nach oben

Erschienen in:

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

The Sky’s Not the Limit: Legal Bonds and Boundaries in Claiming Sovereignty over Celestial Bodies

verfasst von : Paolo Turrini

Erschienen in: Borders, Legal Spaces and Territories in Contemporary International Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

That the claiming of sovereignty on celestial bodies is a topical issue, one that might get newspapers’ headlines in the near future, is pretty evident. Public entities as well as private actors are studying, if not explicitly scheduling, missions destined to land on the Red Planet and colonize it. What about the law regulating such conduct? In the last decade or so, we have witnessed a revival of legal studies on space affairs, and those relating to the legality of the extraction of planetary resources have in particular flourished. However, the possibility of asserting sovereignty over those bodies, or part thereof, did not partake in such revival. This contribution takes the issue seriously, as it aims to understand which rules apply when we reach the final frontier. The same old answer: ‘the Outer Space Treaty applies’ is not satisfactory, for a number of reasons that relate to its uncertain legal status and even its somewhat uncertain content. These factors might prevent the scramble for Mars from being legally hindered. Irrespective of the treaty’s status, someone might try to establish a colony on a celestial body. This contribution analyzes the conditions under which the space homesteaders would be entitled to lay a valid sovereign claim on it; conversely, it answers the question whether the Earthlings would be bound to a duty of non-recognition of the new entity. A problem remains open: is there a possibility that international law at the (final) frontier might turn into the frontier of international law?

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Testing the Analogy: The CoE–ECHR System Pioneering Human Rights Protection in the Cyberspace

Nächstes Kapitel A Bull in a China Shop: The Exercise of the ICC’s Jurisdiction Over Its Territorial Reach in Situations Involving Non-Party States

Mosher (2017). For a comment by another famous legal expert, Frans von der Dunk, see Fecht (2016). Further information on the project is in Alshamsi et al. (2018).

Mosher (2017).

Ibid.

Coppinger (2016).

If the interview with Professor Jakhu has been reported accurately (ibid.), his understanding of statehood is… debatable.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (OST).

Coppinger (2016).

I am referring to the thesis of Goldsmith and Posner (2005).

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 5 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3 (Moon Agreement).

Lyall and Larsen (2009), p. 53.

The latest official list is UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3, 1 April 2019.

See, e.g., Roth (1992), pp. 50–54; Reinstein (1999), p. 66; Lyall and Larsen (2009), p. 184; Soucek (2011), p. 315; von der Dunk (2015), pp. 59–60 (who thinks that there is at least a presumption in favour of custom, so that the burden of proof to demonstrate the contrary shifts to those denying it). See also Zhukov and Kolosov (2014), p. 48, who define non-appropriation as a ‘universally recognized principle’.

See Vereshchetin and Danilenko (1985), p. 25 and, verbatim, both Paxson III (1993), p. 489, and Qizhi (1997), pp. 96–97. Cf. Cheng (1997), pp. 137 ff., 229 and 390, who believes that before 1961 celestial bodies were terra nullius and the void among them, res extra commercium (i.e., res communis). But see Cooper (1961), pp. 24–25, for the idea that outer space was still in the early 60s in a pre-Grotian stage, so that access to it demanded formal agreement. Contra, McDougal (1963), pp. 619, 628 (though his stance on non-appropriation is ambiguous: 638–639). Very interesting is the pre-OST quotation in Gradoni (2017a), p. 37, supporting appropriability and thus denoting a lack of consensus among scholars that seems further confirmed by an unsigned article appeared in the Harvard Law Review: Anonymous (1961), p. 1174.

As recalled by the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 177.

Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT).

This could determine the inapplicability of the Convention to the OST, according to art 4 VCLT. Art 35 quoted in the following footnote, indeed, is likely to codify customary law only insofar as it requires the consent of third parties, whereas the modalities of the manifestation would not belong to custom: Laly-Chevalier (2011), p. 905.

Respectively, arts 36 and 35 VCLT.

Moreover, in the case both rights and duties are present in the same provision, art 35 VCLT takes precedence over art 36: Laly-Chevalier (2011), pp. 913–914. A relatively sophisticated reasoning could go as follows: since arts I and II OST, which cannot be severed, represent a bundle of rights and obligations, and in the light of the fact that all States have at least implicitly accepted the rights, it stems from such universal acceptance that all States have at the same time waived their right to deny their consent insofar as duties are concerned. But this assumption could possibly be rebutted based on the understanding that art I does not confer any right that is not recognized already by general international law—which is, in any case, debatable, since curbing everyone else’s right to appropriate outer space is a right in itself! For the characterization of art II as a source of rights, see De Man (2017), p. 101.

Villiger (2009), p. 478; Proelss (2018), pp. 705–707; Laly-Chevalier (2011), pp. 912–913.

UNGA Res 51/122 (13 December 1996) UN Doc A/RES/51/122, para 1. A strict reading does not capture unilateral or non-concerted acts by States, since the OST would only apply to ‘international cooperation’ in space matters, and no real duty to cooperate is set forth—on the contrary: ‘States are free to determine all aspects of their participation in international cooperation’ (ibid., para 2).

Tronchetti (2008), especially pp. 293–294. Contra, Fawcett (1968), pp. 15–16.

Salerno (2011), pp. 237, 241.

Laly-Chevalier (2011), p. 910.

According to von der Dunk (2017), pp. 357–358, though, a traité-loi coagulates States’ consensus better than the resort to customary law.

Cheng (1997), pp. 192–193; Lyall and Larsen (2009), p. 74.

Lee (2012), p. 112.

S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, para 28; less explicitly, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 67. In turn, the passive nature of the duties enshrined in art II OST makes the distinction between practice and opinio iuris (or between actual practice and paper practice) less significant. On the words and deeds dichotomy see von der Dunk (2017), pp. 354–356.

This argument is a refined version of one that is found in Cherian and Abraham (2007), p. 215.

