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Erschienen in:

2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Topology and Social Choice

verfasst von : Norman Schofield

Erschienen in: Mathematical Methods in Economics and Social Choice

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

In this chapter we apply earlier results to the study of social choice and modelling elections. In Chap. 3 we showed the Nakamura Theorem. that a social choice could be guaranteed as long as the dimension of the space did not exceed k(σ)=2. We now consider what can happen in dimension above k(σ)=1. We then go on to consider “probabilistic” social choice, where there is some uncertainty over voters’ preferences, by constructing an empirical model of the 2008 U.S. presidential election.

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Titel: Topology and Social Choice
verfasst von: Norman Schofield
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Mathematical Methods in Economics and Social Choice
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-39817-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-39818-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2014
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39818-6_6

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