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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

12. The Enforcement of Competition Law—A Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective

verfasst von : Jingyuan Ma

Erschienen in: Competition Law in China

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

The choice of enforcement instruments in competition law has become a major debate around the world. In recent years, many competition authorities commentators have argued for a more “mixed” approach in antitrust enforcement, acknowledging that three enforcement instruments—private, administrative and criminal enforcement—are not substitutes to each other, but rather compliments, and should be better coordinated based on the strengths and weaknesses of each mechanism. This chapter address the insights of this issue by incorporating the recent development of behavioral economics and examine to what extent those insights lead to a different optimal mix of enforcement instruments. Behavioral findings can explain the ineffectiveness of some of the existing mechanisms and allow to provide more balanced criteria for determining the optimal mix of instruments in antitrust enforcement. This chapter discusses the optimal mix of enforcement instruments from the perspective of public and private enforcers. The findings of behavioral studies provided a more nuanced criteria when assessing the pros and cons of each instrument, and may be relevant to explain some of the reasons why the enforcement mechanisms become ineffective.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Enforcement of Competition Law—Role of the Courts and Economic Experts

Nächstes Kapitel Extraterritorial Effects of Chinese Competition Law: A Comparative View on Merger Policy

Korobkin and Ulen (2000, p. 1067), McAdams and Ulen (2009).

Kahneman et al. (1982); For a summary of the research findings by Tversky and Kahneman, see Kahneman (2003, pp. 1449–1475); research by other psychologists, see for example, Evans (1984, p. 451).

For example, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997, p. 109), Benartzi and Thaler (1995, pp. 73–92), Camerer and Hogarth (1999, pp. 7–42).

For example, Fiske and Taylor (1991), Weinstein (1980, p. 806).

The selection of these biases are based on Langevoort (1998, pp. 1503–1506), Faure (2008).

Rachlinski claimed that the methods that behavioural law and economics uses rely on the concepts that Tversky and Kahneman developed, such as endowment effect, framing, anchoring and hindsight bias. See also Korobkin and Ulen (2000).

Simon (1957), Simon (1955, p. 99).

Korobkin and Ulen (2000, p. 1075).

Korobkin and Ulen (2000, p. 1076).

Simon (1979, p. 503).

Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 193), Baron and Kennedy (1998).

McAdams and Ulen (2009).

Reeves and Stucke (2011, p. 1542), Stucke (2007).

Van den Bergh (2013).

Simon (1979, p. 493).

Anchoring effects: a randomly chosen starting point that will influence the estimates. See Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974).

Prospect theory: people value losses more than the gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 263).

Loss aversion: there is an asymmetry between the losses and gains, people suffer more utility loss to give up an object than the amount to acquire it. This effect may affect decision making process in many domains of policy issues. See examples provided by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988, pp. 7–59).

Framing: individual’s decisions are affected by how future losses and gains are framed. Kahneman and Tversky (1984, p. 343).

Kahneman et al. 1990, p. 1325; Knetsch 1989, pp. 1277–1284; Kahneman et al. 1990, pp. 1325–1348.

Kahneman et al. (1990).

Knetsch (1989, pp. 1277–1284).

For an overview of these experiments, see Tversky and Kahneman (1991, pp. 1055–1056), Novemsky and Kahneman (2005, pp. 119–120).

See examples provided by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988, pp. 7–59).

Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).

Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988, p. 8).

Camerer and Kunreuther (1989, p. 577).

Fischhoff (1975, pp. 288–299).

Hindsight bias: People are likely to over-estimate the likelihood of an event’s occurrence after knowing it happened (Fischhoff 1975). Kamin and Rachlinski (1995, p. 91); Korobkin and Ulen (2000, pp. 1095–1100).

Kamin and Rachlinski (1995, p. 91).

Weinstein (1980, pp. 806–820), Taylor and Brown (1988, pp. 193–210).

Jolls (1998, pp. 1658–1663), Sunstein (1997, pp. 1182–1184).

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 915); for an overview of these psychological research on overconfidence, see Camerer and Lovallo (1999, p. 306, footnote 1).

Svenson (1981, pp. 143–148).

Jolls (1998, p. 1659).

Viscusi and Magat (1987).

Baker and Emery (1993, p. 439).

Hastorf and Cantril (1954, pp. 129–134).

Tversky and Kahneman (1973).

Combs and Slovic (1974, pp. 837–849).

Tversky and Kahneman, pp. 92–93, Sunstein (1997, pp. 1188–1189), Hanson and Kysar (1999, p. 630).

Psychologists’ research shows that over-confidence exists when people consider their own activities and their futures. See Weinstein(1980), Taylor and Brown(1988). Unrealistic optimism may lead to under-estimation of the probability that unpleasant events will happen to one self. See Jolls (1998, pp. 1658–1663), Sunstein (1997, pp. 1182–1184).

Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 207).

Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988, p. 7).

Simonson and Tversky (1992, pp. 281, 290).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012a, p. 784), Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 217) (“voters and politicians do not evaluate policies globally by considering all angles, including the interrelationships among policies. Instead, their analyses are subject to pervasive framing, salience, and vividness effects.”); See also Hirschleifer (2008, p. 856).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012a, p. 784).

Cowen (2005, p. 445) (“All voters will be excessively attracted to policies that make citizens “feel good about themselves”. Individuals on all sides of the political spectrum will be unwilling to confront difficult trade-offs”). Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 218).

Anthony Patt and Richard Zeckhauser found that “take action”—such as cleaning up a polluted resource, is more favourable to the public than inaction—for example preserving the source, because taking action is easier to be visualized. See Patt and Zeckhauser (2000, p. 45); see also Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 230).

Coate et al. (1995).

Muris (2005, p. 166) (“For an agency like the FTC, the most attention is paid publicly to the prosecution of cases, preferably “big” ones, or to the launching of “tough” regulations, while non litigation activities that have a major impact on public policy or less obviously significant cases and rules that do not tackle large players, but that alter doctrine in important ways, are usually overlooked.”).

Sokol (2012a, p. 701).

Camerer found that when New York taxi drivers set daily income targets, they will stop working once the target is met Camerer et al. (1997).

Kovacic et al. (2011).

Kovacic (2009, pp. 903, 922–923).

For example, the competition authority in Russia has a strong bias on merely increasing the number of case decisions. See Paneiakh and Novikov (2014).

The judicial capacity restraint of assessing economic evidence has been named by Frank Easterbrook as the “limits of antitrust”, details see Chap. 11 of this book.

Crowley (1987, pp. 266–267), Humphries and Songer (1999, p. 209).

Crowley (1987), Sheehan (1990, pp. 875–85).

Rozenblit and Keil (2002).

See also Tasic (2009, p. 428).

Kruger and Dunning (1999, p. 1121).

Tasic (2009, p. 430).

Also in the area of tort law when assessing damages there is substantial evidence of bias in the judgement of experts. For an overview see Faure and Visscher (2011, p. 376).

Friedman argues that the crucial difference between public and private actors is that there is no similar market competition among regulators. See Friedman (2009, p. 127).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012b, p. 47).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012a, b, pp. 47, 791) (“Once a regulator takes a position on a particular policy, she will want to filter future matters in a way that supports her initial wisdom”).

Simon (2004), Simon and Scurich (2011, p. 711).

Simon and Scurich (2011, p. 711).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012a, p. 788).

Kovacic (2015, p. 257).

In antitrust law, see Shugart II (1995, pp. 7–8) (“Legislative and policy decisions in the realm of antitrust are shaped not by some ideal conception of the public interest, but rather by the interaction between well-organized private interest groups seeking protection from the forces of competition and politicians and other government officials seeking to maximize their own personal welfare.”).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012a, p. 791).

Cooper and Kovacic (2012b, p. 50).

The biased decisions of regulators may come directly from the biased preferences of their political overseers. Some argues that politicians are more biased than regulators. Choi and Pritchard (2003, p. 38) (“Politicians themselves may face their own behavioural biases, and there is no reason to think that the politicians’ biases are any less than those facing regulators”) Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 203) (“Because political actors have little incentive to behave rationally, irrationality is common in politics, and it has a substantial negative effect on the law”).

Kovacic et al. (2011, p. 40), Hyman and Kovacic, p. 2172).

Seidenfeld (2002, p. 486).

Choi and Pritchard (2003, p. 38).

Joshua Davis and Robert Lande found that the benefits of private enforcement were substantial. In the 60 largest successful private US antitrust cases since 1990, private action has recovered USD 33.8 to 35.8 billion for victims of anti-competitive conduct. See Davis and Lande (2013, p. 1272).

For a summary of the criticisms on private enforcement of the US Antitrust Law, See Lande and Davis (2008, pp. 883–887).

Roth and Murnighan (1982, p. 1123).

Babcock et al. (1995a, p. 1337).

Loewenstein et al. (1992); Note that theorists may reach a similar conclusion. For example, Bourjade et al. (2009) argued that “It should be the violators who settle and the innocent firms that refuse.” Bourjade et al. (2009, p. 372).

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 915).

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 914).

Dunning et al. (1989, p. 1082).

Loewenstein and Moore (2004, pp. 37, 38).

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 915).

Babcock et al. (1995a, b, p. 1337).

Loewenstein et al. (1992, p. 135).

Babcock and Pogarsky (1999, p. 341).

Korobkin and Guthrie (1994, pp. 109–110).

Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 263), Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 297).

