11. The United States of America—Disruptive Governments, Social Movements and Technocrats in Transformation Processes Towards Sustainability

On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, which was followed by a formal communication to the United Nations of its intent to withdraw. This announcement aimed to fulfil an electoral promise of President Trump to eliminate ‘burdensome’ regulations on the energy industry in the country and to revive the coal industry, which he concretized in his ‘America First Energy Plan.’ Originally, the United States would have had to implement both the Clean Power Plan and the Climate Action Plan, which was forged by the administration of President Obama, in order for the United States to meet its 2025 Paris Agreement commitment or NDC, which means a reduction of emissions by 26–28 percent below 2005 levels including Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). With pre-Trump climate policies still in place, including the Clean Power Plan, this would only reduce emissions to 10 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 (Climate Action Tracker 2017c). With the suspension of the Clean Power Plan, emissions in 2025 are likely to be higher, at 7 percent below 2005 levels. Although, legally, the NDC remains in place as it is until at least 2019, the Trump administration has already stopped the implementation of the NDC at the federal level (Climate Action Tracker 2017c).

The ‘America first’ ideology of President Trump can also be translated as the withdrawal of the United States from its leadership role in global politics as it pursues national protectionism and isolationism (see Hardt & Mezzada 2016). This withdrawal can be used as leverage to demand more favorable terms, for example, in global trade. President Trump’s USD 10 billion reduction of spending on diplomacy, foreign assistance, and contributions to international organizations, including 50 percent of US contribution to the World Bank’s International Development Association, is seen as negatively affecting anti-poverty programs in (mostly) developing countries (see Simmons 2017; U.S. Department of State 2017; Morello 2017).

Immediately after the election, the Trump administration started to review all environmental and energy policies made not only during the term of former President Obama, but also during earlier terms. Energy security through fossil fuel production expects to gain political momentum as energy production security has been ‘coupled’ with job security, which has been highlighted as a major priority of the government. The Administration’s ‘America First Energy Plan’ and the goal of U.S. ‘Energy Dominance’ are perceived as an encouragement of increased domestic production, reflected in the increased number of rig counts and drilling permit applications in the first months of 2017 (Blackmon 2017). The ‘America First Energy Plan’ does not mention renewable energy at all, which confirms the government’s focus on fossil fuels. On several different occasions, President Trump complained about how expensive renewable energies are and about the subsidies renewable energy companies are receiving (Associated Press 2017). In a speech in the last week of June 2017, President Trump declared that this is the ‘golden era’ of U.S. energy, through which dominance will be asserted through the country’s increased natural gas, coal, and petroleum exports, and identifying Eastern Europe and Asia as important markets for U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports (DiChristopher 2017).

In order to implement these plans, the Trump administration is reviewing linkages between energy production and environmental protection, where environmental protection measures that ‘constrain’ these plans are lifted. For example, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke ordered a review of a conservation plan forged by the Obama administration to protect the greater sage grouse. The review aimed to determine if the plan interfered with the Trump administration’s efforts to increase energy production on federal lands (Greshko et al. 2017). In addition, President Trump signed an executive order that ordered a review of bans on offshore oil and gas drillings in parts of the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, as well as a five-year oil leasing roadmap that excluded Alaska’s Beaufort and Chukcho Seas. Moreover, the executive order also halts the designation or expansion of National Marine Sanctuaries, unless the move includes an Interior Department estimate of the area’s ‘energy or mineral resource potential’ (Greshko et al. 2017).

Expedited by the signing of the presidential memoranda to revive both the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines on January 24, 2017, the U.S. State Department, on March 24, 2017, granted Transcanada Corporation a permit for the construction of the 1,200-mile (1,931-kilometer) Keystone XL pipeline, which will connect oil sands from Alberta, Canada to refineries in Texas (Mufson & Eilperin 2017; Greshko et al. 2017). This project is the fourth phase of the Keystone Pipeline System that was rejected by then President Obama due to environmental concerns and conflicts with Native American communities.

In addition to energy production based on an inclination towards coal, the Trump administration has announced the promotion of fossil fuels, particularly in the transport sector. President Trump appointed ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State. Furthermore, on March 25, 2017, EPA administrator Scott Pruitt and U.S. Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao initiated the reconsideration of the emissions requirements for vehicles with model years between 2022 and 2025 by pursuing the rollback of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which aim to improve cars’ fuel economy.

