is guaranteed by the Riksdag, conducts banking business according to this Act”, cf. Section 3.2.1 above.
 
38
Riksbanklagen (1988:1385) om Sveriges Riksbank, i dess lydelse den 1 januarie 2015.
 
Metadaten
Titel
Sveriges Riksbank and the Four Criteria
verfasst von
Steffen Elkiær Andersen
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39750-4_8