This is named as the Framing Theory of Litigation, Guthrie (2000, pp. 167–168). For details, see Rachlinski (1996, p. 113), Korobkin and Guthrie (1997, p. 77), Babcock et al. (1995b, p. 289), Korobkin and Guthrie (1994, p. 107).

Roth and Murnighan (1982, p. 1123).

Loewenstein et al. (1992, pp. 135–159); Note that theorists may reach a similar conclusion. For example, Bourjade et al. argued that “It should be the violators who settle and the innocent firms that refuse.” See Bourjade et al. (2009, p. 372).

Loewenstein and Moore (2004, pp. 37, 38).

Babcock and Loewenstein (1997, p. 109).

100

Babcock et al. (1997, pp. 913, 915).

101

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 914).

102

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 915).

103

Babcock et al. (1995a, pp. 1337–1343).

104

Loewenstein et al. (1992, p. 135).

105

Lillard and Viscusi (1990).

106

Rubinfeld, p. 176.

107

For a summary of the literature, see Babcock et al. (1997, p. 916).

108

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 921).

109

Nisbett et al. (1976, pp. 107–116).

110

Guthrie (2000, p. 210).

111

Slovic and Fishhoff (1977, p. 544).

112

Koriat et al. (1980).

113

Lord et al. (1984, p. 1231).

114

Babcock et al. (1997, p. 913).

115

Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 174).

116

Cook (1980).

117

Matsueda et al. (2006, p. 950).

118

Connor and Lande (2012).

119

Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 187).

120

Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 186); The adaptation effect is named by Brickman and Campbell as ‘Hedonic treadmill’ See Brickman and Campbell (1971, p. 287).

121

Kahneman (1999, p. 4), Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996, p. 3).

122

In particular, it is important to increase the maximum intensity and the end intensity of the painful experience. However, the punishment with high intensity, short duration and with the most intensive, painful punishment at the end is usually defined as ‘torture’ (Robinson and Darley 2004, pp. 190–191).

123

Guthrie et al. (2001, p. 784).

124

Sokol (2012b, p. 203).

125

Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, pp. 199–264), Berggren (2012, p. 199).

126

Tasic (2009, p. 423).

127

For example, Cass Sunstein said “For every bias identified for individuals, there is an accompanying bias in the public sphere.” Sunstein (2014, p. 102), Liaison and Zeckhauser raised this point earlier (1998, p. 7).

128

Englich et al. (2006, pp. 188–200).

129

Guthrie et al. (2001, p. 784).

130

Rachlinski and Farina (2002, p. 549).

131

Kuran and Sunstein (1999, p. 683).

132

Hirshleifer (2008, p. 856).

133

Viscusi and Gayer (2015, p. 978).

134

Rachlinski and Farina (2002).

135

Caplan (2007).

136

Viscusi (1995, pp. 50–54).

137

Viscusi and Hamilton (1999, pp. 1010, 1025).

138

Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 4).

139

Schnellenbach and Schubert (2015, pp. 395, 396).

140

Tor (2013, p. 6).

141

Van den Bergh (2013, p. 211).

142

Reeves and Stucke (2011, p. 1542).

143

List (2004, p. 615).

144

Glaeser (2006, pp. 140–141, 144–146).

145

Rubin (1998, pp. 1705, 1715), Stucke (2007, p. 515).

146

Cooper and Kovacic (2012a, p. 792).

147

Back to 1948 Judge Prettyman pointed out that “The tribunal does the best it can to decipher the truth from the resultant welter. Nothing could be sillier.” Prettyman, ‘Needed: New Trial Technique: Suggestions for the Trial of Complicated Cases’, 34 ABA J 766, 770 (1948) cited by Massel (1962, p. 48).

148

Epstein et al. (2011, pp. 104, 106).

149

Fruytier et al. (2013, p. 46), Holvast and Doornbos (2015, p. 50).

150

Holvast and Doombos (2015, p. 58).

151

Huang (2011, p. 1116).

152

Driskell and Salas (1991, p. 474).

153

Klein (1976).

154

Behavioural market failure could be considered as an extension of market failure, see Bar-Gill (2002). (“The behavioral market failure, with its emphasis on misperception and bias, is a direct extension of the imperfect information problem.”) Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral Economics Account, in Swedish Competition Authority, the Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection, December 19, 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974499. For the relationship between behavioural government failure and public choice theory, see Rachlinsky and Farina (2002).

155

Schumpeter (1942), Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Chap. 4).

156

Glaeser (2006), p.133.

157

Mueller (2003).

158

Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 259).

159

Polinsky (1980, p. 110).

160

Lucas Jr. and Tasic (2015, p. 259).

161

Shavell (1984, p. 357).

162

Segal and Winston (2007, p. 206).

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Titel: The Enforcement of Competition Law—A Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective
verfasst von: Jingyuan Ma
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Buch: Competition Law in China
Print ISBN: 978-981-15-5104-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-15-5105-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5105-5_12

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