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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. The Impact of Corporate Board Characteristics on Firm Value: A Literature Survey

verfasst von : Ismail Lahlou

Erschienen in: Corporate Board of Directors

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter provides a review of theoretical and empirical studies that analyze the effects of board characteristics on firm performance. It serves the purpose of demonstrating different approaches to studying corporate board characteristics as well as the importance of examining these characteristics, namely, board size, board independence, board leadership, gender diversity, board busyness and staggered boards.

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Nächstes Kapitel Determinants of Board Size, Composition and Leadership

Another study carried out by Coles et al. (2008) shows that larger boards are not equally detrimental for all firms. Specifically, they find that the negative effect of board size on firm performance does not hold for firms with greater advising needs.

Directors are usually classified into three categories: insiders, independent and gray directors. Inside directors are the firm’s executives and officers, “gray directors include former employees, family members of current employees, owners of majority voting control, and individuals with disclosed conflicts of interest such as outside business dealings with the company, receipt of charitable contribution from the company, and interlocking director relationship with the CEO” (Masulis et al. 2012).

The US stock exchange listing requirements state that “no director will qualify as independent unless the board affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company and require companies to disclose determinations of independence in its annual proxy statement”.

Other recent studies examine different aspects of board independence (see, e.g., Borokhovich et al. 2014; Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster 2013; White et al. 2013).

The board leadership structure trend is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Liu et al. (2013) further find that the effect on firm performance is stronger when the woman is an executive director (rather than an independent director).

Likewise, using a unique matched worker-plant data, Tate and Yang (2014) suggest that having women in leadership positions help cultivate more female-friendly cultures, with smaller wage differences between men and women.

The study of Field et al. (2013) is also related to the growing literature analyzing how the effects of busy directors vary across firm characteristics (see, e.g., Cashman et al. 2012; Masulis and Mobbs 2014). The general conclusion of these studies is that directors’ busyness is not equally detrimental for all firms.

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Titel: The Impact of Corporate Board Characteristics on Firm Value: A Literature Survey
verfasst von: Ismail Lahlou
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Corporate Board of Directors
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-05016-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-05017-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05017-7_1