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Erschienen in:
1989 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
The Inefficacy of Profit Level Regulation for the Natural Monopoly Markets of Diversified Firms
verfasst von : Jordan Jay Hillman, Ronald R. Braeutigam
Erschienen in: Price Level Regulation for Diversified Public Utilities: An Assesment
Verlag: Springer US
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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The first question in any assessment of current or alternative forms of regulation is: “Why regulate at all?” From an economic perspective9 the classic basis for regulation has been described as follows: “The most traditional economic case for regulation assumes the existence of natural monopoly-that is-where economies of scale are so persistent that a single firm can serve the market at a lower unit cost than two or more firms.”10