Meredith Rutland Bauer (2016) suggests that the current Trump protests could be the start of a new civil rights era. The election of President Trump has led to the enhanced capacities of social movements as donations and membership have risen by rates that were unimaginable before the 2016 elections (see above). Civil liberties and rights movements have expanded their demands by integrating other related issues. For example, defending indigenous rights now coincides with demands to adequately address the effects of climate change and of the fossil fuel-driven industry projects in indigenous communities. Racial justice now includes components of gender, sexuality, job security, and local community development, which are important pillars of sustainable development as summarized by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2011 Occupy movement included racial justice as a central component of its issues, as it is related to social inequality. In addition, as many groups see climate change as one of the major causes of migration from Mexico, empathy with illegal and undocumented Mexican migrants is easier to communicate (see Fox & Hernandez 1992; Rong 2010; Berrueta et al. 2015).

With the expected reduction of federal funding for sustainability projects, the concept of ‘smart cities’, which has thrived in the past several years, will require a reconfiguration of local governance, because, particularly in the United States, the idea of ‘smart cities’ has been connoted with huge involvement from the federal government through funding (see Shelton & Clark 2016). Apart from the likely withdrawal of the Trump administration from promoting smart cities, revisiting the concept of smart cities calls for new questions on governance. Changes in federal policies will require new forms of partnerships, particularly between local governments and non-profits, to plan and deploy technologies linked to smart cities.

Subsequently, as Jeffrey Berry and Kent Portney (2014) have identified, most non-profits are local in nature, serving the interests of local communities or even mere neighborhoods. As such, non-profits are often more successful in influencing local policies than federal policies. Apart from the way in which non-profits are behaving after the election of President Trump, the roles of social movements in urban or communal political systems in the United States have already been changing in the past several years. One example of changes in urban politics is the increasing importance of the ‘politics of space’ (Berry & Portney 2014), which refers to how non-profits and other social movements are more able to interact with local policymakers.

A major reason for failure in or the limitation of the environmental agenda being able to reach the majority of the US population is attributed to the historical development of environmental movements, where environmental movements traditionally concentrate on what is most visible in national politics. After the election of President Trump, there has been a shift of centers of environmental activism, from the federal capital of Washington D.C. to cities and local communities. As discussed above, compared with environmental groups, non-profits have focused on local issues. With this shift in environmental advocacy, the interlinking of interests between different non-profits can be more successful. Particularly because some cities are now opting for a ‘stronger’ environmental profile, new partnerships between environmental groups and other non-profits are more likely to occur. As more ‘smart cities’ and ‘smart enclaves’ are emerging in the United States, climate mitigation in the context of a federal government under President Trump will most likely continue to evolve around the kind of urban economic development that is highly dependent on social movements, local businesses, and industry sectors. Cities in the United States have already assumed a leading role in designing and implementing innovative policies to achieve sustainability (Portney 2013).

One interesting factor that has further promoted the emergence of these smart cities is the change in the political ecology of most cities. As Berry and Portney (2014) have observed, major companies and corporations have migrated to the suburbs or moved their headquarters to major U.S. cities such as New York City to reflect a new global focus. The diminished role of corporations in local politics has benefited leaders and representatives of non-profits, including citywide civic organizations, social service agencies, environmental groups, and neighborhood associations, as local politicians are seeking more interactions not only to win elections, but also to address various issues through consultations.

Another important entry into climate mitigation in the absence of federal support in the private and business sector. Before the election of President Trump, US domestic climate policies focused on state policies and federal incentives such as subsidies for renewable energy. On the day President Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, the governors of California, New York and Washington announced the formation of the United States Climate Alliance, which is a coalition of states committed to meeting the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. After many months, this coalition has now incorporated 14 states and Puerto Rico, and it also includes several states with Republican governors (Rogers 2017).

While these federal states, which emit 21 percent of U.S. carbon emissions, cannot make a significant difference in terms of global emissions, this coalition can act as a bandwagon, where, as path dependence theory argues, it is more expensive for non-members not to join, especially for Republican states like Iowa and Texas, which have a large wind industry. If leaders of non-member states can ‘frame’ the issue as supporting renewable energy rather than mitigating climate change, the coalition can expect to gain more political support and bipartisan endorsement at the state level. However, as past U.S. climate policies have depended heavily on federal subsidies, new agencies are needed to compensate for the absence of these federal incentives for renewable energy. Nevertheless, as many proponents of the ‘free market’ would argue, government subsidies can inhibit innovation as they may, for example, send wrong signals to the market (Wallsten 2000; see Brodwin 2013)

In a report published by Apex Clean Energy and the GreenBiz Group (see Abraham 2017), a survey of 153 major public and private U.S. corporations concluded that 84 percent of these companies are still “actively pursuing or considering purchasing renewable energy over the next 5 to 10 years.” In addition, 43 percent of these companies intend to be more ambitious in their pursuit of renewable energy in the next two years. According to 87 percent of those actively pursuing renewable energy purchases, the election of President Trump had no impact on their decision, while 11 percent were more inclined to purchase renewable energy after the election. The major reason behind this preference is not political, but rather economical. Diversifying energy portfolios in terms of energy sources and geography through the inclusion of renewable energies is an important instrument against the rising and variable costs of fossil fuels. The surge of renewables is therefore something that will happen in a matter of time, because the tipping point that favors renewables may have already been passed.