UNGA Res 1721/1961 (20 December 1961) UN Doc A/RES/1721(XVI)A, para 1(b); UNGA Res 18/1962 (13 December 1963) UN Doc A/RES/18/1962, para 3.

Notably, Sub-Saharan Africa, which in the early 1960s was undergoing decolonization. Actually, this could be used as an argument supporting the current customary nature of art II OST: since a great share of today’s non-parties were born after the adoption of the treaty, they have to accept it—rectius: the customary law underlying it—together with all customs already in existence at that time. It is doubtful, however, that a true consensus on the non-appropriation principle existed as early as 1961–1963.

See, e.g., the latest in time: UNGA Res 73/91 (7 December 2018) UN Doc A/RES/73/91, Recital 5.

Ibid., para 5.

Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America) (Judgment) [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 199–201.

See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits) [1960] ICJ Rep 6, 39; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Merits) [1962] ICJ Rep 6, 30–31; Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore), (Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 12, paras 121–122 (where the Court affirms that ‘silence may also speak, but only if the conduct of the other State calls for a response’: maintaining that all States are prevented from appropriating celestial bodies is certainly such a conduct).

See, in general, Kohen (1997), pp. 281 ff.

Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, 138. Here the creation of a custom was indeed at stake, but silence was used to buoy up the persistent objector’s position.

Ruys (2011), p. 45. Cf. von der Dunk (2017), p. 357.

Lyall and Larsen (2009), p. 77.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/Netherlands), (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 73.

Ibid. Of course, the motives for acquiescing are generally not relevant as well—unless they convincingly resonate in a legal environment. For instance, a State that did not make its voice heard in front of the emerging practice in conformity with the OST, could try to justify its behaviour by saying that it reputed action unnecessary, since art 35 VCLT shielded it against third-party effects.

Ibid. (being landlocked is a permanent condition). Cf. Thirlway (1972), pp. 71–72, who writes that specially-affected States are ‘those which are actually or potentially in control of the economic or scientific assets necessary for the exploration of space’ but, few lines above, ‘that the fact of only two States being at present in a position to contribute to the practice’ does not hinder the formation of a customary rule (emphasis added). The two sentences are evidently at odds.

See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacefaring> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_government_space_agencies>. Accessed 8 April 2019.

The argument based on interest, or lack thereof, can be short-circuited by noting that if in the eyes of the parties to the OST the legal regime of outer space is res communis, then it is necessarily of concern to all States; as a consequence, States parties cannot easily dismiss non-ratification on part of many countries by banishing them among the non-affected ones. See also Heller (2018), p. 223. But can non-parties rely on a qualification they oppose?

Mine is evidently a calque of the idea of instant custom, a theory that, ironically, was unsuccessfully proposed in relation to the legal status of the two resolutions quoted in footnote 29: see Cheng (1997), especially p. 137 ff.

Another notion—the rebus sic stantibus principle also codified in art 62 VCLT—could work to the same effect. Since ‘the geopolitical landscape of space activity has changed since the Outer Space Treaty was drawn up in the 1960s’—as said by Dr Newman in Davis (2016)—then the demise of the OST could also bring the corresponding custom down.

Hobe and Chen (2017), p. 28. See also De Man (2016), p. 51, who, however, applies this reasoning to the possible peremptory character of the rules of our treaty. To be honest, though, Article II might be possibly understood as a single provision entailing multiple norms, only some of them (like the non-appropriation of celestial territories) being customary in nature—provided that such norms can be conceptually isolated from the other ones: see Lowder (1999), p. 271, for whom the prohibition of national appropriation is customary, but ‘the appropriation of the natural resources thereof is another matter’ and is certainly permitted.

On this, see Pop (2009), p. 49 ff.; De Man (2016), pp. 157–171.

Art 11(2)-(3) (my emphasis).

I speak here of property in a general sense, without attaching to it a precise meaning. Actually, the power held over these movables could take different forms—such as possession as described in art 2228 of the French Code civil, art 1140 of the Italian Codice civile, and section 854 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (I owe these references to the anonymous reviewer)—and give rise to different rights. Absent any international standard, the right to dispose of celestial movables would be dependent on the lex fori.

Freeland (2017), p. 23.

On this regard, one should note that the unrestrained consumptive use of space resources could have an adverse impact on the extra-terrestrial environment, and the impossibility for States to exercise their jurisdiction in order to safeguard the latter could result in a paradoxical situation: free exploitation with no external controls, since only the latter would amount to appropriation under the OST. For a similar concern, see Simberg (2012a), p. 19.

Mickelson (2014), pp. 630–631.

Goldie (1985). But see Ederington (1997), p. 282, fn. 71.

van Engeland (2015), pp. 1542–1543.

On such an idea: Reynolds (1992), p. 235; De Man (2016), p. 282, fn. 310; Lyall and Larsen (2009), p. 197; Tennen (2016), p. 285.

On the relationship between farming and property rights in an international law perspective, see Hu (2016), p. 96 ff. (who stresses how terra nullius was primarily a standard for acquiring property rather than sovereignty). More generally, see also Boucher (2010); Mickelson (2014), p. 626 ff.; Koskenniemi (2017).

See, e.g., Fitzmaurice (2014), p. 284 ff.

As production incapacity is just another form, or a consequence, of political disorganization: for Grotius, ownership rights were only valid within a system of law. Boucher (2010), pp. 73–74.

Fitzmaurice (2014), pp. 267–270—but this argument runs throughout the whole book.

Although the treaties with native communities explicitly stipulated that the transfer of sovereignty to European powers would have left indigenous private rights unaffected, the latter were, in fact, also snatched: van der Linden (2016), p. 20.

See, e.g., Gruner (2005), pp. 322–324. On the birth of such an analogy see, briefly, Fitzmaurice (2014), pp. 269–270 and Fitzmaurice (2012), pp. 859–860.

It must be noticed that ancient law devised more than just two classes (including that of res publicae iuris gentium), and their number and content varied from author to author: see Schiavon (2011), p. 126 ff. Apparently, a right of occupation of parts of the commons was not excluded and was valid as long as they were used: Sini (2008), s. 2.

