2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Time-consistency and Dictator Punishment: Discretion Rather than Rules?
verfasst von : Shaun Larcom, Mare Sarr, Tim Willems
Erschienen in: Contemporary Issues in Development Economics
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
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Following Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) seminal work exhorting the use of rules over discretion, many governments responded by attempting to bind policy makers who are susceptible to time-inconsistency. In subsequent decades, much of the policy discussion and analysis has been concentrated on monetary policy (cf. the extensive literature following Barro and Gordon (1983)). However, there have been other fields where governments have increased their commitment to remain time-consistent. One such area is international justice and the treatment of dictators and warlords who have committed crimes under international law. There, commitment has been increased through the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. The purpose of the ICC is to hold high ranking officials (including heads of state) accountable for acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Indeed, an explicit aim of the Rome Statute (the treaty that established the ICC) is to “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.