Two scenarios will be analyzed when using the ideal types. The first scenario refers to the increased role of non-profit groups; as social movements overtake various competencies of the federal state. In this scenario, non-profit groups build de facto institutions, or ‘shadow bureaucracies’, that run various aspects of social life in the United States. For example, with the emergence of smart cities, local, non-profit groups are able to exert more influence on local policy-making. Through their increased relevance to local policy-making and policy implementation due to their purported technical expertise, non-profits are able to function as expert committees. This scenario will be analyzed through the technocratic policy model.

The second scenario refers to the increased role of profit-oriented groups following the withdrawal of federal state funding, for example, in research and development. As the federal state reduces its role in providing services, profit groups are given space to provide services such as in education, health, and in compliance with environmental protection rules, especially when such services can be linked with revenues. This scenario will be analyzed through the post-democratic policy model.

As discussed in Chapter 8 of this book, a (theoretical) technocratic policy model refers to a policy-making pathway where decision-making is initiated and executed solely or predominantly by expert committees. The technocratic model of governance often looks at Singapore as an example, where expert, bureaucratic committees use electoral feedback, big data, and other kinds of analytical tools to determine policies that reflect, in the long-term, the utilitarian interests of the society (Khanna 2017). The decisive element of the technocratic policy model is an actor finding legitimacy for its governing authority through its technical expertise.

As the following figure illustrates, in a technocratic policy model, the union of the policy and polity stream is the typical arrangement between policy-makers and the institutions managing or guiding the implementation of policies. The politics stream that reflects the low or limited participation of non-profits can contribute only indirectly to streams-alignment. Following streams alignment, further decisions are made in closed-door, expert committees, where non-profits will most likely assume an adversarial stance against these decisions (Fig. 11.1).

Comparing this theoretical model with the United States, non-profits can transform or at least ‘package’ themselves as the policy stream. The policy stream does not need to be represented solely by a government. When the government decides to abandon its leadership of the transformation process, others will emerge as viable alternatives. With the low-carbon transformation process already on its way, the process cannot be stopped, due to newly-established critical junctures and lock-ins as well as potential pay-offs. Due to the convergence of norms and values as well as surpassing of the tipping point, not even a disruptive federal government can deter other ‘change agents’. The process is accompanied by a shift in policy-making towards the politics stream, and to a significant extent, to local policy-makers who are more likely to be pragmatic in their approaches. As the U.S. federal state increasingly withdraws from its various competencies in environmental protection and sustainable urban development, more social groups (both profit-oriented and non-profit), come into the picture, which will most likely legitimize their involvement through their technical expertise, forming de facto ‘expert committees’ that define technocratic policy models. Non-profits can determine and institutionalize various norms and standards that can serve as benchmarks of the low-carbon transformation process.

In the United States, due to the withdrawal of federal state institutions and the expected disruptive behavior of federal government agencies, expert-social groups will depend on norms and standards to build de facto polities or bureaucracies that will guide the transformation process. As the theoretical model suggests, technocratic policy pathways will be highly dependent on institutions, which implies a huge bureaucratic system. Nevertheless, with non-profits able and more willing to influence local electoral processes, bureaucracies that matter in terms of the transformation process, although more likely to be fragmented and dispersed, will still manage to provide the functions required of polities, such as verification and compliance. With non-profits forming verification measures, particularly when due to lock-ins, noncompliance will bring more competitive disadvantages and costs, and social and economic actors will still commit.

The theoretical technocratic policy model assumes a high level of social capital in the short term as the public will tend to tolerate a lack of inclusiveness and transparency for the sake of technical efficiency. Nevertheless, in the case of the United States, the lack of inclusiveness and transparency are major reasons for the emergence of the disruptive leadership. Therefore, non-profits need to constitute more inclusive bargaining interactions, especially at the local level.

A post-democratic policy model refers to a policy pathway that is democratic in nature but has some features that are typical of pre-democratic political systems. The theoretical model highlights the important role of the finance, business and industry sectors in policy-making, not only in regard to how they are able to lobby their interests, often at the cost of other social actors, but also how the space has become conducive to the lobbying of these sectors, as market-based principles & logic have been instilled in the narratives that legitimize political actions. When arguing that not going against the interests of the business and industry sectors will lead to the unacceptable loss of jobs or the loss of economic competitiveness of a country, policy-makers are forced to accept their demands.