An interesting reading on how some private law concepts passed into public law is Lesaffer (2005).

Fitzmaurice (2014), pp. 33, 52. Such a stance was not unanimous, though.

See Freeland (2017), p. 25; Pop (2000), p. 277 ff. For the possibility that this be done through an intermediary, Hertzfeld and von der Dunk (2005), pp. 94–95.

Casalini (2014), p. 9. Though such commons were domestic ones, it is not impossible to conceive imperium over international (that is, governed by international law) commons.

Fitzmaurice (2014).

Aust (2010), p. 40; Crawford (2012), p. 203; Shaw (2014), pp. 355, 363.

O’Connell (1984), p. 792 ff.

According to such a view, all that can be physically appropriated is res/terra nullius; otherwise it is res/terra communis: see, e.g. Paliouras (2014), p. 41. This approach cannot conceal its natural law strain: Gradoni (2017a), p. 36. It might also be that the objective feature is endogenous to the movable/immovable good, such as its quantity, so that the abundance of the resources renders their non-exclusionary appropriation permissible: Su (2017), p. 1001.

On the deep seabed, see Li (1994), pp. 46–47.

Since art IV of the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961) 402 UNTS 71, merely freezes the claims to territorial sovereignty in existence as of the date of its entry into force, and as long as it stays so.

Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998) 30 ILM 1455, art 7.

See arts 1 and 42 ff. of the 1912 draft in ‘Spitzbergenfrage’ (1913) 1 Jahrbuch des Völkerrechts 142, pp. 143 and 150–151 respectively.

De Man (2016), p. 33. On the uselessness of such categories as applied to the high seas, Tanaka (2015), p. 155, fn. 2.

For example, the notions of res nullius communis usus and res communis humanitatis have been invented with reference, respectively, to the deep seabed (Tuerk 2014, p. 285) and celestial bodies (Baslar 1998, pp. 42–43).

I think of ideas such as common concerns, common heritage and common pool resources. For an application of the theory of the commons to outer space, see Beney (2013).

Think of, e.g., how the res extra commercium of Roman origin became territorium extra commercium at the hands of Cheng (1997), pp. 386–387. On the relationship between property and sovereignty from a philosophical perspective, see Ripstein (2017).

A critical (if only a bit too dismissive) assessment of de facto appropriation is in De Man (2016), pp. 323–328. A different view is taken, e.g., by Reinstein (1999), p. 70.

Arts I and XII OST and art 9(2) of the Moon Agreement.

DeSaussure (1992), pp. 11–12.

Art VIII OST (which, however, speaks of jurisdiction over objects launched into space but only of ownership when referring to objects constructed onto a celestial body, the latter being a subset of the former: the building of facilities with in situ materials was not taken into account) and art 12 of the Moon Agreement (jurisdiction also over facilities, stations and installations, whatever their origin). Jurisdiction may follow from registration or ownership: Cheng (1997), pp. 414–415.

Ibid., pp. 387–388, 415–416.

As doubted by Fasan (1994), pp. 51–53.

Paliouras (2014), p. 48.

It might be useful to remind the reader that extra-terrestrial water is most often available in solid form only, or in liquid form as underground water: in both cases, extraction requires mining activities that are obviously dependent on the place in which water is present. On planets having their own atmosphere, water might be gotten directly by air. However, such means, too, is not completely independent from the site chosen: see Coons et al. (1997), p. 1; Adan-Plaza et al. (1998), p. 192.

See, e.g., Blount (2012), p. 518; and much earlier Gorove (1969), p. 351. More generally, see Lee (2012), pp. 166–169.

This is not to say that the requirement of effective occupation had not been appealed to even in earlier epochs, or that it did not go uncontested during the colonization era: Freiherr von der Heydte (1935).

Dubai–Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) 91 ILR 543, 606, quoted in Kohen and Hébié (2012), para 28.

Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v Malesia) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 625, para 140. The same was restated by the Court in Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 659, para 194. An example of official regulation is the US Guano Islands Act 1856 (11 Stat. 119).

See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Judge McNair in the Fisheries case (n 36) para 184. See also the cases cited by Kohen (1997), pp. 220–223, and, not quoted therein, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea v Yemen) (1988) 22 RIAA 209, 315.

Kohen and Tignino (2013).

I think that in this sense is to be read the assertion that animus possidendi is ‘an empty phantom’: Clapham (2012), p. 172, fn. 11. Indeed, animus is oftentimes seen as inherent in corpus, i.e., in the fact that rulers do not ‘hesitate to act as sovereigns […] when opportunity offer[s] itself’ (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Series A/B No 53, 22, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, 83), tough they can in principle be distinguished, and sometimes they have to, as when they go in opposite directions (see the Temple of Preah Vihear case (n 34) 29–30). In any case, the animus possidendi must entail the willingness to act as sovereign, and not all actions over a territory can be taken as implying that intention: The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v United Kingdom) (Judgment) [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 71.

Critical of this possibility (as applied to the appropriation of the Earth’s orbit) is De Man (2016), pp. 324–325.

Jennings (1963), p. 52, gives the example of the Allied occupation of Germany in post-WWII Europe and the lack of animus to annex it. This is a case of debellatio, though it has also been assimilated to one of terra nullius: Fox (2008), p. 257.

Interestingly, in Temple of Preah Vihear (n 34) the effectivités on the ground were negatived by relying on a treaty (and the annexed map), adherence to which was deemed to amount to adverse animus.

Verzijl (1970), p. 349; and Sharma (1997), p. 70. For older sources, Bluntschli (1878), p. 169, para 279; de Dalmau y de Olivart (1903), pp. 841, 846. Analogous conclusions can seemingly be drawn from Kohen (1997), p. 223.

As a side note, it can be said that the legal basis for (one) such legal moves can possibly be found in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts (in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), ch IV.E.1): if the conduct of private subjects in the acquisition of territory through governmental authority is attributable to a State by means of art 5 (Kohen and Hébié 2012, para 30), one may wonder whether also art 11 on the attribution of a conduct subsequently acknowledged by a State also comes into play.

