A second recent trend in Asian SSC and development cooperation is increasing multilateralism. SSC historically has tended to be bilateral in nature. In contrast to the United States, which has become more nationalist, retreating from participation and support for multilateralism through the United Nations (UN) and other agreements such as the Paris Agreement, Asian countries—China and India in particular—are increasing their multilateral cooperation. There are several elements.
24.3.3.1 Multilateral Finance
Only a few years ago, a least-developed country without the credit capacity to borrow in international capital markets had no option but to go to a global financial institution such as the World Bank
or to a regional multilateral bank for large-scale funding. Since the 2000s, China, India, and other Southern-based institutions have emerged as a major source of concessional and commercial development financing in Africa and Asia. Two new Southern-led multilateral banks—the New Development Bank
(NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB)—have increased the pool of multilateral finance but also changed the game in multilateral global governance
. The AIIB has 93 members to date—six countries joined at the end of 2018 (Houston
2018)—and has approved loans worth $6.7 billion to more than 30 energy, transport, and urban projects (Suokas
2019). The NDB approved its third tranche of funding in May 2018. The project scope expanded to include urban development, water supply, and sanitation while keeping sustainable infrastructure development at the heart of its mandate (Vasquez
2018).
Despite these investments, multilateral finance still only makes up about 10 per cent of Asian infrastructure financing (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP]
2017). The AIIB
finances about 1 per cent of the BRI
(Deloitte
2018; UNDP
2017). The big money for infrastructure comes from public-sector funding, whether through direct government budgetary funding, ODA
, or other concessionary loans at the sovereign level. Many of the loans are financed by the CDB, the EXIM Bank of China, the EXIM Bank of India, or commercial banks from the region (Deloitte
2018; UNDP
2017).
When the AIIB was launched, the critics were vocal about their concerns about governance, Chinese dominance, transparency
, environmental and social safeguards, and competition
with the World Bank
and the ADB. However, this contestation
was short lived. The AIIB’s
leaders come with extensive experience from other development banks. Both the World Bank
and the ADB have co-financed AIIB loans in partner countries. The competition
has been healthy, helping to fill the infrastructure gap, driving existing multilateral development banks to streamline their cumbersome operational procedures and processes, and forcing new multilateral development banks to strive to meet the expectations of partner countries regarding compliance as well as social and environmental safeguards (Rana
2018). With 93 members and an increasing voice of non-Chinese member states (Sun
2015), the AIIB
has become a vehicle for increased collaboration
among previously unlike-minded partners, “healthy competition
and functional complementarity
” as Rana calls it (Rana
2018). In December 2018, the UN granted permanent observer status to the AIIB (Suokas
2018), putting it on a par with other development organisations in the UN system such as the OECD
, the African Development Bank, and the ADB. The NDB
is also considering a sustainability
framework drafted and presented by civil society members from BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Vasquez et al.
2017).
24.3.3.2 UN and Other Multilateral Platforms
China and India are also stepping up their engagement
with the UN, representationally and financially. China is now the third-largest contributor to the UN’s regular budget, the second-largest contributor to the peacekeeping budget, and has committed more than 2500 personnel to UN peacekeeping
operations as of 2018 (Center for Strategic and International Studies
2016). China has repeatedly expressed
2 its solidarity with other world leaders in support of multilateralism
at the UN. This is in stark contrast to the US position. China has also set up funds to support the UN’s mission, such as contributing $1 billion for the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, and has committed to increase its contributions to the UN development system by $100 million by the year 2020. China’s contributions, in kind and cash, expand its influence
and extend its voice on international development issues. This leverage is only likely to grow in the future. As Washington increasingly turns its back on multilateral platforms for development cooperation, perhaps China will become the main guarantor (Gowan
2018).
India has steadily increased its contributions to the UN and is one of the top contributors to the UN overall (Kinhal
2017). India has been successful in promoting global governance
and international cooperation
through the UN on issues of climate change
and the 2030 Agenda
. As Thakker (
2018) points out, India was recognised as a drafting author of the climate change
agreements and a leader within the Brazil–South Africa–India–China (BASIC) coalition as well as of the G77 during the Conferences of the Parties in Copenhagen and Paris. Significantly, following the United States pulling out of the Paris Agreement
, Asian countries, including China, India, and Japan are stepping up. India established the international solar alliance
with more than 120 countries and has contributed $30 million to its set-up in Delhi (Neslen
2015). China is expected to reach its reduced emissions targets well before 2030 (Gowen and Denyer
2017). India also sits on the Open Working Group
on the SDGs
, which is comprised of 30 member states (Thakker
2018). In June 2017, India signed a partnership agreement with the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation
(UNOSSC) to launch the UN Development Partnership Fund for $2 million, plus multi-year contributions of $100 million. There is also an India, Brazil, and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (known as the IBSA Fund, which celebrated its 15th anniversary at the end of 2018) with $35 million in contributions (Akbaruddin
2018). These roles and resources
signal India’s commitment to a multilateral agenda for sustainable development, but also a recognition by other member states of the need to bring India’s perspective to the table.
Outside of the UN, China was the chair of the G20 when its members adopted the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development in September 2016 (Risse
2017). The retreat of the United States from multilateralism
and international engagements
opens the space for China and India to step in, step up, and expand their influence
.
24.3.3.3 New and Diverse Partnerships
Historically, nation-states initiated and led most Asian development cooperation and SSC programmes. Asian SSC did not involve civil society until recently (Mulakala
2017). East Asia’s strong development states limited the emergence of domestic civil society and social activism while focussing on industrialisation and growth (Hirata
2002; Lee and Lee
2016; Zhang
2003). This was true in varying degrees for China, Japan, and Korea. Overall, civil society organisation (CSO) engagement
in development cooperation remained limited in scale and scope. South Asia saw a somewhat different evolution. India and Bangladesh, for example, have longstanding, vibrant CSO sectors that have contributed to national development for decades. India and Bangladesh have long advocated for partnerships
with civil society to address the countries’ welfare and social development needs (Mulakala
2017).
