10. The Global Uprising of Populist Conservatism and the Case of Brazil

On the analyses above and below, see Nobre (2013a, b, 2014a, b, 2019). I will not have the time to present today those which I see as the two hegemonic interpretations in the Brazilian public sphere about June 2013 with what I see as their main problems and flaws. On this see: Nobre (2020).

The current democratic Brazilian Constitution was promulgated in October 1988. From this point on, a great part of the political scientists has described Brazilian democracy as a “coalition presidentialism”. The alternative name I gave to this model was pemedebismo, in reference to the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), which has been the leader of the cartel of selling parliamentary support in the oversized government coalitions from 1994 to 2013 (Nobre 2013b). The party changed its name to MDB in 2018, the name it had during the military dictatorship (1964–1985), when it played the role of the only allowed opposition party.

President of Brazil from 2003 to 2010, Lula has been sentenced and imprisoned in April 2018 on corruption charges for a 12-year jail time. In August 2018 the Supreme Court (STF) ruled against his candidacy for president. Lula was released from imprisonment in November 2019, after 580 days in jail. He is still being prosecuted in many different lawsuits, and it is highly unlikely that he will be able to be candidate for office again.

The minimum wage in Brazil is about US$ 250. Roughly half of the Brazilian population live with up to one minimum wage.

This process has striking similarities with those whom Paolo Gerbaudo (2019, p. 43) calls the “connected outsiders”.

Between 2014 and 2016, Brazil’s GDP shrank 8,1%, that is to say, the second most devastating economic crisis since the worst crisis the country ever endured, that between 1981 and 1983, when a real negative growth of 8,5% has been recorded. Up to 2019 the economy has still not really recovered, since the positive growth rate of 1,1% recorded both in 2017 and in 2018 barely corresponds to the 0,8% yearly growth of the population, and GDP per capita that fell by 10,4% in the 2014–2016 recession did not reach its former pre-recession value in 2019. According to a study by IBRE/FGV, after a positive record peak of 0,598 in December 2013, the Gini Index for Brazil only deteriorated, reaching a new negative record of 0,627 by March 2019 (See: “Desigualdade de renda sobre pelo 17o. trimestre e é recorde”, Valor Econômico, 18–20 May 2019). In December 2014 the unemployment rate that was of 4,3%, while in March 2019 it was of 12,7%. According to the “Atlas da Violência 2019” (IPEA and Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública), 65.602 people were murdered in Brazil in 2017, a murder rate of 31,6 per 100.000, an increase of 24% in a decade. There is a gender bias in these numbers: there has been an increase of 30,7% in the murder of women in this decade. There is also a clear color cut in these numbers: for the black population the murder rate per 100.000 is of 43,1, while the number for non-black population is 16. Jan Werner-Müller (2016) warms against the risks of overestimating social-psychological arguments to explain the rise of populism. But in terms of campaigning, in terms of the reasons given both by candidates as by voters, such reasons have been a central element in the Brazilian case. Even if it may not fully explain the results, it cannot be dismissed either.

The final result of the presidential election gave Bolsonaro 55% of the vote, against 45% for Haddad. Polls from the eve of the second round of the election (Ibope, October 27th 2018) show that Haddad won 54% of the vote of the less educated (against 36% for Bolsonaro), while 53% of the voters with a college degree voted for Bolsonaro (35% for Haddad). 56% of the electorate that earn up to 1 minimum wage voted for Haddad (35% for Bolsonaro). In the 2 to 5 minimum wage range, Bolsonaro won 55% of the vote (33% for Haddad).

Subsequent surveys by Datafolha and by Ibope until December 2019 showed stability in the positive evaluation, although negative assessments grew and were close to the numbers of positive assessments. The Datafolha survey of December 2019 showed that 30% approve of Bolsonaro, whereas 36% disapprove of him, and 32% neither approve nor disapprove.

In the formulation of David Runciman (2018, p. 148): “the political parties that have proved most successful in recent years are the ones that have turned themselves into social movements”.

A reconstruction of Bannon’s influential position in Trump’s election may be found in: Moore (2018).

https://​theintercept.​com/​2019/​06/​09/​brazil-car-wash-prosecutors-workers-party-lula/​.

Nobre (2013b, p. 22): “Model of society and political culture are forms rooted in social life, in formal political institutions, in economy, as in everyday life. They are notions that mark visions of the world, which legitimize the way in which wealth, power, environmental resources and social recognition are distributed and redistributed. A model of society is not just an economic program or a determined way of understanding politics, but a broader social regulation pattern. And this comprehensive way of regulating social life is expressed in a particular political culture.”

On the notion of “form of life” in such critical theoretical sense, see Jaeggi (2013).

Bernard Manin (2012, first edition 1995) famously showed that, in its genesis and historical development, representative democracy has no way antipode direct democracy, so that what today appears as a gap between popular will and representation should be thought in much more complex terms.

The most salient example here is that of Steven Levitsky and Samuel Ziblatt (2018).

It was at least how I understood the attempt of synthesis presented by Gerbaudo (2017).

An important attempt to find this common ground in a reformulation of the notion of “civil disobedience” can be found in Peeren et al. (2018).