This option would be roughly coextensive with the case of animus possidendi being ‘instructive where it is not clear whether the first settlers in a certain territory acted as agent of a government’ (Milano 2006, p. 86)—the difference possibly lying in what would be needed in order to retroactively bring the settlers’ actions under the aegis of the State: words, deeds (which ones?) or neither?

100

This amounts to considering animus as implied by corpus, and to a certain extent it is certainly so. A further problem of intertemporal character emerges in the case the State’s endorsement is merely potential: see, e.g., the Guano Islands Act (n 90), whereby the extension of US sovereignty over an island exploited by a US citizen is ‘at the discretion of the President’ of the United States.

101

Aust (2010), p. 38. See also, more explicitly, Lowe (2007), p. 144.

102

It is true, however, that during the modern era some ‘philosophers had no doubt that terra nullius might be inhabited, but such inhabitants were unable to constitute what they termed a “perfect society” and so could not constitute themselves a State’: Jack (2004), p. 296.

103

For an account of the debate in the Eighteenth century, see Salomon (1889), pp. 128–188 (who believes that individuals can only acquire property rights that, however, as time passes by, can become sovereignty rights). Also, cf. Supreme Court of the United States, Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). Other references are in Dennis (2002), pp. 271–273.

104

Thus, the fact that the Dutch settlers who founded the Boer Republics were not ‘at liberty to unilaterally shed their bond of allegiance to the British Crown, could not prevent them from creating of their own volition new Republic which were capable of subsequent recognition by the outside world’: Verzijl (1969), p. 65. However, von der Dunk remarks that ‘it is not for [the colonist] to decide’ (Fecht 2015).

105

Kohen (1997), pp. 217–220.

106

Island of Palmas (Netherlands v United States of America) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 858.

107

Affaire de l’île de Clipperton (Mexique c France) (1931) 2 RIAA 1105, 1110 (emphasis added).

108

Kohen (1997), pp. 208–217.

109

For diverse kinds of licenses and natural resources see, e.g., Eritrea v Yemen (n 91) and Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (n 90).

110

According to Kohen (1997), p. 220, a private actor becomes ‘un agent de l’Etat’ if she is entitled with the ‘prérogatives de la puissance publique’ through a legislation that is ‘opposable aux autres Etats’.

111

Sentence arbitrale relative à la question de la domination et de la souveraineté de l’île d’Aves (Venezuela c Royaume des Pays-Bas) (2007) 28 RIAA 115, 122; Ile de Clipperton (n 107) 1110; Eastern Greenland (n 93) 46; Island of Palmas (n 106) 840, 855. More recently Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (n 90) para 134.

112

Verzijl (1970), p. 349; Lauterpacht (1958), p. 241; McDougal et al. (1963), p. 613.

113

Leib (2015), pp. 15–16. On telepresence see also Pop (2009), pp. 112–115.

114

Erlank (2015), p. 2512.

115

Glenn Reynolds asked: ‘could you claim, say, that you own the [resources within a] quarter of a square mile in which your robot rolled around? The exact size of it is uncertain’ (quoted in Reinstein 1999, p. 71). Here, any figure goes. Thus, Section 6(1) of the Space Settlement Prize Act, a draft law proposed by the Space Settlement Institute to promote land-grabbing missions to celestial bodies, reads: ‘The private entity that establishes the first such settlement on the Moon and meets the other conditions of this law shall be entitled to receive full and immediate U.S. recognition and certification of its claim of ownership of up to 600,000 square miles in a contiguous, reasonably compact shape which includes its base’; the area expands up to 360,000 square miles on Mars, ‘[g]iven the greater distance, higher costs and larger amount of available land’ (Section 6(2)). A mixed view between the spatialist stance and that based on actual needs is also possible. Bruhns and Haqq-Misra (2016), p. 61, maintain that, ‘[w]henever a colonization mission lands, they may occupy a limited plot of land based on what is reasonable for productive use, perhaps an area bounded by a 100 km radius at first. It may be best for this number to be established before colonization commences in order to mitigate future disputes and conflicts. This initial colony size may subsequently be subject to expansion based on need and mutual colony agreement’.

116

On the relationship between property and labour, see supra fn. 56 (in particular Hu (2016), pp. 103–104).

117

Physical improvement is a requirement for Wayne White, as reported by Wasser and Jobes (2008), p. 70.

118

De Man (2016), pp. 291, 310.

119

Wasser and Jobes (2008), p. 68 (but their proposal based on the sale of land deeds would risk making territorial possessions far more extended than the underlying outpost).

120

Phillimore (1854), p. 203.

121

Eastern Greenland (n 93).

122

Wasser and Jobes (2008), pp. 69–70. It should be noted, however, that ‘Russia intended to press her claim by the right of occupancy’: Black (2004), pp. 39, 79 and, for the quotation, 94.

123

Kohen (1997), pp. 240–252; Freiherr von der Heydte (1935), pp. 467–471. Not infrequently, such notions were applied to river basins and archipelagos; it remains to be seen if and how they can be applied to planets which have neither, or whose rivers and seas dried out.

124

Milano (2006), pp. 84–85. This is more or less what Freiherr von der Heydte (1935) called ‘virtual effectiveness’.

125

The reference is here to the famous definition of Russia that can be found in New York Court of Appeals, M Salimoff & Co v Standard Oil Co (1933), para 14.

126

Pop (2000), p. 278. See also Tennen (2010), pp. 805–806. Su (2017), pp. 998–999, excludes that protection of private rights amounts to a sovereignty claim, provided that third parties are not kept out of the exploited area.

127

Wasser and Jobes (2008), p. 55 (hinging on the difference between ‘conferring’ and ‘recognising’ a title to territory).

128

Prof Goedhuis’ statement, quoted in Ogunbanwo (1975), p. 69. See also Roth (1992), pp. 86–87; von der Dunk (1992a), p. 367; Tronchetti (2013), p. 27.