The pivotal condition enabling Asian CSOs to engage (or not) in external development cooperation hinged on state facilitation. Both Japan and Korea are members of the OECD-DAC
, which encourages diverse partnerships for ODA
. In both countries, the government support for NGO/CSO partnerships
contained in its overseas aid was an impetus for growth in the NGO/CSO sector (Hirata
2002; Lee and Lee
2016).
Though partnership with CSOs is a newer concept in China, China has now recognised CSOs as important partners in its expanding SSC and is implementing a facilitative and supportive regulatory and funding framework for CSO engagement
abroad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
2016). China’s largest and most influential poverty-reduction CSO—the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation—had carried out projects in 17 countries and regions valued at more than $17 million (China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation
2017), as of the end of 2016.
In 2015, China announced the establishment of the South-South Cooperation
Aid Fund, which has a current value of $3 billion (China International Development Cooperation Agency
2018). Chinese CSOs may apply to this fund for their programmes in other countries. These measures demonstrate a facilitative and supportive regulatory and funding framework for Chinese CSO engagement
abroad. Indian CSOs (with a few exceptions) have not figured prominently in their country’s official SSC, largely because India has preferred state-to-state relations and has a restrictive regulatory framework for CSOs (Forum for Indian Development Cooperation [FIDC]
2015; Mawdsley and Roychoudhury
2016). The exception is in service delivery. Where the Indian state has enabled CSOs to work outside the country—for example by engaging the Self-Employed Women’s Association in Afghanistan for women’s economic-empowerment programmes—positive impacts have followed (“Women empowerment”
2017). In terms of policy dialogue, India established the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation in 2014 to engage the government, universities, and CSOs on Indian SSC priorities (FIDC
2015). Beyond these state-facilitated partnerships
, Indian CSOs, although vibrant and influential domestically, have limited activities outside of India. However, this is bound to change, given the expansion
of Indian SSC and India’s prioritisation of international people-to-people partnerships
.
Asian private-sector companies and corporations (often state-owned or government-linked) have played a significant role in Asian-led economic cooperation for decades. Public–private partnerships, often facilitated by Asian states, have supported partner countries in developing infrastructure and extracting resources
. For example, since 1987, Korea’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund has committed $13.1 billion to 53 countries with 373 projects. Most of these projects aim to develop the transport sector in Asia and are implemented in cooperation with Korean companies (Lee
2017). Similarly, the line of credit is India’s fastest-growing cooperation instrument
3 and is used to forge public–private partnerships
in partner countries. The value of India’s line of credit exceeded $40.108 billion, reaching 66 countries in 2014–2015 (Saxena
2016). Across South-East Asia, Chinese companies have increased their stake in infrastructure development, particularly in investment, transport, and real estate (Cheok
2017). These corporate efforts have received criticism due to sluggish implementation, preference for hiring their own nationals, lack of community engagement
, and collusion with local officials (Guo and Zuan
2017; Kynge et al.
2016; Saxena
2016).
This adverse scenario is developing positively, however. As with the CSO sector, the role of the private sector in Asian-led SSC has evolved. As Asian companies become part of the “development cooperation” equation with partner countries, they increasingly look for ways to improve the social impact of their investments. Business is no longer seen as peripheral to discussions on how to reduce poverty and create positive community impact. Rather, Asian companies have expanded their exploration of responsible investment, corporate social responsibility activities, and shared-value strategies through their foreign direct investment and SSC.
Alongside the massive infrastructure investments, companies founded in Asia, such as AirAsia, Tata Group, CJ Cheil Jedang, Samsung, LG Electronics, and Alibaba, have altered traditional ways of doing business, bringing new technologies and innovation to markets, and creating additional jobs and opportunities that have brought millions out of poverty. Asian government facilitation has helped to promote socially responsible corporate investing. Chinese chambers of commerce and industry associations have developed standards of social responsibility
for Chinese engineering contractors, requiring member companies to balance resource
development with environmental protection and social development in partner countries (Liang
2016). The Chinese China Textile Information Center is implementing leadership development, health, and safety programmes for women employees in Chinese-invested companies in Pakistan
, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia (The Asia Foundation
2017). In 2013, India introduced a law requiring companies with an annual profit of 10 billion Indian rupees or more to contribute 2 per cent of their profits annually to corporate social responsibility
efforts. This law has the potential to unlock $2.5–$3 billion in funding from around 16,000 eligible companies for social impact projects (Ghuliani
2013). So far, the law applies only in India, but it may expand internationally in the future. Korean food and entertainment conglomerate CJ Cheil Jedang embeds the SDGs
into its business practice and measures its success against an SDG compass (CJ Cheil Jedang
2018). In Vietnam, CJ Cheil Jedang partnered with the Korean International Cooperation Agency to develop a shared-value
strategy to improve the company’s food manufacturing and distribution activities by enhancing the capabilities of local farmers and developing a sustainable agricultural community in Vietnam (CJ Cheil Jedang
2014). SCG, a Thai conglomerate more than 100 years old focussing on cement-building materials, chemicals, and packaging, has an impressive award-winning comprehensive sustainability
strategy and approach that extends to its investments outside Thailand (SCG, n.d.). The increasing participation of Asian CSOs and the private sector adds new contours and possibilities to the landscape of Asian-led development and SSC.