2. The Tributary System and the ‘Century of Humiliation’

In this respect, I will assume that emotions are ‘collectivized’ and that through identity-based structures and culture, emotions are intersubjectively shared. These, in turn, are translated into the state and/or the decision-making structures of the state.

See, for example, Ding and Xu (2015).

See, for example, Kang (2010) or Kang (2003).

See, for example, Chun (1968).

The capital was never a constant in Chinese history. What concerns the capital in the last five dynasties, the last imperial capital was Beiping, today’s Beijing, during Qing dynasty under Manchu rule. In the Yuan Dynasty under Mongol rule, it was referred to as Khanbalik. During the Tang, Song, and Ming Dynasties, there were two capitals (either chronologically one after the other, or synchronously with different administrative regional tasks), Chang’an and Luoyang, Bianjing and Lin’an, and Beijing and Nanjing, respectively.

It is historically unclear whether China actually colonized surrounding states via the tributary system and exerted suzerainty over them, or whether the tributary system was merely an economic exchange of goods in which the showing of submission and the status of China as supreme and the others in a ranking below it are merely symbolic gestures.

The fact that parliamentary monarchy and Western liberal democracy became en vogue with the global hegemonies of Great Britain and the United States, respectively, may be an analogy that comes to mind instantly, when talking about other states adopting the Confucian state ideology during medieval times from the Chinese (regional) hegemon. In the same way, a parliament and elections gave more legitimacy to modern nation-states in the West as the Confucian state ideology have more legitimacy to states or state-like entities in the East.

It is disputed by some scholars that China actually held suzerainty over the tributary states in its system, especially those that would subscribe to the argument that the tributary system was merely either symbolic or economic in nature.

See, for example, Chung (2006).

See Shih (2012).

Hedley Bull defines great-power management as an institution of international society with which ‘dangers and inevitable frictions of international political life can be minimized by the recognized managerial role of the great-powers. Great-powers promote order both by managing relations between themselves (through diplomacy, conferences, missions, joint interventions), but also by developing shared understandings of responsibility and by exploiting their own unequal power over subordinate states within their spheres of influence and alliance systems’ [(2012), p. xiv].

Complex may be the best-fitting description for the psychological effect the ‘Century of Humiliation’ has on China’s general foreign and security policies. Other psychological concepts that are less well-fitting are those of trauma, condition, and aversion. If one defines this ‘Century of Humiliation’ as something that is only relevant at certain times and is something that is ‘triggered’ by certain situations, then it should be referred to as aversion. In a way, this remains to be seen until resolution by the below following case analyses. Complex, trauma, and condition will refer to a more constant influence on state behavior which is continuous, not situational. Complex may be the most suiting because it refers to the highest constancy, whereas trauma or condition could also equally refer to that but there may or may not be some situational element, and they have a slightly derogatory ring to them, especially trauma. Hence, I chose complex in reference to the ‘Century of Humiliation’s’ influence on China’s state behavior.

For an in-depth account of legitimation in imperial China, see Chan (1984).

Besides this term, this period is sometimes referred to as ‘Century of National Humiliation,’ or ‘(One) Hundred Years of (National) Humiliation,’ too. See, for example, Wang (2012).

For more information about how China’s victim mentality came into existence and was molded by its leadership, see, for example, Callahan (2004), Gries et al. (2009), He (2007), Wang (2008, 2012).

For more information on how politics shaped this process, see, for example, Wang (2016).

Especially what concerns Japan, some Chinese leaders have had favorable—or at least not antagonistic—views of Japan during some time periods. At times, Japan was seen as an East Asian fraternal nation with which China should cooperate. Sun Yat-sen held this view, but also Mao Zedong initially. Still, nowadays the relationship with Japan is mostly antagonistic, particularly what concerns politics and societal relations.