129

One may wonder whether these private subjects are still theirs even after a declaration of independence: I am obviously thinking of the promoters of the secession of Kosovo, who did not act in their capacity as organs (and citizens?) of Serbia: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, paras 102 ff.

130

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (adopted 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187.

131

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 248.

132

Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011) ITLOS Rep 2011, 10, paras 117–120.

133

Thus, the sentence attributing to States parties the responsibility for the activities carried on by non-governmental entities should be read as a generic (i.e., non-technical) introduction to the real obligation, the one expressing the duty of due diligence (art VI, second part of the first sentence).

134

Cf. Simberg (2012b), p. 25. Of course, one can argue that in that case, too, the spirit of art II OST would be violated (otherwise, a system of cross-recognition could be arranged!). More generally, it should be noticed that, from a logical point of view, a State’s responsibility and the lawfulness of its act of recognition can be kept distinct: on the one hand, such State may lawfully recognize a third State despite the former’s responsibility under art II (as long as its recognition is seen not as a re-affirmation of its wrongful conduct, but as a mere declaratory act about the existence of the factual requirements of statehood); on the other hand, recognition of space nations may be considered, ipso facto and per se, as a violation of art II even if the recognizing State acted with due diligence and thus could not be deemed responsible for lack of due care.

135

In the former case, a duty of non-recognition would arise even towards appropriation by nationals of non-parties to the OST; in the latter case, such instances of appropriation would not be an iniuria. This could turn into an incentive to the use of ‘flags of convenience’: von der Dunk (2013).

136

Lagerwall (2016), pp. 221–223.

137

See, e.g., the Namibian case: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, paras 119–124 (as it is clear by these lines, the Court hinges the duty of non-recognition on the authoritative determination of the Security Council, rather than an autonomous verification of the existence of a serious breach of international law).

138

See, e.g., the Kuwaiti case: UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661, para 9(b).

139

Crawford (2006), p. 160.

140

In this perspective, non-recognition can be conceived as a sanction against the author of the violation (Milano 2014, p. 49 ff.), although one should not lose sight of the fact that non-recognition is always an option, as in international law there is no duty to recognize.

141

Professor Jakhu has coherently endorsed this thesis throughout the last 35 years: from Jakhu (1982), pp. 362–363, to Jakhu and Freeland (2017), passing from Jakhu (2006), p. 48. See also Sachdeva (2017), p. 25 and, citing other sources, Oralova (2015). Contra, Roth (1992), p. 55.

142

Tronchetti (2008), p. 279.

143

Paliouras (2014), p. 38 (but the substance does not live up to the high-sounding name).

144

Fawcett (1968), pp. 15–16.

145

Tronchetti (2008), p. 300.

146

See the case of Kosovo referenced in footnote 129 above.

147

Lanovoy (2017), pp. 567–571.

148

E.g., UNSC Res 202 (6 May 1965) UN Doc S/RES/202, paras 3–5.

149

Although the context is different (if only because the author deals with recognition of general de facto governments rather than de facto States), the importance of recognition in matters of responsibility vis-à-vis the recognizing State is stated by Houghton (1931).

150

A (dubious?) parallel could be drawn with art 10 of the Articles on State Responsibility (n 98), which does not mention recognition.

151

Cf. Neff (2018), p. 6.

152

Okowa (2009), p. 183 ff. See also van Essen (2012), p. 47.

153

Ryngaert (2015), p. 168.

154

As the one that set up the European Union: see Case 26–62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 3.

155

Cheng (1987), pp. 155–157. International practice, though, is inconclusive: see Amerasinghe (2008), pp. 217–220.

156

Iran–US Claims Tribunal, Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v TAMS–AFFA, 6 Iran–US CTR 219, 228.

157

‘[The colonies of America would not] tolerate the idea that the States of Europe might acquire any part of the American continent, however unexplored it might be, that is to say, regions “nullius” according to the then dominant doctrines of law’: Alvarez (1909), p. 275.

158

Ibid.

159

Verzijl (1971), pp. 285–286.

160

Arts 1 and 3 OST.

161

Jakhu (2006), p. 40; von der Dunk (1992b), p. 230.

162

This seems to be the view taken by Ogunbanwo (1975), pp. 24–25.

163

von der Dunk (1992b), p. 232.

164

This is a problem for lawyers (and everyone else), not a legal problem. This might explain why lawyers, so far, have hardly discussed the issue. For instance, even after noticing that the distance between colonies and their mother planets would exacerbate jurisdiction problems, Hardenstein (2016), pp. 283–284, predicts that ‘international law will continue to dominate interactions and activities in outer space for the foreseeable future’. Even if it were true, it is likely that it would not be international law as we know it.

165

Erlank (2015), p. 2515; Pop (2009), pp. 101–102.

166

Pop (2009), p. 102. This is why a revival of the US frontier’s law has been proposed: Gruner (2005).

167

For such a speculation in a recent, generalist piece of legal scholarship see Kolb (2016), p. 61, commented with a bit of irony by Gradoni (2017b), p. 695 ff.

168

Rossi (2017), p. 289.

Adan-Plaza, S., Carpenter, K., Elias, L., Grover, R., Hilstad, M., Hoffman, C., et al. (1998). Extraction of atmospheric water on mars for the mars reference mission. In N.A. Budden & M.B. Duke (Editors), HEDS-UP mars exploration forum (pp. 171–194). Retrieved 31 March 2019, from https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19990025822.pdf.

Alshamsi, H., Balleste, R., & Hanlon, M. L. D. (2018). Space station Asgardia 2117: From theoretical science to a new nation in outer space. Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 16(1), 37–60.

Alvarez, A. (1909). Latin America and international law. American Journal of International Law, 3(2), 269–353.CrossRef

Amerasinghe, C. F. (2008). Diplomatic protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Anonymous. (1961). National sovereignty of outer space. Harvard Law Review, 74(6), 1154–1175.CrossRef

Aust, A. (2010). Handbook of international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Baslar, K. (1998). The concept of the common heritage of mankind in international law. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Beney, R. D. (2013). Space as a commons: Towards a framework for the allocation of extraterrestrial property rights. Master thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

Black, L. T. (2004). Russians in Alaska: 1732–1867. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press.