Comparing the post-democratic policy model to the United States, some elements of the US political system can confirm the post-democratic tendencies of the country. The current withdrawal of the federal state in order to pursue low-carbon, sustainable transformation reinvigorates the current devolution of state functions to private actors, particularly because privatization tends to be equated with rationalization and efficiency. With the various U.S. corporations still committing themselves to climate and environmental protection, monetary and economic values are increasingly defining the instruments of climate and environmental protection. As discussed earlier, one major entry point to climate mitigation has been identified through urban development (smart cities), which may further reproduce inequality among regions and cities as well as reinforce further socio-spatial fragmentation in the country.

As the following figure demonstrates, in a post-democratic policy model, business and industry actors can access the policy stream, either through direct influences or through the norms and standards being followed by policy-makers. The polity and the politics streams can contribute to the streams alignment. Nevertheless, with the state ceasing to monopolize authority and welfare services, as it has privatized most of its functions, the state will be most likely concentrating its activities on bureaucracy (the polity stream). Here, the state becomes predominantly a security provider (Fig. 11.2).

Due to the privatization of most of public services of the state, the state will most likely have low autonomy and low capacity. This means that the state will depend highly on other actors when implementing policies. Because it merely functions as a regulatory body, should the government initiate and pursue more ambitious targets it will need more assistance and collaboration from other actors. The success of government-led programs will be highly dependent on how the economic actors will think they will profit from these programs. In addition, the tolerable-window approach will be highly de-politicized and commercialized, which will most likely lead to the dominance of the financial over the social aspects of public life. Maximizing benefits with the lowest possible costs will frame political actions, leading to non-monetary values being unable to compete against monetary values in terms of political decision-making.

Moreover, bargaining interactions follow the market-driven and market-defined framework for assessing the feasibility of policies. With the market logic defining the criteria for performance efficiency, the output orientation of legitimacy becomes the major driver of state actions. In a post-democratic policy model, as Hubertus Buchstein (in Crouch 2008) identifies, the re-definition of democracy through output-legitimacy opens the possibility of finding ‘functional equivalents’ to participatory legitimization, paving the way for dictatorial, aristocratic and technocratic policy models to be classified as democratic.

The imminent loss of federal funding for various environmental protection projects could create a vacuum, which will most likely be filled by the private sector, including profit-oriented and non-profit groups. The withdrawal of federal funding will further increase the privatization of knowledge and expertise in the country. As scientific communities become increasingly independent from government agencies, scientific knowledge can be further privatized, which can be beneficial on the meta-level, as scientists can maintain independence from political actors. Nevertheless, as is happening in the United States, the further privatization of this generation of scientific knowledge and technical expertise will be most likely accompanied by the federal government’s increased resignation from various areas of societal life, which has been taken significantly into private hands (e.g., Ivy League universities). As such, the state will lose more of its competencies, which will be further assumed by profit-oriented and non-profit actors. This privatization of knowledge generation in the United States is not new, as the share of basic research funding provided by the federal government has been slipping in recent years, from around 70 percent in the 1960s and 1970s to an estimated 44 percent in 2015 (Science News 2017). In terms of non-profit groups that tend to pursue advocacy, some experts argue that government funding actually constrains advocacy (see O’Connell 1994; Reinelt 1994). For example, Steven Smith and Michael Lipsky (1993) argue that non-profits that are dependent on government funds are less likely to engage in advocacy for fear of alienating government funders, driving away possible sources of new funding, or reducing the flexibility of funding.

Dispersed decision-making and factional politics in post-democratic policy models is complemented by a centralized concentration of power in the inner ellipsis of decision-makers, further reinforcing transparency deficits. The privatization of several state functions and the market-orientation of the remaining state policies will most likely lead to further shifts in power towards smaller membership of the elite, who are often referred to as the ‘millionaires from Martha’s Vineyard.’ As the US federal government increasingly withdraws from various services, combined with increasing political opposition from within the Republican Party, President Trump will most likely resort to executive orders. As observed by Chris Cillizza and Sam Petulla (2017), President Trump is set to sign more executive orders than any other president in the last 50 years. With 49 executive orders already signed between assuming office in January 2017 and October 13, 2017, President Trump may resort to further executive orders after the possible loss of Republican control of the legislative branch, further limiting bargaining interactions in the United States. With this, decisions and policies will be less likely the results of bargaining and persuasion involving all relevant stakeholders.