Blount, P. J. (2012). Renovating space: The future of international space law. Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, 40(1–3), 515–532.

Bluntschli, J. C. (1878). Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt. Nördlingen: Verlag der CH Beck’schen Buchhandlung.

Boucher, D. (2010). The law of nations and the doctrine of Terra Nullius. In O. Asbach & P. Schröder (Eds.), War, the state and international law in seventeenth-century Europe (pp. 63–82). Farnham: Ashgate.

Bruhns, S., & Haqq-Misra, J. (2016). A pragmatic approach to sovereignty on Mars. Space Policy, 38, 57–63.CrossRef

Casalini, D. (2014). Fondamenti per un diritto delle acque dolci. Torino: Giappichelli.

Cheng, B. (1987). General principles of law as applied by international courts and tribunals. Cambridge: Grotius Publications.

Cheng, B. (1997). Studies in international space law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRef

Cherian, J. G., & Abraham, J. (2007). Concept of private property in space – An analysis. Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, 2(4), 211–220.

Clapham, A. (2012). Brierly’s law of nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Coons, S. C., Williams, J. D. & Bruckner, A. P. (1997). Feasibility study of water vapor adsorption on Mars for in situ resource utilization. In 33rd joint propulsion conference and exhibit. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/6.1997-2765.

Cooper, J. C. (1961). The rule of law in outer space. American Bar Association Journal, 47(1), 23–27.

Coppinger, R. (2016). Asgardia, proposed space-based nation accepting citizenship applications. Space.com. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from www.space.com/34386-asgardia-space-nation-accepting-citizenship-applications.html.

Crawford, J. (2006). The creation of states in international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crawford, J. (2012). Brownlie’s principles of public international law (8th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Davis, N. (2016). Will you become a citizen of Asgardia, the first nation state in space? The Guardian. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from www.theguardian.com/science/2016/oct/12/will-you-become-a-citizen-of-asgardia-the-first-nation-state-in-space.

de Dalmau y de Olivart, R. (1903). Tratado de derecho internacional público. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez.

de Man, P. (2016). Exclusive use in an inclusive environment: The meaning of the non-appropriation principle for space resource exploitation. Cham: Springer.CrossRef

de Man, P. (2017). State practice, domestic legislation and the interpretation of fundamental principles of international space law. Space Policy, 42, 92–102.CrossRef

Dennis, T. A. (2002). The principality of Sealand: Nation building by individuals. Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law, 10(1), 261–296.

DeSaussure, H. (1992). The freedoms of outer space and their maritime antecedents. In N. Jasentuliyana (Ed.), Space law: Development and scope (pp. 1–15). Westport: Praeger/International Institute of Space Law.

Ederington, B. (1997). Property as a natural institution: The separation of property from sovereignty in international law. American University International Law Review, 13(2), 263–331.

Erlank, W. (2015). Rethinking Terra Nullius and Property Law in Space. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 18(7), 2503–2523.CrossRef

Fasan, E. (1994). Human settlements on planets; New stations or new nations. Journal of Space Law, 22(1&2), 47–55.

Fawcett, J. E. (1968). International law and the uses of outer space. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Fecht, S. (2015). Should mars be independent, or just a colony of earth? Popular science. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from www.popsci.com/astrobiologist-wants-liberate-future-mars-colonies.

Fecht, S. (2016). The founding of the first space nation today doesn’t really mean anything. Popular science. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from www.popsci.com/dont-count-on-asgardia-becoming-legit-space-state.

Fitzmaurice, A. (2012). Discovery, conquest, and occupation of territory. In B. Fassbender & A. Peters (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the history of international law (pp. 840–861). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fitzmaurice, A. (2014). Sovereignty, property and empire, 1500–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Fox, G. (2008). Humanitarian occupation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Freeland, S. (2017). Common heritage, not common law: How international law will regulate proposals to exploit space resources. Questions of International Law, Zoom in, 35, 19–33.

Freiherr von der Heydte, F. A. (1935). Discovery, symbolic annexation and virtual effectiveness in international law. American Journal of International Law, 29(3), 448–471.CrossRef

Goldie, L. F. E. (1985). Title and use (and usufruct) – An ancient distinction too oft forgot. American Journal of International Law, 79(3), 689–714.CrossRef

Goldsmith, J., & Posner, E. (2005). The limits of international law. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gorove, S. (1969). Interpreting article II of the outer space treaty. Fordham Law Review, 37(3), 349–354.

Gradoni, L. (2017a). L’astéroïde est-il un poisson de haute mer? Forum, 379, 35–39.

Gradoni, L. (2017b). Robert Kolb. Theory of international law, Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 475. Italian Yearbook of International Law, 26, 693–703.CrossRef

Gruner, B. (2005). A new hope for international space law: Incorporating nineteenth century first possession principles into the 1967 space treaty for the colonization of outer space in the twenty-first century. Seton Hall Law Review, 35(1), 299–357.

Hardenstein, T. (2016). In space, no one can hear you contest jurisdiction: Establishing criminal jurisdiction of the outer space colonies tomorrow. Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 81(2), 251–288.

Heller, K. J. (2018). Specially-affected states and the formation of custom. American Journal of International Law, 112(2), 191–243.CrossRef

Hertzfeld, H. R., & von der Dunk, F. (2005). Bringing space law into the commercial world: Property rights without sovereignty. Chicago Journal of International Law, 6(1), 81–99.

Hobe, S., & Chen, K.-W. (2017). Legal status of outer space and celestial bodies. In R. Jakhu & P. S. Dempsey (Eds.), Routledge handbook of space law (pp. 25–41). London, New York: Routledge.

Houghton, N. D. (1931). The responsibility of the states for the acts and obligations of general de facto governments – Importance of recognition. Indiana Law Journal, 6(7), 422–441.

Hu, H. (2016). The doctrine of occupation: An analysis of its invalidity under the framework of international legal positivism. Chinese Journal of International Law, 15(1), 75–138.CrossRef

Jack, S. (2004). The “Debatable Land”, Terra Nullius, and natural law in the sixteenth century. Northern History, 41(2), 289–300.CrossRef

Jakhu, R. S. (1982). Developing countries and the fundamental principles of international space law. In R. Gutiérrez Girardot et al. (Eds.), New directions in international law: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Abendroth (pp. 351–373). Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag.

Jakhu, R. S. (2006). Legal issues relating to the global public interest. Journal of Space Law, 32(1), 31–110.

Jakhu, R. S., & Freeland, S. (2017). The relationship between the outer space treaty and customary international law. In P. J. Blount et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the international institute of space law 2016 (pp. 183–199). The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.

Jennings, R. (1963). The acquisition of territory in international law. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kohen, M. (1997). Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.CrossRef

Kohen, M., & Hébié, M. (2012). Territory, acquisition. In R. Wolfrum (Ed.), Max planck encyclopedia of international law (pp. 887–900). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kohen, M., & Tignino, M. (2013). Do people have rights in boundaries’ delimitations? In L. Boisson de Chazournes, C. Leb, & M. Tignino (Eds.), International law and freshwater: The multiples challenges (pp. 95–122). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.CrossRef

Kolb, R. (2016). Theory of international law. Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing.

Koskenniemi, M. (2017). Sovereignty, property and empire: Early modern english contexts. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 18, 355–389.CrossRef

Lagerwall, A. (2016). Le principe ex injuria jus non oritur en droit international. Bruxelles: Bruylant.

Laly-Chevalier, C. (2011). Article 35. In O. Corten & P. Klein (Eds.), The vienna conventions on the law of treaties: A commentary (pp. 902–928). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lanovoy, V. (2017). The use of force by non-state actors and the limits of attribution of conduct. European Journal of International Law, 28(2), 563–585.CrossRef

Lauterpacht, H. (1958). The development of international law by the international court. London: Stevens & Sons.

Lee, R. (2012). Law and regulation of commercial mining of minerals in outer space. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRef

Leib, K. (2015). State sovereignty in space: Current models and possible futures. Astropolitics, 13(1), 1–24.CrossRef

Lesaffer, R. (2005). Argument from Roman law in current international law: Occupation and acquisitive prescription. European Journal of International Law, 16(1), 25–58.CrossRef

Li, Y. (1994). Transfer of technology for deep sea-bed mining: The 1982 law of the sea convention and beyond. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

Lowder, S. (1999). A state’s international legal role: From the earth to the moon. Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law, 7(1), 253–283.

Lowe, V. (2007). International law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Lyall, F., & Larsen, P. (2009). Space law: A treatise. Farnham: Ashgate.

McDougal, M. (1963). The emerging customary law of space. Northwestern University Law Review, 58, 618–642.

McDougal, M., et al. (1963). The enjoyment and acquisition of resources in outer space. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 111(5), 521–636.CrossRef

Mickelson, K. (2014). The maps of international law: Perceptions of nature in the classification of territory. Leiden Journal of International Law, 27(3), 621–639.CrossRef

Milano, E. (2006). Unlawful territorial situations in international law: Reconciling effectiveness, legality and legitimacy. Leiden: Nijhoff.CrossRef

Milano, E. (2014). The non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea: three different legal approaches and one unanswered question. Questions of International Law, Zoom out, 1, 35–55.

Mosher, D. (2017). The “space nation” Asgardia will attempt its first launch this summer – with help from a Russian billionaire. Business insider. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from www.businessinsider.com/asgardia-first-space-country-satellite-2017-6?IR=T.

Neff, S. C. (2018). A short history of international law. In M. D. Evans (Ed.), International law (pp. 3–27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O’Connell, D. P. (1984). The international law of the sea. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ogunbanwo, O. (1975). International law and outer space activities. The Hague: Nijhoff.CrossRef

Okowa, P. (2009). State and individual responsibility in international conflicts: Contours of an evolving relationship. Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 20, 143–188.

Oralova, Y. (2015). Jus cogens norms in international space law. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 6(6), 421–427.

Paliouras, Z. A. (2014). The non-appropriation principle: The Grundnorm of international space law. Leiden Journal of International Law, 27(1), 37–54.CrossRef

Paxson, E. W., III. (1993). Sharing the benefits of outer space exploration: Space law and economic development. Michigan Journal of International Law, 14, 487–517.

Phillimore, R. (1854). Commentaries upon international law. Philadelphia: T&J W Johnson.

Pop, V. (2000). Appropriation in outer space: the relationship between land ownership and sovereignty on the celestial bodies. Space Policy, 16(4), 275–282.CrossRef

Pop, V. (2009). Who owns the moon? Extraterrestrial aspects of land and mineral resources property. Berlin: Springer.

Proelss, A. (2018). Article 35. In O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach (Eds.), Vienna convention on the law of treaties: A commentary (pp. 699–710). Berlin: Springer.CrossRef

Qizhi, H. (1997). The outer space treaty in perspective. Journal of Space Law, 25(2), 93–100.

Reinstein, E. (1999). Owning outer space. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 20(1), 59–98.

Reynolds, G. H. (1992). International space law: Into the twenty-first century. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 25(2), 225–255.

Ripstein, A. (2017). Property and sovereignty: How to tell the difference. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 18, 243–268.CrossRef

Rossi, C. (2017). Sovereignty and territorial temptation: The grotian tendency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Roth, A. (1992). La prohibition de l'appropriation et les régimes d’accès aux espaces extra-terrestres. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.CrossRef

Ruys, T. (2011). ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN charter: Evolutions in customary law and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ryngaert, C. (2015). State responsibility and non-state actors. In M. Noortmann, A. Reinisch, & C. Ryngaert (Eds.), Non-state actors and international law (pp. 163–182). Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing.

Sachdeva, G. S. (2017). Select tenets of space law as Jus Cogen [sic]. In V. Rao, V. Gopalakrishnan, & K. Abhijeet (Eds.), Recent developments in space law: Opportunities & challenges (pp. 7–26). Singapore: Springer.CrossRef

Salerno, F. (2011). Treaties establishing objective regimes. In E. Cannizzaro (Ed.), The law of treaties beyond the Vienna convention (pp. 225–243). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Salomon, C. (1889). L’occupation des territoires sans maître: étude de droit international. Paris: A Giard Libraire-éditeur.

Schiavon, A. (2011). Acqua e diritto romano: “invenzione” di un modello? In G. Santucci, A. Simonati, & F. Cortese (Eds.), L’acqua e il diritto: Atti del Convegno tenutosi presso la Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Trento (2 febbraio 2011) (Vol. 99, pp. 117–181). Trento: Quaderni del Dipartimento.

Sharma, S. P. (1997). Territorial acquisition, disputes and international law. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Shaw, M. N. (2014). International law (7th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simberg, R. (2012a). Homesteading the final frontier: A practical proposal for securing property rights in space. Competitive Enterprise Institute, Issue Analysis No 2. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Rand%20Simberg%20-%20Homesteading%20the%20Final%20Frontier.pdf.

Simberg, R. (2012b). Property rights in space. The New Atlantis, 37, 20–31.

Sini, F. (2008). Persone e cose: res communes omnium. Prospettive sistematiche tra diritto romano e tradizione romanistica. Diritto e storia, 7. Retrieved 31 March 2019, from http://dirittoestoria.it/7/Tradizione-Romana/Sini-Persone-cose-res-communes-omnium.htm.

Soucek, A. (2011). International law. In C. Brünner & A. Soucek (Eds.), Outer space in society, politics and law (pp. 294–405). Wien: Springer.

Su, J. (2017). Legality of unilateral exploitation of space resources under international law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 66, 991–1008.CrossRef

Tanaka, Y. (2015). The international law of the sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Tennen, L. I. (2010). Towards a new regime for exploitation of outer space mineral resources. Nebraska Law Review, 88, 794–831.

Tennen, L. I. (2016). Enterprise rights and the legal regime for exploitation of outer space resources. The University of the Pacific Law Review, 47(2), 281–299.

Thirlway, H. (1972). International customary law and codification. Leiden: AW Sijthoff.

Tronchetti, F. (2008). The non-appropriation principle as a structural norm of international law: A new way of interpreting Article II of the outer space treaty. Air & Space Law, 33(3), 277–305.

Tronchetti, F. (2013). Fundamentals of space law and policy. New York: Springer.CrossRef

Tuerk, H. (2014). The international seabed area. In M. Fitzmaurice & N. A. Martinez Gutierrez (Eds.), The IMLI manual on international maritime law – Volume 1: The law of the sea (pp. 276–303). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

van der Linden, M. (2016). The acquisition of Africa (1870–1914): The nature of international law. Leiden, Boston: Brill.CrossRef

van Engeland, A. (2015). Protection of public property. In A. Clapham, P. Gaeta, & M. Sassòli (Eds.), The 1949 Geneva conventions: A commentary (pp. 1535–1550). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

van Essen, J. (2012). De facto regimes in international law. Merkourios, 28(74), 31–49.

Vereshchetin, V., & Danilenko, G. (1985). Custom as a source of international law of outer space. Journal of Space Law, 13(1), 22–35.

Verzijl, J. H. W. (1969). International law in historical perspective. Leiden: AW Sijthoff.

Verzijl, J. H. W. (1970). International law in historical perspective. Leiden: AW Sijthoff.

Verzijl, J. H. W. (1971). International law in historical perspective. Leiden: AW Sijthoff.

Villiger, M. (2009). Commentary on the 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties. Leiden: Brill.CrossRef

von der Dunk, F. (1992a). Liability versus responsibility in space law: Misconception or misconstruction? In Proceedings of the thirty-fourth colloquium on the law of outer space (pp. 363–371). Washington: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

von der Dunk, F. (1992b). Jus Cogens Sive Lex Ferenda: Jus Cogendum? In T. Masson-Zwaan & P. Mendes de Leon (Eds.), Air and space law: De Lege Ferenda – Essays in Honour of Henri A. Wassenbergh (pp. 219–239). Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

von der Dunk, F. (2013). Towards “Flags of Convenience” in space? In C. Jorgenson (Ed.), Proceedings of the international institute of space law 2012 (pp. 811–830). The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.

von der Dunk, F. (2015). International space law. In F. von der Dunk & F. Tronchetti (Eds.), Handbook of space law (pp. 29–126). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

von der Dunk, F. (2017). Customary international law and outer space. In B. Lepard (Ed.), Reexamining customary international law (pp. 346–373). New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Wasser, A., & Jobes, D. (2008). Space settlements, property rights, and international law: Could a lunar settlement claim the lunar real estate it needs to survive? Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 73(1), 37–78.

Zhukov, G., & Kolosov, Y. (2014). International space law (2nd ed.). Moskow: Statut Publishing House.

Adams, T. R. (1968). The outer space treaty: An interpretation in light of the no-sovereignty provision. Harvard International Law Journal, 9(1), 140–157.

Anonymous. (1961). National sovereignty of outer space. Harvard Law Review, 74(6), 1154–1175.CrossRef

Gradoni, L. (2017). L’astéroïde est-il un poisson de haute mer? Forum, 379, 35–39.

Sittenfeld, L. R. (1980). The evolution of a new and viable concept of sovereignty for outer space. Fordham International Law Journal, 4(1), 199–212.

Weaver, J. H. (1992). Illusion or reality? State sovereignty in outer space. Boston University International Law Journal, 10(2), 203–240.

Titel: The Sky’s Not the Limit: Legal Bonds and Boundaries in Claiming Sovereignty over Celestial Bodies
verfasst von: Paolo Turrini
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Borders, Legal Spaces and Territories in Contemporary International Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-20928-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-20929-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20929-2_7

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Premium Partner